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ABSTRACT 
This research study analyses a conceptual model investigating the relationship between 
the level of health insurer product innovation and entrepreneurial orientation (EO); the 
relationship between the level of health insurer product innovation and external 
collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service providers. This study also 
analyses whether low presence of perceived strategic regulatory factors, necessary for 
encouraging health insurer product innovation in the private healthcare industry in South 
Africa, weakens the relationship between the level of new health insurer product innovation 
and EO, as well as the relationship between the level of new health insurer product 
innovation and external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers. 
The research study, focusing on major actors in both the demand and supply side 
structures of the private healthcare value chain, found that organisational-level EO is a very 
strong predictor of health insurer product innovation in the South African private healthcare 
industry. The research study also found that external collaboration between health insurers 
and healthcare service providers is a weak predictor of health insurer product innovation. 
An important finding of this study was that the low presence of strategic regulatory factors 
(which are necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation in the South 
African private healthcare industry) means that the relationship between health insurer 
product innovation and EO is not moderated, and neither is the relationship between health 
insurer product innovation and external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers.  
These findings contribute to the South African private healthcare industry in terms of 
innovation, regulation, external collaboration and entrepreneurial orientation literature and 
studies. 
 
iii 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Milton Alfred Streak, declare that this research report is my own work except as 
indicated in the references and acknowledgements. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Management specialising in Entrepreneurship and 
New Venture Creation in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not 
been submitted before for any degree or examination in this or any other university. 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Milton Alfred Streak 
 
Signed at …………………………………………………… 
 
On the …………………………….. day of ………………………… 2012 
 
 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research study has added new insights to my understanding of the workings and the 
complex nature of the demand and supply side structures of the private healthcare industry 
in South Africa. It has also added to my own personal growth. I would like to thank the 
following people for their assistance and support throughout this rewarding, yet challenging 
process: 
To my wife, for her extraordinary patience and support, making this a very worthwhile 
exercise. 
To my supervisor, Prof. Boris Urban, for his encouragement, guidance and support through 
every stage of my research study. 
To Mrs Merle Werbeloff, for her dedication, assistance, support and continuous teaching 
throughout my extensive data analysis and data interpretation exercises.  
To Neil Lilford and his management team at Greenfields Institute of Business for 
administering the research survey. 
To the Board of the Discovery Health Medical Scheme for their support and 
encouragement. 
To my work colleagues for their support and assistance. 
To the medical scheme CEOs/Principal Officers for agreeing to participate in the study. 
To the various medical scheme administrators for agreeing to participate in the study. 
To the hospital groups for agreeing to participate in the study. 
To the general practitioner representative associations and the specialist representative 
associations for participating in the study.  
Finally, I would also like to thank all my friends and fellow students for their support and 
encouragement. 
 
 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................... II 
DECLARATION ............................................................................. III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................. IV 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................ VIII 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................... XI 
CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION ................................................... 14 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY ........................................................................... 14 
1.2 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY ........................................................................... 14 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................. 17 
1.3.1 MAIN PROBLEM .................................................................................................... 17 
1.3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES ............................................................ 18 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .................................................................... 23 
1.5 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................... 23 
1.6 DEFINITION OF TERMS .............................................................................. 25 
1.7 ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................... 26 
CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................ 28 
2.1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 28 
2.2. ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION (EO) ..................................................... 33 
2.3. EXTERNAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN HEALTH INSURERS AND HEALTHCARE SERVICE 
PROVIDERS ............................................................................................. 37 
2.4. REGULATION ........................................................................................... 45 
2.5. HEALTH INSURER PRODUCT INNOVATION ................................................... 53 
2.6. CONCLUSION OF LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................... 55 
CHAPTER 3:   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................. 59 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 59 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................ 60 
3.3 POPULATION AND SAMPLE ..................................................................... 61 
3.3.1 POPULATION ........................................................................................................ 61 
3.3.2 SAMPLE AND SAMPLING METHOD ........................................................................... 62 
3.3.3 EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF THE STUDY ........................................................................ 65 
 
vi 
3.4 THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT ................................................................ 66 
3.4.1 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT ......................................................... 66 
3.4.2 CONTROL FOR COMMON METHOD BIAS ................................................................. 68 
3.5 PROCEDURE FOR DATA COLLECTION ..................................................... 70 
3.6 ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL: STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING (SEM) 71 
3.7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ....................................................................... 72 
3.8 EVALUATION OF THE MODEL: MEASUREMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF SCALES 72 
3.8.1 RELIABILITY OF SCALES ........................................................................................ 73 
3.8.2 VALIDITY OF THE SCALES OF THE MODEL ................................................................ 74 
3.8.3 TESTING FACTOR STRUCTURE VIA CFA ................................................................. 76 
3.8.4 TESTS OF MEASUREMENT VARIABLES .................................................................... 79 
3.8.5 COMPARISON OF THE SUBGROUPS ON THE MEASUREMENT VARIABLES .................... 80 
3.9 EVALUATION OF THE MODEL: STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE MODEL .... 80 
3.10 CHAPTER CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 84 
CHAPTER 4:   PRESENTATION OF RESULTS ........................... 86 
4.1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................... 86 
4.1.1 RELIABILITY ............................................................................................. 86 
4.1.2 VALIDITY ................................................................................................. 86 
4.1.3 NORMALITY ASSUMPTIONS........................................................................ 88 
4.1.4 GROUP COMPARABILITY ............................................................................ 88 
4.1.5 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR HYPOTHESIS TESTING ...................................... 88 
4.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION .............................................................................. 89 
4.3  RELIABILITY OF THE THEORETICALLY DERIVED SCALES OF THE MODEL ........ 95 
4.4 VALIDITY OF THE SCALES .......................................................................... 97 
4.5 EVALUATION OF THE MODEL STRUCTURE VIA REGRESSION ANALYSIS .......... 131 
4.6 SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS .................................................................... 159 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 163 
5.1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................... 163 
5.2 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ....................................................................... 163 
5.2.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS .................................................................................... 163 
5.2.2 EVALUATION OF THE MODEL ............................................................................... 164 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY .................................................................. 172 
5.3.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY DEVELOPMENT .......................................................... 174 
5.3.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVES ...................................................... 175 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................... 176 
 
vii 
REFERENCES ............................................................................ 178 
APPENDIX A .............................................................................. 186 
APPENDIX B .............................................................................. 202 
APPENDIX C .............................................................................. 204 
APPENDIX D .............................................................................. 205 
APPENDIX E .............................................................................. 208 
APPENDIX F ............................................................................... 209 
APPENDIX G .............................................................................. 210 
APPENDIX H .............................................................................. 211 
APPENDIX I ................................................................................ 212 
 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Profile of respondents ............................................................................................64 
Table 2: Distribution of Industry sector of respondents (n=139) ..........................................89 
Table 3: Organisational characteristics by industry sector ...................................................91 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Organisational Competitive Capability scores ..................93 
Table 5– Industry sector by Innovation input .......................................................................95 
Table 6 – Reliabilities of theoretically derived scales ...........................................................96 
Table 7 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis ................................................................97 
Table 8 – Factor loadings for EO items ...............................................................................98 
Table 9 – CFA Model estimates for EO ...............................................................................99 
Table 10 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis ............................................................100 
Table 11 – Factor loadings for External Collaboration items .............................................101 
Table 12 - CFA Model estimates using theory and data outputs for External Collaboration
 ..........................................................................................................................................102 
Table 13 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis ............................................................104 
Table 14 - Factor loadings for Regulation items ................................................................105 
Table 15 - CFA Model estimates for Regulation ................................................................106 
Table 16 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis ............................................................107 
Table 17 – Factor loadings for health insurer product innovation items .........................108 
Table 18 - CFA Model estimates using theoretically derived scales and empirically derived 
scales for health insurer product innovation ......................................................................109 
 
ix 
Table 19 – Model estimates second order CFA .................................................................111 
Table 20 – Model fit results ................................................................................................112 
Table 21 – 1-way ANOVA comparisons of clusters on clustering variables and dependent 
variable measures .............................................................................................................116 
Table 22 – Reliabilities of the empirically based scales .....................................................118 
Table 23 – Descriptive statistics of theoretically and empirically derived scales ................119 
Table 24 – Comparison of scale means of HIs (n=34) and HIAs (n=83) ...........................126 
Table 25 - Intercorrelation matrices of measurement variables for model testing of total 
group and industry sectors variables .................................................................................128 
Table 26 – Health insurers (HIs) ........................................................................................129 
Table 27 – Health insurer administrators - HIAs ................................................................129 
Table 28 – Healthcare service providers ...........................................................................129 
Table 29 - Significance levels (p) of comparisons of correlations between subgroups – HIAs 
vs. HIs................................................................................................................................130 
Table 30 - Significance levels (p) of comparisons of correlations between subgroups – 
Providers vs. HIs ...............................................................................................................130 
Table 31 - Significance levels (p) of comparisons of correlations between subgroups – 
Providers vs. HIAs .............................................................................................................130 
Table 32 – Research hypotheses ......................................................................................132 
Table 33 – Correlations between EO constructs and health insurer product innovation 
constructs ..........................................................................................................................136 
Table 34 - Correlations between innovation generation and organisational competitiveness 
(DV‘s) and External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and External Collaboration (RR) ................136 
Table 35 – Hypothesis 3a ..................................................................................................143 
 
x 
Table 36 – Hypothesis 3a (excluding healthcare service providers) ..................................144 
Table 37 – Hypothesis 3b ..................................................................................................145 
Table 38 – Hypothesis 3b (excluding healthcare service providers) ..................................146 
Table 39 – Hypothesis 4a ..................................................................................................147 
Table 40 – Hypothesis 4b ..................................................................................................148 
Table 41 – Hypothesis 4c ..................................................................................................149 
Table 42 – Hypothesis 4d ..................................................................................................150 
Table 43 – Hypothesis 5a ..................................................................................................151 
Table 44 – Hypothesis 5a (excluding healthcare service providers) ..................................152 
Table 45 – Hypothesis 5b ..................................................................................................153 
Table 46 – Hypothesis 5b (excluding healthcare service providers) ..................................154 
Table 47 – Hypothesis 6a ..................................................................................................155 
Table 48 – Hypothesis 6b ..................................................................................................156 
Table 49 – Hypothesis 6c ..................................................................................................157 
Table 50 – Hypothesis 6d ..................................................................................................158 
Table 51 – Summary of results of the hypothesis tests .....................................................161 
 
 
 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 - Consolidation amongst open medical schemes (2005-2010), Source: Council for 
Medical Schemes (2010/11:156) .........................................................................................16 
Figure 2 - Fitting Corporate Entrepreneurship into Strategic Management, Source: Morris et 
al. (2008:47) ........................................................................................................................20 
Figure 3 – Conceptual Research Model, Source: (Own source) ..........................................21 
Figure 4 - The healthcare value chain, Source: Adapted from Stremersch (2008); 
Stremersch and Van Dyck (2008); adapted from Burns (2005) ...........................................25 
Figure 5 - The health care value chain, Source: Adapted from Stremersch (2008); 
Stremersch and Van Dyck (2008), adapted from Burns (2005) ...........................................29 
Figure 6 – Performance vs. cost rankings of global health systems, Source: Monitor Group, 
L.P. (2008) ...........................................................................................................................32 
Figure 7 – Four types of cooperation tools, source: Christensen et al. (2009:403) ..............42 
Figure 8 - Issues in healthcare reform, Source: Porter and Teisberg (2006:327) ................48 
Figure 9 – Innovation as a linear process, Source: Morris et al.  (2008:338) .......................53 
Figure 10 - Conceptual Research Model, Source: (Own source) ........................................81 
Figure 11–Distribution of respondents by industry sector and subsector (n=139) ...............89 
Figure 12 – Firm age ...........................................................................................................91 
Figure 13 – Firm size (number of permanent employees) ...................................................92 
Figure 14 – Firm size (membership/patient base) ...............................................................92 
Figure 15: Distribution of Organisational Competitive Capability scores .............................94 
Figure 16: Distribution of Innovation input levels by industry sector ....................................95 
 
xii 
Figure 17 – Standard CFA analysis model for EO, Source: (Own source) ........................100 
Figure 18 - Standard CFA analysis model for External Collaboration, Source: (Own source)
 ..........................................................................................................................................103 
Figure 19 – Standard CFA analysis model for Regulation, Source: (Own source) ............106 
Figure 20 – Standard CFA analysis model for Health Insurer Product Innovation, Source: 
(Own source) ....................................................................................................................109 
Figure 21 – Organisational competitiveness vs. Organisational competitive capacity .......114 
Figure 22 – Clusters based on innovation input variables .................................................117 
Figure 23 - Distribution of EO scores .................................................................................121 
Figure 24- Distribution of External Collaboration scores (T,RS,RI) ....................................121 
Figure 25 – Distribution of External Collaboration (Relationship Restructure) scores before 
transformation ....................................................................................................................122 
Figure 26 – Distribution of External Collaboration (Relationship Restructure) scores after 
transformation (cube transformation) .................................................................................122 
Figure 27 - Distribution of Regulation scores .....................................................................123 
Figure 28 - Distribution of EO*Regulation (interaction term) scores ..................................123 
Figure 29 - Distribution of External Collaboration (T,RS,RI)*Regulation scores ................124 
Figure 30 – Distribution of External Collaboration (RR)*Regulation scores .......................124 
Figure 31 - Distribution of Innovation Generation scores ...................................................125 
Figure 32 – Distribution of organisational competitiveness scores ....................................125 
Figure 33 – Comparison of means between health insurers/health insurer administrators 
and healthcare service providers .......................................................................................127 
Figure 34 – Hypothesis 1a – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) .................................................................................................................134 
 
xiii 
Figure 35 – Hypothesis 1b – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) ........................................................................................135 
Figure 36 – Hypothesis 2a – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. external collaboration 
(T, RS, RI) .........................................................................................................................137 
Figure 37 – Hypothesis 2b – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. external 
collaboration (T, RS, RI) ....................................................................................................138 
Figure 38 – Hypothesis 2c – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. external collaboration 
(RR) ...................................................................................................................................139 
Figure 39 – Hypothesis 2c – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. (cube transformation) 
external collaboration (RR) ................................................................................................140 
Figure 40 – Hypothesis 2d – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. external 
collaboration (RR) ..............................................................................................................141 
Figure 41 – Hypothesis 2d – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. (cube 
transformation) external collaboration (RR) .......................................................................142 
 
 
 
14 
 
CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this research study is to investigate the relationship between the level of 
health insurer product innovation and entrepreneurial orientation (EO); the relationship 
between the level of health insurer product innovation and external collaboration between 
health insurers and healthcare service providers and; whether the low presence of 
perceived strategic regulatory factors, necessary for  encouraging health insurer product 
innovation in the private healthcare industry in South Africa, weakens the relationship 
between the level of new health insurer product innovation and EO, as well as the 
relationship between the level of new health insurer innovation and external collaboration 
between health insurers and healthcare service providers. 
1.2 Context of the study 
The private healthcare industry in South Africa is complex and requires expertise and 
innovative solutions to ensure the financial sustainability of private health insurers and the 
industry as a whole.  The private healthcare insurance market in South African is voluntary 
and covers a small percentage of the population due to cost, access and healthcare 
delivery challenges.  The South African private healthcare insurance market will be used as 
a proxy to investigate the level of private health insurer product innovation. This is based on 
the performance versus cost ratio results of health systems in the world, as analysed by 
Monitor Group, L.P. (2008). 
The private healthcare insurance market in South Africa is voluntary and accounts for 60% 
of total healthcare expenditure, but it only serves 16% of the South African population with 
higher incomes (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2011; Council for Medical 
Schemes 2010/11). There are approximately five-million formally employed uninsured 
people in South Africa (McLeod and Grobler 2008) and it is essential that they enter the 
private healthcare insurance market to ensure growth and future sustainability of the private 
healthcare industry.  
15 
 
The vehicles for private health insurance in South Africa are medical schemes (health 
insurers) and they are governed by the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998. According to the 
Centre for Development and Enterprise (2011) the Medical Schemes Act has been praised 
for good intentions and salutary effects in this regard, but has also been criticised for 
unintended consequences, resulting from what is included and what has been omitted. The 
Act exemplifies problems of over- and under-regulation; one key problem is community 
rating without mandatory participation of the formally employed uninsured population 
(Centre for Development and Enterprise 2011).  
Medical Schemes are regulated by the Council for Medical Schemes, and the private 
healthcare industry has been subjected to increased regulatory intervention since 2000.  
Health insurers (medical schemes) in South Africa face many challenges to ensure they 
provide sustainable, quality and affordable healthcare cover to the populations they insure. 
According to the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2011), the average cost of 
belonging to a private health insurer has increased fivefold in real terms since 1980.  
According to the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2011), the relative number of 
dependents on medical insurance in South Africa has declined, especially in open health 
insurers and that this may be evidence of the impact of reduced affordability, especially 
since it occurred against the backdrop of overall GDP growth and an increasing population.  
According to the Discovery Health Medical Scheme (2010), there are a number of key 
strategic issues facing the South African private healthcare industry: 
1. Balancing the needs of all stakeholders in the healthcare value chain; 
2. Managing the complexities of a heavily-regulated private healthcare funding 
system based on cross-subsidisation principles; 
3. Finding sustainable ways of funding new medical technologies; 
4. Managing health insurer cost drivers effectively; 
5. The impact of the proposed National Health Insurance Plan on private health 
insurers; 
6. The extension of private healthcare cover to a broader base of the formally 
employed population in order to grow the private healthcare market. 
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The challenges of managing a complex healthcare environment have led to significant 
industry consolidation, both in the number of health insurers and health insurer 
administrators operating in the private healthcare industry in South Africa.  Over the past 10 
years, 60 health insurers have closed or merged with other health insurers (Council for 
Medical Schemes 2010/11). Figure 1 indicates the reduction in the number of open medical 
schemes (open health insurers) during the last five years alone. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Consolidation amongst open medical schemes (2005-2010), Source: 
Council for Medical Schemes (2010/11:156) 
In addition, the cost pressures have led to continued financial underperformance of health 
insurers evidenced from a decreased industry solvency trend since 2005 (Council for 
Medical Schemes 2010/11).  This trend of health insurer consolidation is still continuing and 
is predicted to continue for the foreseeable future. According to the Council for Medical 
Schemes (2010/11), in contrast to the decrease in the number of registered health insurers, 
the average number of benefit options in open health insurers increased from 5.0 in 2002 to 
6.1 in 2010 and for restricted membership health insurers from 1.8 in 2002 to 2.1 in 2010. 
According to the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2011) incentives should be 
developed for the private sector to innovate more on the supply side of healthcare delivery. 
In addition, increased competition in private healthcare will put pressure on prices and 
encourage innovation in low-cost delivery structures.  
This research study builds on the existing Domain Framework by Guth and Ginsberg (1990) 
which integrates corporate entrepreneurship into the strategic management of a company 
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(Morris, Kuratko and Covin 2008).  Innovation in the entire healthcare value chain is 
required to drive sound healthcare reform ensuring sustainable, cost-effective quality 
healthcare delivery in the private healthcare industry.  This research study focused on the 
demand (financing) and supply side (healthcare delivery) structures of the healthcare value 
chain, incorporating health insurers, health insurer administrators and healthcare service 
providers.  According to Porter and Teisberg (2006), health insurer product innovation 
focusing on positive sum competition on results plays a critical role in aligning incentives 
between all stakeholders in the healthcare value chain. External collaboration between 
health insurers/health insurer administrators and healthcare service providers, focusing on 
innovation and building systems that both promote health and treat illness, are essential to 
create future sustainable healthcare delivery systems (Mintzberg 2011).  
The objective of the research study was to investigate the relationship between the level of 
health insurer product innovation and entrepreneurial orientation (EO); the relationship 
between the level of health insurer product innovation and external collaboration between 
health insurers and healthcare service providers and; whether low presence of perceived 
strategic regulatory factors, necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation in 
the private healthcare industry of South Africa, weakens the relationship between the level 
of new health insurer product innovation and EO as well as the relationship between the 
level of new health insurer innovation an external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers. 
1.3 Problem statement 
1.3.1 Main problem 
In the context of healthcare inequalities and a struggling and underfunded public healthcare 
system in South Africa, the South African private healthcare industry is viewed as a national 
asset.  However, the South African private health insurance industry is a complex and 
heavily-regulated industry, with minimal growth in total lives covered, spiralling healthcare 
costs and coverage of only 16% of the South African population. There are approximately 
five-million formally employed uninsured people in South Africa and in order to grow and 
sustain the private healthcare industry, and lighten the population load of formally employed 
18 
 
uninsured people on public healthcare delivery systems, the private healthcare industry 
needs new, attractive/innovative health insurer products/plans.  This could align the 
incentives of stakeholders (demand and supply side structures) in the private healthcare 
value chain, and thus could create the necessary access to private healthcare cover for the 
uninsured. 
1.3.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As entrepreneurial orientation (EO) (innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking) is a 
traditional determinant of product innovation, it is important to investigate whether there is a 
relationship between the level of product innovation of health insurers and firm-level EO.  
For health insurer product innovation to occur, the level of external collaboration between 
health insurers and healthcare service providers is needed to foster supply side innovation 
in the healthcare value chain.  The private healthcare industry is heavily regulated and it is 
important to investigate whether low presence of strategic regulatory factors, necessary for 
encouraging health insurer product innovation in the private healthcare industry in South 
Africa, weakens the relationship between the level of new health insurer product innovation 
and EO, and weakens the relationship between  the level of new health insurer product 
innovation and external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers. 
The following research questions have been designed to test the respective relational 
hypotheses, which were developed on the basis of extensive theory and literature reviews 
as set out in chapter 2 of this report. 
Research question 1: 
Does firm entrepreneurial orientation (EO) promote new product innovation by health 
insurers? 
Research Hypothesis 1:  A positive correlation exists between the level of new product 
innovation by health insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO). 
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Research question 2: 
Does external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers promote new product innovation by health insurers? 
Research Hypothesis 2:  A positive correlation exists between the level of new product 
innovation by health insurers and external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers. 
Research question 3: 
Does the South African private healthcare regulatory environment impede new 
product innovation by health insurers? 
Research Hypothesis 3:  The relationship between the level of new product innovation by 
health insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is moderated by perceived strategic 
regulatory factors necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation, such that 
the relationship is weaker where these strategic regulatory factors have lower presence and 
stronger where they have higher presence. 
Research Hypothesis 4:  The relationship between the level of new product innovation by 
health insurers and external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers is moderated by perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for encouraging 
health insurer product innovation, such that this relationship is weaker where these 
strategic regulatory factors have lower presence and stronger where they have higher 
presence. 
Conceptual Research Model 
This research study builds on the existing Domain Framework by Guth and Ginsberg (1990) 
which integrates corporate entrepreneurship into the strategic management of a company 
(Morris et al. 2008).  In this model they argue that the domain of corporate entrepreneurship 
encompasses two types of processes; internal innovation, or venturing through the creation 
of new businesses within existing organisations, and strategic renewal, or the design of 
corporate initiatives that transform organisations (Morris et al. 2008). 
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Figure 2 - Fitting Corporate Entrepreneurship into Strategic Management, Source: 
Morris et al. (2008:47) 
This research study aimed to build on the innovation process of the Domain Framework by 
Guth and Ginsberg (1990). 
A conceptual model for this research study, highlighting the independent variables (EO, 
external collaboration and regulation) and the dependent variable (health insurer product 
innovation) is shown in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – Conceptual Research Model, Source: (Own source) 
The constructs that will be measured under each of the independent variables and 
dependent variable have been obtained through a review of existing academic literature.  
The regression equation of the model is: 
Level of Health Insurer Product innovation =   + β₁(EO) +β₂(External Collaboration) 
 + β₃(Regulation) + β₄(EO*Regulation) +β₅(External Collaboration*Regulation) 
  
Independent variable 1: Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) – measurement constructs: 
innovativeness (I), proactiveness (P), and risk-taking (R).  The EO instrument was based on 
the original Covin and Slevin (1989) scale, as modified by Kreiser, Marino and Weaver 
(2002). 
Independent variable 2:  External Collaboration – measurement constructs: 
trustworthiness (T), role specification (RS), relationship initiation (RI) and relationship 
restructure (RR).  The external collaboration measurement instrument was based on the 
instrument used by Zillich, Douchette, Carter and Kreiter (2005) to measure physical 
pharmacist collaboration (PPCI) from a physician perspective.  This instrument was 
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adapted to measure health insurer/health insurer administrator and healthcare service 
provider collaboration from both health insurer/health insurer administrator and healthcare 
service provider perspectives.  This instrument was further adapted to add another 
construct to measure the extent to which the health insurer and healthcare service provider 
relationship need to be restructured to facilitate the increase of positive sum competition in 
the healthcare value chain as per Porter and Teisberg (2006). 
Independent variable 3: Regulation – measurement constructs: increased competition 
(C), increased health insurance and access (HI & A), standards for coverage (SFC) and, 
structure of health care delivery (SHD). These measurement constructs are important from 
a strategic perspective in light of healthcare innovation and reform.  This section is not 
based on a previous instrument and the construction of the measurement instrument 
followed guidelines in terms of strategic regulatory factors encouraging healthcare 
innovation by Porter and Teisberg (2006) and Christensen, Grossman and Hwang (2009).  
The instrument was designed to measure the following items which are perceived to 
influence healthcare innovation from a strategic perspective: 
- Create competition in healthcare to reduce prices; 
- Health insurance improvement and access to private healthcare cover; 
- Standards for coverage; 
- Structure of health care delivery. 
Dependent variable: Health insurer product innovation – measurement constructs:  
Internal innovation input and innovation output.  Internal innovation input is measured by 
establishing the research and development intensity of organisations and innovation output 
is measured by the number of ―new to the organisation‖ and ―new to the healthcare 
industry‖ products introduced in the last three years. This section included measurement 
constructs for innovation output, which contextualised both innovation adoption (A) and 
innovation generation (G), as well as organisational competiveness (OC). This section of 
the questionnaire was adapted from previous measurement instruments used by Perez-
Luno, Wiklund and Cabrera (2011) and Rosenbusch, Brinkman and Bausch (2011) for 
internal innovation input and innovation output as well as the GEM Global report (2010) 
(Kelly, Bosma and Amoros 2010).  
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1.4 Significance of the study 
This research study fills a gap in that it aims to investigate why the private healthcare 
insurance market in South Africa is only covering 16% of the population (Council for 
Medical Schemes 2010/11) and is not growing, although the relative performance of the 
private healthcare system in South Africa is comparing favourably to international 
benchmarks (Monitor Group, L.P. 2008).  There are approximately five-million people 
(McLeod and Grobler 2008) in formal employment who are not covered by the private 
healthcare system in South Africa and it is imperative that this uncovered group access 
private healthcare insurance in order to ensure future sustainability of the private healthcare 
system.  This research study aims to investigate firm-level entrepreneurial orientation of 
health insurers/health insurer administrators and healthcare service providers in South 
Africa and its relationship to health insurer product innovation. The research study also 
aims to investigate to what extent health insurers and healthcare service providers 
collaborate in designing and implementing new innovative health insurer products.  
Furthermore, the study intends investigating the moderating effect of the presence of 
perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for encouraging health insurer product 
innovation in the private healthcare industry in South Africa. 
This research study has both theoretical and practical implications for actors in the South 
African private healthcare value chain and aims to add to entrepreneurship research in 
South Africa. It will provide guidance to health insurers, health insurer administrators, 
healthcare service providers and regulatory authorities on aspects which could influence 
and drive both healthcare product innovation and supply side innovation in the private 
healthcare industry in South Africa.  
1.5 Delimitations of the study 
The research study will only focus on health insurers, health insurer administrators and 
healthcare service providers as major actors in the South African private healthcare value 
chain, as well as the regulatory environment of health insurers.  The private healthcare 
market for the purpose of this study is defined as: 
 
24 
 
Demand side financing structures 
 Health Insurers – Registered health insurers in South Africa – health insurers include 
both restricted membership and open health insurers. 
 Health Insurer Administrators – Accredited private health insurer administrators in 
South Africa. 
 
Supply side delivery structures 
 Healthcare service providers, including major private hospital groups and physician 
societies representing the majority of medical specialists and general practitioners in 
South Africa. 
Regulatory environment 
The regulatory focus will include the existing regulatory environment of healthcare insurers. 
The focus of the research study is presented in terms of the healthcare value chain, 
adapted from Stremersch (2008), as shown in figure 4.  The red block indicates the section 
of the healthcare value chain which was the focus of the research study. 
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Figure 4 - The healthcare value chain, Source: Adapted from Stremersch (2008); 
Stremersch and Van Dyck (2008); adapted from Burns (2005) 
1.6 Definition of terms 
 HMOs – Health Maintenance Organisations 
 Closed health insurers/restricted membership health insurers -  a medical scheme, 
the rules of which restrict the eligibility for membership by reference to: 
(a) employment or former employment or both employment or former 
employment in a profession, trade, industry or calling; 
(b) employment or former employment or both employment or former 
employment by a particular employer, or by an employer included in a 
particular class of employers; 
(c) membership or former membership or both membership or former 
membership of a particular profession, professional association or union; or 
(d) any other prescribed matter (Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998). 
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 Open health insurers – membership is open to any person or employer. 
 The Life Science Industry – the life science industry is composed of the 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and (therapeutic) medical devices industries 
(Stremersch 2008). 
 Boundary Industries – food (e.g. nutraceuticals), high tech (e.g. medical imaging) 
and cosmetics industries (e.g. cosmeceuticals) (Stremersch 2008). 
1.7 Assumptions 
The following assumptions are based on the research study. 
 All respondents are deemed to be aware of an entrepreneurial environment within 
their organisations. 
 Knowledge of respondents - It is assumed that the respondents have enough 
knowledge of the healthcare value chain and the private healthcare industry to 
contextualise and articulate the answers to the research questions and minimise 
response bias. 
 Industry representation – this study aimed to have industry representation in terms of 
the organisations (sample populations) that have been surveyed for the research 
study. 
 Respondent perceptions of the research topic – the perceptions of the respondents 
are important and the purpose of the research was stressed in order to allay any 
fears from industry competitors that the results (or data collection process) will be 
used for competitive purposes.  This might have had a negative impact on 
respondents‘ attitudes to respond. 
 Research instrument – the research instrument has been operationalised as an 
online questionnaire to facilitate responses from the respective respondents and it is 
assumed that the data collected using this technique adequately reflects reality. 
 Relationship with respondents – it is assumed that the respondents have an interest 
in the results of the survey and that the existing relationship between the researcher 
and major healthcare organisations and provider groups would have facilitated 
response rates. 
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 Regulatory environment - it is assumed that the respondents have sufficient 
knowledge of the existing health insurer regulatory provisions. 
 Time and costs – it is assumed that there would be time and cost constraints to 
finalise the research study in the required time lines. 
 Definition of healthcare product innovation - It is assumed that the sample 
populations know or have been informed of the definition of healthcare product 
innovation.  The definition used for the purpose of the study is: ‗a product innovation 
is the introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly improved regarding 
its characteristics or intended uses‘. 
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CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Conceptualising Entrepreneurship 
According to Morris et al. (2008) entrepreneurship is the process of creating value by 
bringing together a unique combination of resources to exploit an opportunity.  This 
definition of entrepreneurship has four key elements: 1) entrepreneurship involves a 
process; 2) entrepreneurs create value where there was none before; 3) entrepreneurs put 
resources together in a unique way and; 4) entrepreneurship is an opportunity-driven 
behaviour (Morris et al. 2008).  The ability to recognise new opportunities, evaluate these 
opportunities and then translate these opportunities into viable business concepts lie at the 
heart of the entrepreneurial process (Morris et al. 2008). 
Conceptualising corporate entrepreneurship 
According to Morris et al. (2008), corporate entrepreneurship is a term used to describe 
entrepreneurial behaviour inside established mid-sized and large organisations. Other 
terms for corporate entrepreneurship include intrapreneurship, corporate venturing and 
organisational entrepreneurship (Morris et al. 2008). Guth and Ginsberg (1990) and Morris 
et al. (2008) argue that corporate entrepreneurship includes two major processes, 
innovation and new venture creation within existing organisations and the transformation of 
organisations though strategic renewal. 
Innovation is concerned with introducing something new to the market place; corporate 
venturing is concerned with entrepreneurial efforts that lead to the creation of new business 
organisations within corporate organisations and; strategic renewal is concerned with 
organisational revitalisation involving major strategic and/or structural changes (Morris et al. 
2008). 
According to Ireland, Covin and Kuratko (2009) entrepreneurial strategy is a core construct 
within the corporate entrepreneurship literature and a specific manifestation of firm-level 
entrepreneurship. According to Ireland et al. (2009) the organisational-level outcomes of 
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corporate entrepreneurship strategy is competitive capability and strategic repositioning. 
According to Ireland et al. (2009), research suggests that exploiting entrepreneurial 
opportunities enables organisations to both strengthen existing competitive capabilities and 
build new competitive capabilities (Covin, Ireland and Kuratko 2003; Ireland et al. 2009). 
Competitive capability as per Ireland et al. (2009) is the capacity of firms to create and 
sustain economically viable industry positions (Nelson 1991; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
1997; Ireland et al. 2009). According to Ireland et al. (2009) strategic repositioning can alter 
relationships among competitors in an industry by strategically locating the organisation 
within a newly defined competitive space (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1990; Ireland et al. 
2009).   
Conceptualising the Healthcare Value Chain 
The scope of the research study can be best understood by the perspective of the 
healthcare value chain (Stremersch 2008; Stremersch and Van Dyck 2008, adapted from, 
Burns 2005). 
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Figure 5 - The health care value chain, Source: Adapted from Stremersch (2008); 
Stremersch and Van Dyck (2008), adapted from Burns (2005) 
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The healthcare value chain (Figure 5) consists of a healthcare delivery chain (supply side 
chain) and a healthcare payment (financing) chain (demand side chain).  The healthcare 
delivery starts with therapy producers, who are commonly referred to as the life science 
industry (Stremersch 2008; Stremersch and Van Dyck 2008).  At its core, the life science 
industry is composed of the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and (therapeutic) medical 
devices industries (Stremersch 2008).  At its boundaries are the food (e.g nutraceuticals), 
high tech (e.g medical imaging) and cosmetics industries (e.g cosmeceuticals) (Stremersch 
2008). Product intermediaries are typically referred to as the ―channel‖ in marketing 
literature (Stremersch 2008).  Healthcare providers are central in the healthcare value 
chain.  The care provided in the chain is paid for by employers, government, and/or 
consumers (who, if afflicted with a disease, are referred to as patients by the medical 
profession) (Stremersch 2008). According to Stremersch (2008) there is often co-payment 
by several of these actors, where each pays a certain share.  Especially in systems where 
the government is not the main payer, there is a substantial financial intermediary industry 
composed of Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) and health insurance companies 
(Stremersch 2008).  The scope of this research study will address health insurers, health 
insurer administrators and healthcare service providers as major actors in the healthcare 
value chain. 
The Private Healthcare Industry in South Africa 
According to Ruff, Mzimba, Hendrie and Broomberg (2011) South Africa currently faces a 
divided healthcare system with ever-increasing distinctions between the private and public 
healthcare sectors in terms of access and quality. The performance and cost rankings of 
emerging market health systems (South Africa is classified as an emerging market 
economy) are poor compared to developed economies (Monitor Group, L.P. 2008).  Figure 
6 is a comparison of performance versus cost rankings of various healthcare systems in the 
world (Monitor Group, L.P. 2008).  It is clear from the comparison that emerging market 
health systems (green oval indicator) find themselves in various stages of maturity and 
therefore have low performance and cost rankings compared to developed  countries 
(Monitor Group, L.P. 2008).  According to Bloom, Standing and Lloyd (2008), since the 
early 1980s economic and structural crises have exposed the weak institutional capacity of 
the public sector in many countries.  In health as in other sectors, growing demands and 
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structural reform policies have left the state overworked and underfunded (Bloom et al. 
2008).  The private health care insurance market in South Africa covers only 16% of the 
population (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2011; Council for Medical Schemes 
2010/11) and accounts for 60% of total healthcare expenditure (McLeod and Grobler 2008). 
According to Monitor Group, L.P. (2008), the South African private healthcare system (red 
oval indicator) is ranked high on the performance versus cost rankings and compares more 
favourably with health systems in developed economies. Conversely, the public healthcare 
system in South Africa (blue oval indicator) is ranked low in terms of performance versus 
cost.  The cost ranking of the South African private healthcare system compared to 
performance is however out of line and it is therefore imperative that costs and access are 
managed more aggressively through innovation in the healthcare value chain. According to 
the Centre for Development and Enterprise (2011), the average cost of belonging to a 
private health insurer has increased fivefold in real terms since 1980. There are 
approximately five-million people (McLeod and Grobler 2008) in formal employment who 
are not covered by the private healthcare system in South Africa and it is imperative that 
this uncovered group access private healthcare insurance in order to ensure future 
sustainability of the private healthcare system.  Innovation is critical if health insurers want 
to win subscribers and stay ahead of the competition (Porter and Teisberg 2006). 
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Figure 6 – Performance vs. cost rankings of global health systems, Source: Monitor 
Group, L.P. (2008) 
It is therefore imperative to investigate if health insurers, health insurer administrators and 
healthcare service providers are able to act entrepreneurially in terms of product innovation 
by measuring the firm-level EO of health insurers/health insurer administrators and 
healthcare service providers in the South African private healthcare industry.  External 
collaboration between health insurers/health insurer administrators and healthcare service 
providers are viewed as a major driving factor of product innovation by health insurers and 
healthcare efficiencies (Porter and Teisberg 2006) in the healthcare system. This research 
study investigates the relationship between external collaboration between health 
insurers/health insurer administrators and healthcare service providers and health insurer 
product innovation in South Africa. The private health insurance industry is heavily 
regulated and the moderating effect of the presence of perceived strategic regulatory 
factors necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation in the South African 
private healthcare industry will be investigated. 
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2.2. Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) 
According to Dess and Lumpkin (2005) entrepreneurial orientation (EO) refers to: the 
strategy-making practices that organisations use to identify and launch corporate ventures 
and; a frame of mind and perspective about entrepreneurship reflected in a firm‘s ongoing 
processes and corporate culture. According to Urban and Barreira (2010) entrepreneurship 
in organisations has been labelled in various different ways, including ―intrapreneurship‖ 
(Kuratko 2002; Antoncic and Hisrich 2001; Urban and Barreira 2010), ―innovation 
entrepreneurship‖ (Schumpeter 1934; Urban and Barreira 2010), ―innovation management‘ 
(Drucker 1979; Urban and Barreira 2010), ―venture entrepreneurship‖ (Tang and Koveos 
2004; Urban and Barreira 2010), ―corporate entrepreneurship‖ (Dess, Ireland, Zahra, Floyd, 
Janney and Lane 2003;  Urban and Barreira 2010), ―strategic entrepreneurial posture‖ 
(Covin and Slevin 1989; Urban and Barreira 2010), ―internal corporate venturing‖ (Hornsby, 
Kuratko and Zahra 2002; Urban and Barreira 2010). 
According to Li, Huang and Tsai (2009) in order for organisations to respond to the dynamic 
and competitive environment they need to consistently transfer EO into feasible strategic 
activities to fulfil the organisations‘ objectives and achieve superior performance. EO 
reflects how a firm operates rather than what it does (Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Li et al. 
2009). According to Urban and Barreira (2010) the concept of EO incorporates 
organisational-level processes, practices and decision-making styles of innovative 
organisations (Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Urban and Barreira 2010). The strength of an 
organisation‘s EO can have a strong positive effect on performance (Zahra and Covin 1995; 
Morris and Sexton 1996; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005; Green, Covin and Slevin 2008).  EO 
is also an important predictor of firm growth: firms that nurture structures and values 
conducive to intrapreneurial activities are more likely to grow than firms lacking in such 
characteristics (Antoncic and Hisrich 2001; Dess et al. 2003; Urban 2008). 
The literature and extensive research confirms that there are three dimensions that 
characterises an entrepreneurial organisation, innovativeness, risk taking and 
proactiveness (Morris et al. 2008; Urban and Barreira 2010).  
Innovative behaviours are born from a tendency to enter into experimentation, support new 
ideas and depart from established practices (Lumpkin and Dess 2001; Hansen, Deitz, 
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Tokman, Marino and Weaver 2011).  According to Urban and Barreira (2010) 
innovativeness is the fundamental posture of an entrepreneurial organisation in terms of 
developing and creating new products and processes. According to Dess and Lumpkin 
(2005), innovations come in many different forms, such as technological innovativeness, 
product-market innovativeness and administrative innovativeness. They define 
technological innovativeness as consisting primarily of research and engineering efforts 
aimed at developing new products and processes. Product market innovativeness includes 
market research, product design and innovations in advertising and promotion (Dess and 
Lumpkin 2005). Administrative innovativeness refers to novelty in management systems, 
control techniques and organisational structure (Dess and Lumpkin 2005).   Innovation is 
critical if organisations want to win customers and stay ahead of their competition; 
innovativeness is one of the fundamental instruments of growth strategies to enter new 
markets, to increase an organisation‘s existing market share and to provide the 
organisation with a competitive advantage (Gunday, Ulusoy, Kilic and Alpkan 2011).  
Proactiveness refers to an organisation‘s efforts to seize new opportunities (Dess and 
Lumpkin 2005). According to Lumpkin and Dess (2001) and Hansen et al. (2011), proactive 
behaviours reflect a propensity to act aggressively towards competitor organisations in the 
pursuit of favourable business opportunity.  Proactiveness is also an indicator that initiatives 
are implemented and is also concerned with adaptability and tolerance of failure (Lumpkin 
and Dess 1996; Urban and Barreira 2010; Hansen et al. 2011). According to Wiklund 
(1999) and Soininen, Martikainen, Puumalainen and Kylaheiko (2011), proactiveness gives 
organisations the capacity to present new products or services to the market before their 
competitors which also gives them a competitive advantage. According to Dess and 
Lumpkin (2005), first movers have several advantages. They indicate that first movers often 
capture unusually high profits because there are no competitors to drive prices down and 
first movers that establish brand recognition are usually able to retain their image and hold 
onto market share gains. Dess and Lumpkin (2005) also indicate that there are two other 
methods that organisations use to act proactively, such as: 
- Introducing new products or technological capabilities ahead of the competition; 
- Continuously seeking out new product or service offerings. 
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Risk-taking refers to an organisation‘s willingness to seize a venture opportunity even 
though it does not know whether the venture will be successful and to act boldly without 
knowing the consequences (Dess and Lumpkin 2005:152). According to Rauch, Wiklund, 
Lumpkin and Frese (2009) and Soininen et al. (2011) risk taking describes the nature of 
easily venturing into the unknown, borrowing heavily, and/or committing remarkable 
resources to ventures in uncertain environments. Risk taking behaviours also result from a 
willingness to invest in projects that have uncertain outcomes or unusually high profits and 
losses and to take calculated business risks when identifying business opportunities 
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Urban and Barreira 2010; Hansen et al. 2011). According to 
Dess and Lumpkin (2005), organisations could use the following two methods to strengthen 
their competitive position through risk-taking: 
- Researching and assessing risk factors to minimise uncertainty; 
- Using tried-and-true practices and techniques that have worked in other domains. 
According to Dess and Lumpkin (2005) prior research has explored the direct relationship 
between EO and performance (Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin and Freeze 2004) as well as the 
sustainability of the EO-performance relationship (Wiklund 1999). Dess and Lumpkin (2005) 
also indicate that other work has found that the EO-performance relationship is dependent 
on the fit between EO and such factors as environment, structure and strategy (Dess, 
Lumpkin and Covin 1997). Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) have suggested that EO acted as 
a moderator and found that the relationship between knowledge-based resources and 
performance was stronger among organisations with higher levels of EO (Dess and 
Lumpkin 2005). Dess and Lumpkin (2005) also indicate that exploring relationships among 
the individual dimensions of EO and performance is superior to considering EO as a 
unidimensional construct and that the individual dimensions of EO were more robust 
predictors of organisational growth than a summated unidimensional EO construct. A study 
by Kreiser, Marino and Weaver (2002), found that EO dimensions tended to vary 
independently with each other and have different associations with environmental hostility 
(Dess and Lumpkin 2005). A study by Richard, Barnett, Dwyer and Chadwick (2004) 
focusing on cultural diversity and firm performance, found that innovativeness and risk-
taking had different relationships with organisational performance and that innovativeness 
positively moderated and risk-taking negatively moderated nonlinear relationship patterns 
for both racial and gender heterogeneity (Dess and Lumpkin 2005). According to Lumpkin 
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and Dess (1996) (Urban and Barreira 2010), all the EO dimensions are central to 
understanding the entrepreneurial process, although these dimensions may occur in 
different combinations, depending on the type of entrepreneurial opportunity the 
organisation pursues. According to Urban and Barreira (2010) firms can be labelled 
entrepreneurial only if they are simultaneously risk-taking, innovative and proactive. The 
extent to which each of these dimensions is useful for predicting business success may be 
contingent on the specific industry environment, and the norms for EO could also vary 
among industries (Urban and Barreira 2010.) For the individual organisation that adopts 
innovation, the change in knowledge may be incremental in magnitude, but it may also 
radically expand its current knowledge base (Perez-Luno, Wiklund, and Cabrera 2011).  
According to Urban and Barreira (2010) the EO concept is best understood as a complex 
mix of personal and situational factors, and in addition to individual and organisational 
differences, forces operating within other, larger cultural contexts also determine levels of 
EO (Aloulou and Foyolle 2005; Urban and Barreira 2010). Organisations with EO, therefore, 
typically out-perform other similar organisational types in volatile times (Knight 1997; Urban 
and Barreira 2010). 
According to Li et al. (2009), the resource advantage theory stipulates that innovative 
competencies may be a source of competitive advantage because they are deeply rooted in 
the context of the organisation and cannot be explicitly articulated and imitated (Barney 
1991; Nonaka 1994; Hunt and Morgan 1996; Hunt and Arnett 2006). They further indicate 
that by increasing commitment to innovative products and processes, organisations can 
renew their operations in marketplace and improve their profitability (Miller 1983; Lumpkin 
and Dess 1996; Zahra and Garvis 2000; Li et al. 2009).  
According to Li, Liu and Zhao (2006), there is a strong link between EO and new product 
development improvement (Drucker 1985; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Li et al. 2006). Their 
study focused on building a systemic conceptual model to describe the relationship among 
organisational orientation, internal control systems and new product development. Their 
study focusing on the Chinese transitional economy found that EO is significantly and 
positively related to new product development improvement. 
Based on the extensive literature on the relationships between EO and performance and 
EO and innovation the following hypothesis is set out: 
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H1:  A positive correlation exists between the level of new product innovation by health 
insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO). 
2.3. External Collaboration between Health Insurers and Healthcare 
Service Providers 
According to Adler, Heckscher and Prusak (2011) a growing number of organisations are 
reaping the rewards of collaborative communities in the form of higher margins on 
knowledge intensive work.  According to Adler et al. (2011) collaborative communities 
encourage people to continually apply their unique talents to group projects and to become 
motivated by a collective mission, not just personal gain or the intrinsic pleasures of 
autonomous creativity. Adler et al. (2011) argues that by marrying a sense of common 
purpose to a supportive structure, these organisations are mobilising knowledge workers‘ 
talents and expertise in flexible, highly manageable group efforts.  This approach fosters 
not only innovation and agility but also efficiency and scalability (Adler et al. 2011).   
According to Adler et al. (2011) this approach requires four new organisational efforts: 
- Defining and building a shared purpose; 
- Cultivating an ethic of contribution; 
- Developing processes that enable people to work together in flexible but 
disciplined projects; 
- Creating infrastructure where collaboration is valued and rewarded 
Zillich et al. (2005) define collaboration among healthcare professionals as a joint 
communication and decision-making process with the goal of satisfying the patient‘s 
wellness and illness needs while respecting the unique qualities and abilities of each 
professional. This definition is also applicable in terms of the collaboration between 
healthcare service providers and health insurers/health insurer administrators in developing 
and implementing new innovative health insurer products.  Discussions around healthcare 
reform rarely focus on health outcomes. Instead the discussion emphasises cost, cost-
shifting and access (Teisberg and Wallace 2009).  In healthcare, patient outcomes define 
quality and quality can be enhanced by preventing errors, reducing waste and improving 
coordination (Teisberg and Wallace 2009).  Each of these changes creates better 
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experiences for patients and also brings down costs (Teisberg and Wallace 2009).  
According to Teisberg and Wallace (2009) the focus of healthcare reform should therefore 
be on creating value-based care delivery on improving results rather than cost reduction as 
a solution.  Competing to improve value for patients means competing to provide better 
medical care, enable better health and restore professional satisfaction for clinicians 
(Teisberg and Wallace 2009).  When improving value is the goal, the interests of all parties 
in the healthcare value chain are aligned (Teisberg and Wallace 2009). 
According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) health insurers have a unique and essential role in 
value-based competition and innovation in healthcare.  They emphasise that health insurers 
must rethink and reorient their whole approach around value-based competition.  Health 
insurers must become health organisations, not just insurance organisations and they must 
be participants in health, and not just payers (Porter and Teisberg 2006).  Health insurers 
must become health organisations dedicated to patient and physician information, support 
and service, not just organisations for administrative, auditing and financial services (Porter 
and Teisberg 2006).  Health insurers therefore must move from being adversaries to true 
partners in value creation for patients (Porter and Teisberg 2006). 
Healthcare service providers, including hospitals, clinics, physician groups and individual 
physicians are the central actors in the healthcare system and the place where most value 
is actually delivered (Porter and Teisberg 2006).  Health insurers can therefore reinforce or 
detract from this value through their specific roles and choices.  Moving towards a positive 
sum competition on results offers the only real way to address the long-standing 
weaknesses in healthcare delivery, while also encouraging the entire healthcare system to 
innovate (Porter and Teisberg 2006). 
It is critical to restructure the health insurer–healthcare service provider relationship so the 
adversarial mindset between health insurers and healthcare service providers makes way 
for a spirit of collaboration in terms of creating value for patients (Porter and Teisberg 
2006).  When health insurers and healthcare service providers collaborate around value 
and health results, efficiency will improve exponentially and administrative costs will fall 
(Porter and Teisberg 2006).  According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) restructuring the 
relationship between health insurers and health care providers involves the following key 
areas of innovation for health insurers and healthcare service providers: 
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 Shift the nature of information sharing with providers – health insurers can 
assist patients and their doctors to gather information, understand their treatment 
options, seek the best provider to address their circumstances, and ensure that 
providers involved in care have up-to-date patient information.  Health insurers 
should also give ongoing feedback to healthcare providers about the results 
achieved by their referrals in terms of patient outcomes 
 Reward provider excellence and value-enhancing innovation for patients – 
current health insurer contracting and payment practices are not tied to value and 
providers are not rewarded for excellence. There is also a lack of gain sharing in the 
healthcare system in terms of healthcare service providers achieving better results 
and for healthcare service providers who improve results over time.  Health insurers 
should reward the best healthcare service providers in terms of their medical work 
with patients rather than focusing on raising all healthcare service providers to an 
acceptable level. 
 Move to single bills for episodes and cycles of care, and single prices – health 
insurers should aim to minimise administrative complexity for healthcare service 
providers and move towards creating a system involving single process for service 
bundles, episodes of care, and ultimately full care cycles. 
 Simplify, standardise, and eliminate paperwork and transactions – Health 
insurers and healthcare service providers should aim to minimise administrative 
complexity and focus on reducing costs that do not contribute directly to patient 
value. Health insurers would therefore aim to drastically streamline their 
administrative processes. 
 
The new role for health insurers involve a radical transformation not only in their 
relationship with healthcare service providers and members but also in their internal culture 
which means that they need to create a culture of patient health (Porter and Teisberg 
2006). According to Zillich et al. (2005) and Liu, Doucette and Farris (2010) a theoretical 
framework for physician-pharmacist collaboration was developed, indicating that 
collaborative relationships are developed through five progressive stages: 
- Stage 0 – professional awareness – exchange is minimal 
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- Stage 1 – professional recognition – exchange is mostly unilateral and driven by one 
party 
- Stage 2 – exploration and trail – the exchanges becomes bilateral  
- Stage 3 - professional relationship expansion – as the relationship progresses, the 
exchange becomes bilateral in which both parties are active 
- Stage 4 – commitment to the collaborative working relationship – this stage 
represents a committed and sustained relationship characterised by bilateral 
communication and mutual trust. 
 
This physician-pharmacist theoretical framework was used to develop a measurement 
instrument (PPCI instrument) to capture the nature and scope of social exchange which 
drives a professional relationship (Zillich et al. 2005).  This measurement instrument was 
crafted around seven professional themes surrounding a professional relationship: 
collaborative care, commitment, dependence symmetry, bidirectional communication, trust, 
initiating behaviour and conflict resolution (Baggs 1994; Zillich et al. 2005).  According to 
Zillich et al. (2005) this framework measures the following factors which influence 
collaborative relationships: 
- Trustworthiness (T) 
- Role specification (RS) 
- Relationship initiation (RI) 
According to Mintzberg (2011) healthcare actors need to build systems that both promote 
health and treat illness and to do that, more cooperation between healthcare actors is 
required, not more competition.  Mintzberg (2011) further adds that in healthcare, 
‗competition‘ mostly amounts to individualisation – with every person, profession and 
institution looking out for number one (Mintzberg 2011). 
Christensen et al. (2009) presents a model from their research on innovation which is called 
the ―Tools of Cooperation‖ presented in figure 7.  The essence of this model, as a start, is 
having the right vision for where an organisation needs to go.  According to Christensen et 
al. (2009), once the organisation‘s future direction is in place, the organisation needs to 
convince all the other people and resources and energies that are required to succeed in 
that journey to cooperatively work together to get there. Christensen et al. (2009) explains 
41 
 
that the effectiveness of the various tools that might be wielded to elicit this cooperation 
depends upon the extent of pre-existing agreements along two dimensions:  the first is the 
extent to which the people involved agreed on what they want, the results they seek, what 
their priorities are, and which trade-offs they are willing to make to achieve those results 
(Christensen et al. 2009). The second is the extent to which they agree with each other on 
which actions will yield the desired result (Christensen et al. 2009).  The key to this model is 
recognising the extent of agreement and then selecting the tools of cooperation that will 
work most effectively in that situation (Christensen et al. 2009).  Christensen et al. (2009) 
believes that this model applies to units of small families, to business units and 
corporations, to school districts, and even to nations. 
Figure 7 maps the two dimensions of agreements in the matrix, and describes the tools 
managers can utilise in different situations in order to elicit cooperation among the 
stakeholders to work in concert in achieving the required change. The boundaries 
delineating the domains in which the various tools can be applied are not rigid, but the 
broad labels can give leaders a sense of which tools are likely to be more or less effective 
in various situations (Christensen et al. 2009). A short discussion of the different tools 
follow. 
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Figure 7 – Four types of cooperation tools, source: Christensen et al. (2009:403) 
Power tools 
According to Christensen et al. (2009) where there are sharp disagreements among the 
concerned parties about what they want and how to get it, the only tools that will elicit 
cooperation in pursuit of a new course are ―power tools‖, such as fiat, force, coercion and 
threats. 
Tools such as negotiation, strategic planning and financial incentives do not work well in 
situations of minimal agreement and as shown in figure 7, these tools only work when there 
is a modicum of agreement on both dimensions of the matrix (Christensen et al. 2009).  
Only power tools are reliably effective in low agreement situations and the key is to have 
the authority to use them (Christensen et al. 2009). In democracies, many of these 
mechanisms are not effective and are outlawed (Christensen et al. 2009). 
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Management tools 
According to Christensen et al. (2009) the management tools in the matrix are cooperative 
and process-oriented in nature, and they include training, standard operating procedures 
and measurement systems.  For management tools to work, group members need not 
agree on what they want from their participation in the organisation, but they must agree on 
cause and effect (Christensen et al. 2009). 
Leadership tools 
In the upper left region of figure 7, results-oriented tools, as opposed to process-oriented 
tools, are more effective because there is high consensus about what employees want from 
their participation in the organisation (Christensen et al. 2009).  Charismatic leaders, who 
command respect, do not often address how to get things done; instead they focus on 
motivating people to just do what needs to be done (Christensen et al. 2009). 
Culture tools 
According to Christensen et al. (2009) people located in the upper-right region will 
cooperate almost automatically to continue in the same direction and this is indicative of a 
strong culture – their common view of what they want and how the world works means that 
little debate is required about where to go and how to get there. This very strength can 
make such organisations highly resistant to change and facilitate cooperation only to 
preserve the status quo (Christensen et al. 2009).  When executives in this circumstance 
see big changes in the future and realise that the organisation‘s momentum is propelling it 
in the wrong direction, the culture often fires the manager (Christensen et al. 2009). 
Healthcare systems in the agreement matrix 
According to Christensen et al. (2009) for the most part, healthcare systems  are positioned 
in the lower-left corner of the matrix – patients, healthcare service providers, regulators, IT 
professionals, health insurers, executives in pharmaceutical and medical device companies 
and politicians all have divergent priorities and disagree strongly about how to achieve 
them.  The fact that healthcare is in the lower-left world of disagreement helps explain why 
certain remedies that reformers tried to introduce in the past have not worked.  There are 
also instances in which disagreement among parties that need to cooperate is so 
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fundamental that it is simply impossible to reach consensus on a course of action 
(Christensen et al. 2009).  According to Christensen et al. (2009), when all other tools have 
failed, a ―separation‖ strategy needs to be followed – dividing the conflicted parties into 
separate groups so they can reach agreement with others inside their own group, yet don‘t 
need to agree with those in other groups.  The separation tool is used where organisations 
create separate business units to pursue disruptive opportunities with a unique business 
model, separate from the parent company, placing it in competition with the parent 
company (Christensen et al. 2009). 
Based on a study by Wu (2011), two perspectives have been identified which are useful in 
understanding the effects of strategic alliances on firm product innovation. The first 
perspective emphasises cooperative behaviours in strategic alliances and suggests that 
collaborative behaviours in strategic alliances can enhance organisations‘ learning 
capability (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad 1994; Powell et al. 1996; Wu 2011), increase the 
likelihood of successful innovation activities (Uzzi 1997; Ahuja 2000; Wu 2011), develop 
and strengthen internal competencies (Mitchell and Singh 1996; Ahuja 2000; Wu 2011), 
reduce risks and costs of the innovation process (Tyler and Steensma 1995; Das and Teng 
2000; Wu 2011), shorten innovation cycles (Pisano 1990; Wu 2011), obtain efficiency gains 
such as economies of scope and scale (Ahuja 2000; Wu 2011), and access to new markets 
(Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1998; Wu 2011). 
According to Wu (2011) the second perspective emphasises the competitive aspect of 
strategic alliances and suggests that intense competition stimulates firms to position 
themselves for competitive behaviours in strategic alliances (Das and Teng 2000; Wu 
2011). According to Wu (2011) if organisations do not institute proper monitoring 
mechanisms or invest sufficient resources in critical activities, such as trust building, their 
partners might indulge in opportunistic behaviour which could lead to failed collaboration 
(Hamel 1991; Larsson, Bengtsson, Hendrisson and Sparks 1998; Wu 2011). 
According to Rosenbusch et al. (2011), entrepreneurs and small business owners face the 
dilemma of deciding whether they should pursue and focus on innovation development 
projects as firm-internal projects or with strategic alliances (external partners). They indicate 
that prior research mainly advocates external collaborations and networking for new and 
small organisations. Their study findings show that internal innovation projects lead to 
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greater firm performance than innovation projects with external partners. They further stress 
that their meta-analytical results indicate that the innovation projects that focus on external 
collaboration do not increase the performance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
According to Vanvactor (2011), external collaboration and cooperation is critical in today‘s 
business environment.  As related by Kouzes and Posner (2007) and Vanvactor (2011) 
collaboration is so critical to success that every significant relationship should be treated as 
if it is a lifelong endeavour.  The face of healthcare management is an evolutionary process 
and the relationships established between multifaceted partners can produce dynamic 
effects on an organisation‘s environment (Vanvactor 2011). 
Based on the above literature review, where the research point to an expected relationship 
between innovation and external collaboration, the following research hypothesis will be 
tested: 
H2. A positive correlation exists between the level of new product innovation by health 
insurers and external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers. 
2.4. Regulation 
According to Dassler (2006), traditionally, two theories of regulations have emerged, firstly 
the concept of ‗regulatory intervention‘ or, in different terms, the way regulators conduct 
market intervention.  A review of the issues relevant in this respect has been provided by 
Trebing (1987) and (Dassler 2006), who distinguish between market-driven and non-
market-driven approaches (Dassler 2006).  Secondly, in the context of ‗regulatory 
governance‘, Majone (1996) identifies a substantive and a proceduralist model (Dassler 
2006).  This research study will however focus only on one of the two theories, namely 
regulatory intervention as this aspect has a direct impact on the development/generation 
and adoption of innovative healthcare products and services in terms of external 
collaboration between healthcare service providers and healthcare insurers. 
According to Dassler (2006) the aspect of regulation that has probably received the most 
attention, in both theoretical and political contexts, is the way in which dedicated regulatory 
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authorities intervene in their markets or, in other words, intend to promote durable 
competition and consumer benefits. To achieve these objectives, two schools of thought 
have emerged over time on the role of the regulatory authority (Trebing 1987; Dassler 
2006).  These are market-driven and non-market-driven approaches to regulatory 
intervention. 
Market-driven approach 
This school of thought, according to Dassler (2006) argues that competition is the most 
powerful means to achieve a Pareto-optimal economic outcome and therefore, market 
intervention other than to tackle market failure until durable competition arrives, is 
undesirable.  The market-driven approach to regulation recognises, however, that there 
may be a dominant supplier and a Pareto-optimal economic outcome may not be achieved.  
Hence, the emphasis in the regulation is to remove legal barriers to entry and to encourage 
competition by setting performance targets in the form of price or profit regulation (Dassler 
2006). In addition, it is argued that regulating the dominant supplier‘s prices or profits may 
be appropriate to create a level playing field for all the competitors (Dassler 2006).  
Performance-based regulation should, however, reduce as competition matures (Littlechild 
1983; Burton, 1997; Parker 2002; Dassler 2006).  Specific regulatory methods used under 
this approach commonly include price cap regulation (Littlechild 1983; Dassler 2006) or 
benchmarking, originally proposed by Shleifer (1985) (Dassler (2006). 
Non-market-driven approach 
According to Dassler (2006) proponents of this school of thought argue that the markets are 
inherently flawed and lead to an inefficient distribution of outcome including disadvantages 
for consumers.  This is primarily in the context of economies of scale, scope and positive 
network externalities.  According to Dassler (2006), the purpose of regulation is to tackle 
market flaws on a permanent basis. He further emphasises that in contrast to the market 
driven approach, a non-market driven approach does not focus simply on bringing barriers 
of entry down and regulating prices or profits in the short term. Instead, regulation should 
concentrate more widely on the public interest or social values, such as benefiting all 
classes of consumers.  To achieve these intentions, a set of policy recommendations is 
proposed, such as setting quality guidelines for services, implementing health and safety 
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requirements for suppliers, and entrusting one or more operators with the provision of 
services that might be discontinued when regarded as non-profitable (Kolstad, Ulen and 
Johnson 1990; Dassler 2006). 
It is proposed in the non-market-driven school of thought to conduct regular market reviews 
to identify, for example, areas of inadequate service, potential competition or least-cost 
supply options (Dassler 2006). It is important to stress that market-driven and non-market-
driven approaches to regulation have their shortcomings and it has been argued that in 
practice no clear line can be drawn between them.  Baldwin and Cave (1999) (Dassler 
2006) have argued that the Pareto-optimum may not be achieved without referring to wider 
social and economic interests and hence, a regulator may need to pursue a mix of 
objectives for regulation (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Dassler 2006).  It may, therefore, be the 
case that a regulatory authority places emphasis on pursuing a non-market-driven 
approach, but still promotes competition. Alternatively, a regulator may pursue a market-
driven approach and administer price caps as the main method of regulation, while at the 
same time, taking into account wider economic and social interests (Dassler 2006). 
Healthcare regulation 
In the healthcare sector, regulatory bodies play a pivotal role in balancing cooperation and 
competition by means of reforms introduced through legislation (Provan 1984; Mur-
Veeman, Eijkelberg and Spreeuwenberg 2001; Baretta 2008).  According to Baretta (2008), 
within the healthcare sector regulatory bodies can influence the level of competition, for 
example, by: (a) increasing the number of healthcare service providers authorised to 
provide healthcare services (b) choosing a competitive financing model for healthcare 
service providers, (c) establishing the same spheres of activity for many (or all) healthcare 
service providers and (d) adopting mechanisms for evaluating performance based on the 
pursuit of individual goals.  Baretta (2008) argues that the regulatory bodies can also impact 
on the level of cooperation among providers of healthcare services through many decisions, 
such as: (a) the implementation of a financing model for healthcare service providers that 
induces collaboration/cooperation among them; (b) the establishment of different spheres of 
activity for each category of healthcare service provider and; (c) the adoption of 
mechanisms for evaluating performance based on the pursuit of collective objectives.  
Therefore, a regulatory body in the healthcare sector is potentially able to act as a 
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coordinator system through its own power to balance competition and cooperation (Baretta 
2008). 
According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) there are three broad areas of healthcare policy 
from a strategic perspective that drive healthcare innovation, as shown in figure 8. 
Health 
Insurance 
and Access
Structure of 
Healthcare 
Delivery
Standards 
For 
Coverage
 
Figure 8 - Issues in healthcare reform, Source: Porter and Teisberg (2006:327) 
According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) the first set of policies address healthcare 
insurance and access to insurance, such as who has health insurance, how health plans 
operate, and how insurance is paid for.  As health insurance become more and more 
expensive, individuals are being requested to pay more towards their healthcare coverage 
and as the number of uninsured grows, the debate about access to cover and the structure 
of insurance have become urgent and crucial (Porter and Teisberg 2006). According to the 
Centre for Development and Enterprise (2011), one aspect of under-regulation of health 
insurers in South Africa is the key problem of community rating without mandatory 
participation. Under community rating health insurance, premiums cannot be differentiated 
on actuarial risk factors like age (Centre for Development and Enterprise 2011). Community 
rating increases equity because the young and healthy subsidise the old and sick, but it 
also acts as a disincentive for young potential members to join health insurers (Centre for 
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Development and Enterprise 2011). Healthcare reformers therefore argue that community 
rating must accompany compulsory membership of health insurers for those in formal 
employment and thus create larger risk pools in terms of industry sustainability (Centre for 
Development and Enterprise 2011). 
According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) the second broad strategic issue in healthcare 
policy is coverage: what services insurers and society should be responsible for covering 
and what services individuals should pay for themselves.  This includes difficult issues 
including and surrounding the extent of treatment justified in terms of its health value, the 
types of care that should be discretionary, and the responsibilities of patients in participating 
in their health and their healthcare (Porter and Teisberg 2006).  What is covered by health 
insurance is a major determinant of the cost of private and public health plans and many 
issues of coverage have not been addressed adequately (Porter and Teisberg 2006).  
Instead of explicit policy attention, the area of coverage has tended to be left to policies, 
individual negotiations between members and health plans, and the courts (Porter and 
Teisberg 2006).  According to Porter and Teisberg (2006), some experts assert that the 
only way to reduce the rate of growth in healthcare costs is to make tough rationing choices 
about what is covered. 
The third broad strategic issue in healthcare policy is the structure of healthcare delivery 
itself (Porter and Teisberg 2006).  The delivery of healthcare creates the value for patients 
and this area has not received much attention until recently when it was realised that more 
and more private and public money is poured into healthcare without the necessary 
attention to the value delivered (Porter and Teisberg 2006). Policy attention directed at 
healthcare delivery has been dominated by how to reduce costs and more recently, 
attention has been focused on the importance of information technology and pay for 
performance initiatives to reduce errors and improve quality (Porter and Teisberg 2006). 
These measures have still largely focused on attempting to control the supply of care and 
bargain down prices, instead of enabling competition in terms of value (Porter and Teisberg 
2006).  According to Christensen et al. (2009), when care of a disorder has moved into the 
realm of empirical medicine, emphasis of regulation needs to focus less on the 
qualifications of providers and more on how they do their work – on the process being 
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followed.  Following best-practice processes is the key to getting the best outcomes most 
consistently, when medical practice is empirical (Christensen et al. 2009). 
All three strategic areas – health insurance and access, coverage, and the structure of 
healthcare delivery are important, however, Porter and Teisberg (2006) believe that the 
structure of healthcare delivery is the most fundamental and that delivering value for 
patients (in terms of health outcomes per Dollar spend) is the central purpose of the 
healthcare system in the first place.  The value delivered will determine the cost of 
insurance and what can be covered. Improving the value delivered must be the central 
focus of health policy instead of an afterthought; it is not just about shifting costs (Porter 
and Teisberg 2006). 
According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) healthcare policy has been both a reflection and a 
contributor to the zero-sum competition that plagues the healthcare system.  Government 
policies have contributed to the cost shifting and flawed incentives in the healthcare system 
(Porter and Teisberg 2006).  They believe that the central policy goal of healthcare reform 
must be to enable value-based competition on results.  Harnessing the power of 
competition will enable major improvements in value.  Porter and Teisberg (2006) argue 
that if every actor in the healthcare system has to measure and report results and compete 
for every member/subscriber or patient, value will increase and innovation will flourish. 
According to Christensen et al. (2009) the lack of business model innovation in the 
healthcare industry is a result of regulators not permitting it and the pattern of regulation in 
healthcare matches that of many other industries in which the public interest may not be 
addressed through normal market mechanisms.  Regulation in these industries typically 
goes through three stages (Christensen et al. 2009): 
1. Foster. Subsidise the creation of the industry. 
2. Stabilise and assure. Strengthen the participants; ensure that all who should have 
access in fact do; and make sure that the products are safe and effective. 
3. Afford.  Encourage competition that will reduce prices. 
According to Christensen et al. (2009) it has been disruptive competition that has reduced 
costs dramatically in most historical instance because regulators have sought to reduce 
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prices.  Regulations which try to intensify sustaining competition in an industry normally 
results in higher prices (Christensen et al. 2009). A key reason why regulatory change 
persistently lags behind the process of medical science is that those who would be 
disrupted by a shift in regulatory focus have a lot to lose, and for the good of the healthcare 
provider they preserve regulations that initially had been adopted for the good of the patient 
(Christensen et al. 2009).  Regulations are toppled only when disruptive innovators find 
applications or markets beyond the reach of regulators (Christensen et al. 2009). 
According to Christensen et al. (2009), the transformation force that has brought 
affordability and accessibility to industries is disruptive innovation – disruption solves the 
more fundamental question:  How to make healthcare affordable?. Christensen et al. (2009) 
indicates that most disruptions have three enablers: a simplified technology, a business 
model innovation, and a disruptive value network.  The technological enabler transforms a 
technological problem from something that requires deep training, intuition, and iteration to 
resolve, into a problem that can be addressed in a predictable, rules-based way.  
Diagnostic abilities are the technological enablers of disruption in healthcare (Christensen 
et al. 2009). Christensen et al. (2009) comment that business model innovation has stalled 
in the last three decades in healthcare and that regulations and reimbursement systems 
currently trap in high cost venues where much of the care could be provided in lower-cost, 
more convenient business models.  One of the key lessons from the history of disruptive 
innovation is that business model innovations are almost always forged by new entrants to 
the industry.  Regulators must therefore be aware of attempts by leading institutions to out-
law business model innovation (Christensen et al. 2009). 
Christensen et al. (2009) also indicate that other disruptions fail because they lack new 
value networks that combine business models into coherent ecosystems that allow them to 
disrupt their predecessors. Christensen et al. (2009) also emphasises that disruption rarely 
happens piecemeal where stand-alone disruptions are plugged into the existing value 
network of an industry – rather entirely new value networks are created, disrupting the old.  
Regulators should therefore realise that disruptive business models such as value-adding 
process clinics, retail clinics and facilitated networks must be married with disruptive 
innovations in insurance and reimbursement to maximise the full impact in cost and 
accessibility of healthcare (Christensen et al. 2009).  Christensen et al. (2009) warns that 
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knitting all these pieces together will require a much higher degree of integration than has 
been the norm in the health care industry to date. The authors also warn that employers will 
need to play a more proactive role in orchestrating the emergence of these new value 
networks compared to the reactive posture they have taken in the past. 
When stability and quality have become assured, governments often shift their focus to 
regulations that improve the affordability and convenience of the products and services in 
question. This can be achieved by deregulation, or the unwinding of restrictions on price-
cutting and entry that had been put in place when stabilisation and assurance were of 
paramount concern (Christensen et al. 2009). Economists and economist-turned 
deregulators have employed a simple formula for cost reduction (Christensen et al. 2009): 
   Increased competition =     reduced prices 
If competition is intensified it will drive prices down.  It is disruptive competition that yields 
dramatic reduction in price and improved accessibility; the implication is that deregulators 
need to focus not simply on enabling competition, but on facilitating disruptive competition 
to reduce prices and increase efficiency (Christensen et al. 2009). 
Based on the above literature review it is expected that a low presence of strategic 
regulatory factors in healthcare regulation, necessary for encouraging product innovation, 
would impact innovation activities of organisations in the supply and demand side 
structures of the healthcare value chain. For this reason, the following research hypotheses 
will be tested: 
H3: The relationship between the level of new product innovation by health insurers and 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is moderated by perceived strategic regulatory factors 
necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation, such that the relationship is 
weaker where these strategic regulatory factors have lower presence and stronger where 
they have higher presence. 
H4: The relationship between the level of new product innovation by health insurers and 
external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service providers is 
moderated by perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for encouraging health 
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insurer product innovation, such that this relationship is weaker where these strategic 
regulatory factors have lower presence and stronger where they have higher presence. 
2.5. Health Insurer Product Innovation 
Innovation is broadly seen as an essential component of competitiveness, embedded in the 
organisational structures, processes, products and services within a firm (Gunday et al. 
2011).  Motivated by the increasing competition in global markets, companies have started 
to grasp the importance of innovation, since rapidly changing technologies and severe 
global competition rapidly erode the value-add of existing products and services (Gunday et 
al. 2011).  According to Gunday et al. (2011) innovations constitute an indispensable 
component of the corporate strategies for several reasons such as to apply more productive 
manufacturing processes, to perform better in the market, to seek positive reputation in 
customer‘s perception and as a result to gain sustainable competitive advantage. According 
to Morris et al. (2008) the new product or service development process does not evolve in a 
neat, orderly way. There are some key steps that must be accomplished to produce a 
commercially viable new product, service or process.  These steps are outlined in Figure 9. 
Idea generation
Concept Testing
Technical feasibility assessment
Product testing
Financial assessment
Test marketing
Launch
Life cycle management
 
Figure 9 – Innovation as a linear process, Source: Morris et al.  (2008:338) 
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In the OECD Oslo Manual (2005) (Bloch 2007; Gunday et al. 2011) four different innovation 
types are introduced: product innovation, process innovation, marketing innovation and 
organisational innovation. This research study only focuses on product innovation. 
A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly 
improved regarding its characteristics or intended uses, including significant improvements 
in technical specification, components and materials, incorporated software, user-
friendliness or other functional characteristics (OECD Oslo Manual 2005; Gunday et al. 
2011). Product innovations can utilise new knowledge or technologies, or can be based on 
new uses or combinations of existing knowledge or technologies (Gunday et al. 2011). The 
term ‗product‘ covers both goods and services. ‗Product‘ innovation is a difficult process 
driven by advancing technologies, changing customer needs, shortening product life cycles 
and increasing global competition (Gunday et al. 2011).  For product innovation success, it 
must involve strong interaction within the organisation and further between the organisation 
and its customers and suppliers (Akova, Ulusoy, Payzin and Kaylan 1998; Gunday et al. 
2011). 
The ‗newness‘ concept is the central element of innovation definitions, but the scope of 
newness has been conceptualised inconsistently in the literature (Pérez-Luño et al. 2011).  
Whether the innovation is new to an individual adopter or organization or ‗new to the word‘ 
reflects substantially different scopes or newness. Pérez-Luño et al. (2011) argues that the 
literature has been unclear as to whether newness refer to one or several of these 
dimensions, or has assumed that newness to the organization is equivalent with ‗new to the 
world‘. 
Damanpour and Wischnevsky (2006) and Pérez-Luño et al. (2011) suggested a way to 
address the different scopes of newness in the innovation literature.  They differentiate 
between the generation and the adoption of innovations and as the terminology indicates, 
the generation of innovation refers to situations where a firm internally generates a product, 
process or technology that was previously unknown to the market in which the firm operate.  
If a firm adopts innovation, on the other hand, it assimilates knowledge and technologies 
that have been developed elsewhere and that are new to the organization only (Pérez-Luño 
et al. 2011).  
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According to Rosenbusch et al. (2011) the product development process is considered to 
be a path dependent idiosyncratic dynamic capability and it leads to competitive advantage 
via enhancement, recombination or creation of resources and their deployment in value-
creating strategies (Grant 1996; Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Branzei 
and Vertinsky 2006; Rosenbusch et al. 2011). Rosenbusch et al. (2011) argue that there 
are a number of ways to assess innovation.  They classify innovation measures into input-
related and output-related indicators; innovation input has been associated with research 
and development expenditure and research and development experience of organisations. 
Innovation output has been associated with organisational performance (Rosenbusch et al. 
2011). According to Wiklund (1999) and Soininen et al. (2011) innovation keeps 
organisations ahead of their competitors, gaining competitive advantage and leading to 
improved financial results. According to Goedhuys and Veugelers (2011) product innovation 
translates into superior sales and growth rates and product innovation is a more complex 
process with multiple inputs requiring more advanced knowledge inputs and absorptive 
capacity. Pérez-Luño et al. (2011) classify innovation output as the proportion of total 
innovation output (number or amount of innovations organisations produce) that falls within 
each of the two categories of innovation generation and innovation adoption.  
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Global Report (2010) (Kelly, Bosma and 
Amoros 2010) indicates that GEM assesses innovation in entrepreneurial businesses by 
asking entrepreneurs to rate the newness of their current services and products and the 
level of newness this represents for their clients. In addition, GEM asks each entrepreneur 
to rate industry newness, in terms of the degree of competition the business faces, focusing 
on whether they perceive there are ―many‖, ―few‖ or ―no other businesses‖ offering similar 
products or services. 
2.6. Conclusion of Literature Review  
Private healthcare insurance in South Africa covers only 16% of the population due to cost, 
access and healthcare delivery challenges (Council for Medical Schemes 2010/11). In 
South Africa approximately five-million formally employed people are not covered by private 
healthcare insurance (McLeod and Grobler 2008) and this is a grave concern.  In order for 
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the industry to grow it needs new attractive/innovative insurance products/plans offered by 
health insurers. 
The conceptual research model builds on the existing Domain Framework by Guth and 
Ginsberg (1990) for integrating corporate entrepreneurship into the strategic management 
of a company (Morris et al. 2008).  This research study focuses on the innovation process 
of corporations and includes three independent variables: entrepreneurial orientation (EO), 
external collaboration and regulation. Predicting health insurer product innovation is the 
dependent variable.  The literature review focused on these four variables.  
According to Dess and Lumpkin (2005) entrepreneurial orientation (EO) refers to the 
strategy-making practices that organisations use to identify and launch corporate ventures 
and it represents a frame of mind and a perspective about entrepreneurship that are 
reflected in a firm‘s ongoing processes and corporate culture. Entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) has been positively associated with firm performance.  The literature indicates that the 
three dimensions of EO, innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness are determinants of 
firm performance. According to Urban and Barreira (2008), innovativeness is the 
fundamental posture of an entrepreneurial organisation in terms of developing and creating 
new products and processes. The literature also indicates that innovation is broadly seen 
as an essential component of competitiveness embedded in the organisational structures, 
processes, products and services. According to Lumpkin and Dess (2001) and Hansen et 
al. (2011), proactive behaviours reflect a propensity to act aggressively towards competitor 
organisations in the pursuit of favourable business opportunity. Risk taking behaviours 
result from a willingness to invest in projects that have uncertain outcomes or unusually 
high profits and losses and to take calculated business risks when identifying business 
opportunities (Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Urban and Barreira 2010; Hansen et al. 2011). 
It is therefore important to investigate the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation in actors 
identified for this research study, within the healthcare value chain.  These identified actors 
are health insurers, health insurer administrators and healthcare service providers as major 
contributors in the healthcare value chain. 
External collaboration between health insurers/health insurer administrators and healthcare 
service providers has been recognised as a necessary condition for the development and 
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implementation of innovative health insurer products/plans. Value-based healthcare 
delivery is recognised as the next frontier of healthcare innovation and it focuses on 
competition based on health outcome or health results – positive sum competition.  Porter 
and Teisberg (2006) argue that moving towards positive sum competition on results offers 
the only real way to address the long-standing weaknesses in healthcare delivery while also 
encouraging the entire healthcare system to innovate.  Aligning the incentives of all 
stakeholders in the healthcare value chain will enhance quality, health outcomes and 
efficiencies in the healthcare system. According to Mintzberg (2011) healthcare actors need 
to build systems that both promote health and treat illness and to do that more cooperation 
between healthcare actors are required, not more competition. According to Kouzes and 
Posner (2007) and Vanvactor (2011), external collaboration and cooperation is critical in 
today‘s business environment and collaboration is so critical to success that every 
significant relationship should be treated as if it a lifelong endeavour.  
Regulatory authorities play an important role in the healthcare system in terms of balancing 
cooperation and competition by means of reforms introduced through legislation.  
Regulatory authorities and regulations can support or hamper innovation in the healthcare 
system.  A lack of business model innovation in the healthcare system has been attributed 
to the regulatory environment (Christensen et al. 2009). According to Christensen et al. 
(2009) it has been disruptive competition that has reduced costs dramatically in literally 
every historically instance in which regulators have sought to reduce prices. According to 
Porter and Teisberg (2006) there are three broad areas of healthcare policy, from a 
strategic perspective, that drive healthcare innovation: health insurance and access; 
standards for coverage and; structures of healthcare delivery. It is therefore important to 
investigate whether the presence of strategic regulatory factors, necessary for encouraging 
healthcare innovation, moderates the relationship between EO and health insurer product 
innovation and moderates the relationship between external collaboration and health 
insurer product innovation.  
Motivated by the increasing competition in global markets, companies have started to gasp 
the importance of innovation, since rapidly changing technologies and severe global 
competition rapidly erode the value add of existing products and services (Gunday et al. 
2011). A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or 
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significantly improved in terms of its characteristics or intended uses, including significant 
improvements in technical specification, components and materials, incorporated software, 
user-friendliness or other functional characteristics (OECD Oslo Manual 2005; Gunday et 
al. 2011). Product innovations can utilise new knowledge or technologies, or can be based 
on new uses or combinations of existing knowledge or technologies (Gunday et al. 2011). 
The ‗newness‘ of product concepts is the central element defining innovation, but the scope 
of newness has been conceptualised inconsistently in the literature (Pérez-Luño et al. 
2011). Damanpour and Wischnevsky (2006) and Pérez-Luño et al. (2011) suggested a way 
to address the different scopes of newness in the innovation literature.  They differentiate 
between the generation and the adoption of innovations. Rosenbusch et al. (2011) argue 
that there are a number of ways to assess innovation.  They classify innovation measures 
into input-related and output-related indicators. Innovation input has been associated with 
research and development expenditure and research and development experience of 
organisations; innovation output has been associated with organisational performance 
(Rosenbusch et al. 2011). According to Rosenbusch et al. (2011), entrepreneurs and small 
business owners face the dilemma of deciding whether they should pursue and focus on 
innovation development projects as firm-internal projects or with strategic alliances 
(external partners). They indicate that prior research mainly advocates external 
collaborations and networking for new and small organisations. They also find that internal 
innovation projects lead to greater firm performance than innovation projects with external 
partners. They further stress that their meta-analytical results indicate that the innovation 
projects that focus on external collaboration do not increase the performance of small and 
medium SMEs. 
The research study aims to predict the relationship between health insurer product 
innovation and EO and the relationship between health insurer product innovation and 
external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service providers. The study 
also aims to investigate whether the level of presence of perceived strategic regulatory 
factors, necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation in the private 
healthcare industry of South Africa, weakens the relationship between the level of new 
health insurer product innovation and EO and weakens the relationship between the level of 
new health insurer innovation and external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers. 
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CHAPTER 3:   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology that has been followed for the selection 
of the sample population and sample size, the development of the research instrument, the 
data gathering procedure and the statistical methods used to test the research hypotheses 
and answer the research questions of the research study.  The research paradigm that has 
been used for this research study is based on positivist social science (PSS).  Positivist 
social science is an organised method for combining deductive logic with precise empirical 
observations of individual behaviour in order to discover and confirm a set of probabilistic 
causal laws that can be used to predict general patterns of human activity (Neuman 2011). 
The focus of this research study is explanatory research and the objective is to test certain 
relational hypotheses. This research study followed a quantitative cross-sectional research 
approach. Cross-sectional research examines information on many cases at one point in 
time (Neuman 2011). The proposed research model comprises scales of entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO), external collaboration, regulation and health insurer product innovation. 
 
The following methodological steps were adopted (Suhr 2006): 
Step 1 – The development of a conceptual framework for testing the model; 
Step 2 - The development of a questionnaire to measure the constructs of the model; 
Step 3 – The determination of measurement scales for all the measurement items; 
Step 4 – Pilot testing and revision of the measurement instrument; 
Step 5 – Data collection through an online questionnaire, administered by an independent 
business research organisation; 
Step 6 – Investigation of the measurement aspects of the model through assessing the 
reliability and validity and normality assumptions of the measurement scales relative to 
theoretical expectations. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) are used for empirical testing of hypotheses that relationships exist between the 
observed variables and their underlying latent constructs; 
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Step 7– Multiple regression analysis to test the structure of the model via tests of relational 
hypotheses. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research study is based on explanatory research and followed a quantitative 
approach.  The methodological approach that was adopted is an online survey that was 
administered by an independent business research organisation in order to ensure data 
confidentiality of participants. The questionnaire was delivered via the internet in the form 
of an online questionnaire and elicited perceptions of respondents at managerial levels.  
Management perceptions are the preferred measure of corporate entrepreneurship 
(Antoncic and Hisrich 2004). 
The research questionnaire followed guidelines extracted from the academic literature and 
some of the measurement items were amended based on the nature of the South African 
healthcare industry and the sample populations selected for this study.  Additional 
measurement items were added to existing instruments based on recent academic 
literature. The following advantages of a research questionnaire have been identified, 
based on the research study (Cooper and Schindler 2011). 
- It allows direct contact with specific participants 
- It is a low cost option and can be administered nationally without additional cost 
- It allows participants time to think about the questions 
- It is perceived as more anonymous 
- It allows for rapid data collection 
The following disadvantages have been identified based on the research study (Cooper 
and Schindler 2011): 
- Low response rates are a real risk 
- No interviewer is available for probing, clarification or explanation 
- The questionnaire should not be too long and complex 
- Accurate e-mail lists are required to ensure participants are reached 
- Anxiety among some participants 
- Computer security 
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Ethical consideration has been taken into account in terms of the research design.  The 
study purpose and benefits to the sample population as well as the participant‘s rights and 
protections had been explained previously.  The study design was fully disclosed to 
participants.  The study also adhered to participant confidentially and participants were fully 
debriefed following the data collection process.  Participants‘ rights to privacy were also 
protected during the data collection process. 
3.3 Population and Sample 
3.3.1 Population 
The sampling frame of participants in the supply and demand side structures of the 
healthcare value chain was determined by using the Council for Medical Schemes Annual 
Report (2010/11). This report provided  the sampling frame for  health  insurers  and  health  
insurer  administrators  and  was  also  used  to identify  the  sampling  frame  for  
healthcare  service  provider  disciplines responsible  for the majority of annual healthcare  
benefits paid in the industry. The  focus  of  the  sample  populations  were  CEOs  and  
senior  executives  of health insurers,  health insurer  administrators and healthcare service 
providers, representing  demand  and supply side structures as indicated in the private 
healthcare value  chain, adapted  from Stremersch  (2008).   The sample population was 
determined as follows in order to ensure proper representation: 
 
1. Health Insurers (open and restricted health insurers) 
The target population was CEOs (Principal Officers) of all the registered health 
insurers in South Africa.  A list of all the registered health insurers is provided in 
Appendix D.  
2. Health Insurer Administrators – The target population was CEOs and senior 
executives of all the accredited health insurer administrators in South Africa.  A list of 
the accredited health insurer administrators is provided in Appendix E.  
3. Health care service providers – The target population was CEOs and senior 
executives of the four largest hospitals groups in South Africa, as well as the CEO of 
the representative body of the independent hospitals, representing the majority of 
hospital beds in the country (89% of total private hospital beds) (HASA 2012) – a list 
62 
 
of the hospital groups is provided in Appendix F. CEOs and regional executives of 
general practitioner and specialist associations/societies, representing the majority of 
general practitioners/specialists and specialist disciplines in South Africa.  A list of the 
general practitioner and specialist representative organisations/societies is provided 
in Appendix G.  The healthcare service provider population (hospitals, specialists and 
general practitioners) identified for this research study is responsible for sixty one 
percent (61%) of total healthcare benefits paid by health insurers on an annual basis 
(Council for Medical Schemes 2010/11). 
3.3.2 Sample and sampling method 
The sample of respondents is assumed to be representative of private health insurers, 
health insurer administrators and major healthcare service providers in the private 
healthcare industry in South Africa. The  ultimate  objective  was  to build  a  sample  size  of  
n=150,  after  allowing  for  lack  of response  from  the sample populations. 
 
A non-probability judgmental sampling method was used for the private hospital sample. 
According to Cooper and Schindler (2011) judgement sampling occurs when a researcher 
selects sample members to conform to some criterion. The researcher chose judgment 
sampling for the hospital groups based on the selection of Funder Relations Executives as 
sample members due to their specific business interaction roles with health insurers and 
health insurer administrators on product innovation and hospital contracting principles. The 
four major private hospital groups were included in the hospital provider sample as well the 
independent hospitals‘ representative body. As mentioned previously, Funder Relations 
Executives were identified as participants due to their business interaction with health 
insurers and health insurer administrators. The five Funder Relations Executives of the 
hospital groups received an electronic link to the online questionnaire via e-mail. 
 
A non-probability judgmental sampling method was used for the general practitioner and 
specialist representative associations/societies sample. As mentioned before a judgmental 
sampling method was used due to the fact that specialist and general practitioner provider 
associations/societies are responsible for representing specialists and general practitioners 
in healthcare service provider negotiations and product innovation with health insurers and 
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health insurer administrators in South Africa. The major specialist and general practitioner 
professional associations/societies were included in the general practitioner and specialist 
sample.  For this reason, the views of the CEOs and executives of these healthcare service 
provider associations/societies are assumed to be representative of the specialist and 
general practitioners‘ views of product innovation in the private healthcare industry in South 
Africa.   CEOs and Executives of nine provider representative organisations/societies were 
identified and the CEOs received the electronic link to the online questionnaire via e-mail for 
distribution to their respective executives for completion. 
 
All one hundred (n=100) registered health insurers in South Africa was included in the 
health insurer sample. A non-probability purposive saturation sampling method was 
adopted. All CEOs (Principal Officers) received the online survey link via e-mail. According 
to Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) in terms of instrument content, the more widely 
distributed a particular experience or domain of knowledge, the fewer the number of 
participants required to provide an understanding of the phenomenon of interest. They 
emphasise that it really depends on how a researcher wants to use the data and what the 
researcher wants to achieve from the analysis. They indicated that Johnson (1998:153) 
stipulated that it is crucial that the connection between theory, design (including sampling), 
and data analysis are established from the beginning and Johnson (1998) highlights that 
how the data were collected, both in terms of measurement and sampling, is directly related 
to how it can be analysed. They further emphasise that if the goal is to describe a shared 
perception, belief, or behavior among a relatively homogeneous group, then a sample of 
twelve will likely be sufficient. If a researcher wishes to determine how two or more groups 
differ along a given dimension, then the researcher would likely use a quota sample and 
might purposively select twelve participants per group of interest (Guest et al. 2006).  
 
Guest et al. (2006) also indicates that the more similar participants in a sample are in terms 
of their experiences with respect to the research domain, the sooner sample saturation will 
be reached.  
 
All twenty four (n=24) accredited health insurer administrators in South Africa were included 
in the health insurer administrator sample yielding a saturation sample.  The sample size of 
the accredited health insurer administrators totalled n=24. The CEOs of all the accredited 
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health insurer administrators were sent an e-mail containing the electronic survey link. The 
CEOs were also requested to identify senior executives in their respective organisations to 
complete the survey.  A non-probability judgement sampling method was used for this 
sample population.  
 
All respondents were based nationally and represent the two major demand and supply 
side structures of the health care value chain, adapted from Stremersch (2008). 
Table 1: Profile of respondents 
RESPONDENT TYPE 
1. CEOs of all the registered health insurers in South Africa (n=100 health insurers) 
2. CEOs and senior executives of all the health insurer administrators in South Africa (n=24 
health insurer administrators) 
3. Funder Relations Executives of the five largest hospital groups in South Africa (n=5 hospital 
groups) 
4. CEOs and regional executives of the largest general practitioner representative 
associations/societies in South Africa (n=3 general practitioner associations)  
5. CEOs and regional executives of the largest specialist representative associations/societies 
in South Africa (n=6 specialist representative organisations) 
 
An independent research organisation, Greenfields Institute of Business (Pty) Ltd was 
contracted to collect the data using Qualtrics research software (www.qualtrics.com). This 
was done with the objective of enhancing the confidentiality of respondents. All CEOs of 
health insurers, CEOs of Health insurer administrators, CEOs of healthcare service provider 
associations/societies and the Funder Relationships Executives of the five hospital groups 
received a personalised e-mail from the researcher positioning the research, objectives of 
the research and the value of the research to the South African private healthcare industry. 
The e-mails were followed up with telephone calls. 
 
A total of 154 respondents completed the online survey. Fifteen (15) respondents did not 
fully complete the survey and their responses were deleted from the data set, leaving the 
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total number of respondents at 139. The health insurer response rate achieved was 34%, a 
total of 34 responses. Fourteen open health insurers responded (51.8% of all registered 
open health insurers) and 20 closed health insurers (27.3% of all registered closed health 
insurers). Fifty percent (50%) of the number of large open health insurers (>30,000 
beneficiaries) as defined in the Council for Medical Schemes‘ annual report, responded 
(Council for Medical Schemes 2010/11).  Sixty percent (60%) of the number of large closed 
health insurers (>30,000 beneficiaries), as defined in the Council for Medical Schemes' 
annual report, responded (Council for Medical Schemes 2010/2011). The number of private 
healthcare lives covered by the 34 health insurers that responded totalled 68% of all the 
private healthcare lives in the South African private healthcare industry. 
 
The health insurer administrator responses totalled 83. The responses from the general 
practitioner representative organisations totalled 11 and 7 responses were received from the 
specialist representative organisations. Four out of the five private hospital groups 
responded, with 4 responses received. 
 
Based on the sampling method and response rates, the researcher considers all samples as 
adequate representations of their respective populations. 
3.3.3 External validity of the study 
According to Cooper and Schindler (2011), external validity is largely a matter of 
generalisation, which is an inductive process of extrapolating beyond the data collected. 
The ability to generalise the research findings across the population for this study was 
controlled by carefully selecting the sample population for this research.   The   sample   
population   was   selected   based   on   their   in-depth knowledge  of the healthcare  
industry,  and included  all major health  insurers, health insurer administrators, private 
hospital groups and healthcare service provider representative organisations, representing 
demand and supply  side structures of the private healthcare value chain in South Africa. 
 
Additional measures to control non-response bias were implemented in order to generalise 
the study's findings across the sample population. E-mail reminders were  sent  out  weekly  
to  the  sample  population  for  four  weeks  to maximise response rates. 
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According to Cooper and Schindler (2011), external validity is also concerned with the 
interaction of the experimental treatment with other factors and the resulting impact on the 
ability to generalise to (and across) times, settings, or persons. However, none of these are 
threats to the external validity of the results of the present study in view of its non-
experimental nature and thus absence of treatment effects. 
3.4 The Research Instrument 
The research instrument was designed to answer the three research questions and to 
provide the data for testing the four relational hypotheses.  The questionnaire was a closed 
online questionnaire consisting of five parts/sections and a total of 74 closed ended 
questions. The survey was conducted online and results captured through a remote online 
system, Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com).  
3.4.1 Structure of the research instrument 
The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. It consisted of the following parts: 
Section A - This section focuses on biographical data (control variables for the study, i.e. 
firm size, firm age, industry sector, geographical area). This section also included questions 
derived from the literature on organisational competitive capability described by Ireland et 
al. (2009), and used a seven point Likert scale. The range of the seven point Likert scale is 
from 1 - strongly disagree trough to 7 – strongly agree with the midpoint 4 – neither agree 
nor disagree. The levels are: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – somewhat disagree, 4 
– neither agree nor disagree, 5 – somewhat agree, 6 agree and 7 – strongly agree. 
 
Section B – This section focuses on entrepreneurial orientation (EO) as one of the 
independent variables. This section aimed to answer Research Question 1 and test 
research hypotheses 1a and 1b, The EO instrument was based on the original Covin and 
Slevin (1998) scale as modified by Kreiser et al. (2002). All items were measured using a 
seven point Likert scale. The range of the seven point Likert scale is from 1 - strongly 
disagree trough to 7 – strongly agree with the midpoint 4 – neither agree nor disagree. The 
levels are: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – somewhat disagree, 4 – neither agree 
nor disagree, 5 – somewhat agree, 6 agree and 7 – strongly agree. 
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The following EO constructs were measured in this section: innovativeness, proactiveness 
and risk taking. 
 
Section C - This section focuses on external collaboration between health insurers and 
health care service providers and provided the data to measure this independent variable.   
This section aimed to answer Research Question 2 and test research hypotheses 2a-d.  
The collaboration measurement instrument was based on the instrument used by Zillich et 
al. (2005) to measure physician-pharmacist collaboration (PPCI) from a physician 
perspective. This instrument was adapted to measure health insurer/health   insurer   
administrator   and    healthcare   service   provider collaboration from   both   health 
insurer/health insurer administrator and healthcare service provider perspectives.  This 
instrument was further adapted to include items on a seven point Likert scale designed to 
measure the extent to which the healthcare insurer and healthcare service provider 
relationship needs to be restructured, as per Porter and Teisberg (2006) to facilitate value-
based competition/innovation in healthcare. The range of the seven point Likert scale is 
from 1 - strongly disagree trough to 7 – strongly agree with the midpoint 4 – neither agree 
nor disagree. The levels are: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – somewhat disagree, 4 
– neither agree nor disagree, 5 – somewhat agree, 6 agree and 7 – strongly agree. 
 
This section of the questionnaire was designed to measure the constructs of 
trustworthiness (T), role specification (RS), relationship initiation (RI) and health insurer 
and healthcare service provider relationship restructure (RR). 
 
Section D – This section focuses on regulation as the independent moderator variable 
of the researcher‘s model, impacting product innovation by health insurers.  This 
section aimed to answer Research Question 3 and test research hypotheses 3a and b 
and 4a-d. This section was not based on a previous instrument and the construction of 
the instrument followed guidelines in terms of strategic regulatory factors present in 
healthcare regulation, encouraging health insurer product innovation and value-based 
health care delivery by Porter and Teisberg (2006) and Christensen et al. (2009).  The 
instrument was designed to measure the following constructs: 
- Encourage competition in healthcare to reduce prices 
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- Improve health insurance and access to private healthcare 
- Standards for coverage 
- Structure of health care delivery 
All items were measured using a seven point Likert scale. The range of the seven point 
Likert scale is from 1 - strongly disagree trough to 7 – strongly agree with the midpoint 4 – 
neither agree nor disagree. The levels are: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – 
somewhat disagree, 4 – neither agree nor disagree, 5 – somewhat agree, 6 agree and 7 – 
strongly agree. 
 
Section E - This section focused on measuring the dependent variable, health insurer 
product   innovation. The questionnaire was designed to measure two aspects of this 
construct, internal innovation input; and innovation output. Internal innovation input was 
measured by questioning the research and development intensity of organisations. This 
section of the questionnaire used forced choice items in terms of response options as well 
as a seven point Likert scale for certain items. The range of the seven point Likert scale is 
from 1 - strongly disagree trough to 7 – strongly agree with the midpoint 4 – neither agree 
nor disagree. Innovation output was measured through items on the following constructs: 
innovation adoption, innovation generation and organisational competitiveness. This 
section of the questionnaire was based on combining and adapting previous measurement 
instruments used by Pérez-Luño et al. (2011), Rosenbusch et al. (2011) and the GEM 
Global report (2010) (Kelly et al. 2010) for internal innovation input and innovation output.  
Items were measured using a seven point Likert scale and forced choice items in terms of 
response options. The range of the seven point Likert scale is from 1 - strongly disagree 
trough to 7 – strongly agree with the midpoint 4 – neither agree nor disagree. The levels 
are: 1 – strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – somewhat disagree, 4 – neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 – somewhat agree, 6 agree and 7 – strongly agree. 
3.4.2 Control for Common Method Bias 
Response bias refers to tendencies of respondents to respond systematically to 
questionnaire items on some basis other than the specific item content (Baumgartner and 
Steenkamp 2001), (Tellis and Chandrasekaran 2010). According to Tellis and 
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Chandrasekaran (2010), there is not much clarity on how, and if at all, response biases 
distort survey results. 
According to Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee and Podsakoff (2003), most researchers agree that 
common method variance (CMV), which is the variance that is attributable to the 
measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures represent, is a potential 
problem in behavioural research. According to Siemsen, Roth and Oliveira (2010) many 
researchers agree that CMV exists in some form and they indicate that the literature 
remains inconclusive on whether and when CMV inflates observed relationships among 
variables. Indeed, in spite of the general recognition of the possibility of correlations being 
distorted due to the influence of general bias, some authors are less concerned about the 
effects of common method bias. According to Bidderman, Nguyen, Cunningham and 
Ghorbani (2011), there have been few reported instances of changes in correlations after 
removal of the influence of bias. 
 
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), common method biases arise from having a common 
rater, a common measurement context, a common item context, or from characteristics of 
the items themselves, and in any given study it is possible for several of these factors to be 
present. It is therefore important to evaluate the conditions under which the data are 
obtained carefully to assess the extent to which method biases may be a problem 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Podsakoff et al. (2003) indicates that method biases are likely to be 
particularly powerful in studies in which the data for both the predictor and criterion variable 
are obtained from the same person in the same measurement context using the same item 
context and similar item characteristics.  
 
As the same respondents responded to all the questionnaire scales and the seven-point 
Likert-type scale was the dominant measurement scale used, the researcher was careful to 
control for common method biases in the responses using both design and statistical 
controls. These are two primary ways to control for method biases (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003) procedural remedies include the following: 
 Obtain measure of predictor and criterion variables from different sources 
 Methodological separation of measurement 
 Protecting respondent anonymity and reducing evaluation apprehension 
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 Counter balance question order 
 Improving scale items 
 
Following these recommendations, the researcher applied procedural controls through 
obtaining measures of the criterion variable from other sources by introducing an 
independent scale of organisational competitive capability (Ireland et al. 2009) as a check 
and correlate of the criterion variable. Furthermore, the respondents clustered on measures 
of innovation input were compared on the dependent variable measures of innovation 
adoption, innovation generation and organisational competitiveness as a validity check of 
the dependent variable measures. In addition, the researcher respected respondent 
anonymity. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher applied confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to the empirical 
data of the scales of each construct to check whether a single factor could account for most 
of the variance in the data as would occur if there was strong method bias in the responses 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003).The CFA method is a more recent and more sophisticated test of 
common method bias than other tests such as the Harman single-factor test that uses 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to examine the unrotated factor solution for the 
dimensionality in the data (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The basic assumption of these tests is 
that if a substantial amount of common method variance is present, either a single factor 
will emerge from the factor analysis or one general factor will account for the majority of the 
covariance among the measures (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
3.5 Procedure for Data Collection 
The data was collected through an online survey.   The online survey link was e-mailed to a 
selected sample population as per Table 1 of the report. 
 
The results were captured through a remote online system provided by Qualtrics 
(www.qualtrics.com) and administered by Greenfields Institute of Business (Pty) Ltd, an 
independent business research organisation. The instrument was tested by conducting pilot 
testing before it was used for the main study. Pilot testing was conducted by selecting 15 
senior managers from Discovery Health (Pty) Ltd with sufficient knowledge of the demand 
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and supply side structures of the health care value chain as presented by Stremersch 
(2008). The pilot test showed that the questionnaire‘s instructions were clear and that the 
items were unambiguous. 
 
3.6 Analysis of the model: Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
The model comprised the relationships among the constructs of entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO), external collaboration, regulation and health insurer product innovation, and specified 
their respective measurement scales. According to Kline (2011), these are the model‘s a 
priori specifications that the researcher tests to see whether they are supported by the 
empirical data gathered. Kline (2011) explains that models may be tested in three contexts: 
a strictly confirmatory context in which the researcher‘s model is accepted or rejected 
based on the fit of the data; a less restrictive context of multiple alternative models in which 
some of the models may be retained and others rejected; and finally, a context of model 
generation in which the researcher‘s model is modified if the empirical data does not fit 
(Kline 2011:8). 
The aim of the researcher in the present study is best characterised in the context of model 
generation as the researcher applied EFA to determine the dimensionality of the constructs 
of the model and then used CFA to test and compare both the empirically and the 
theoretically derived factor structures. Model generation occurred when the CFA results 
showed the empirically derived factor structure as superior to the theoretically derived 
structure. 
Although Structural equation modelling (SEM) was proposed to evaluate the model, the 
sample size realised did not allow the application of this statistical procedure. According to 
Kline (2011), an ideal sample size-to-parameters ratio would be 20:1, a ―typical‖ sample 
size being about 200 cases in studies where SEM is used. Instead, the researcher tested 
the structure of the model by applying regression analysis to each of the hypotheses of 
the model separately and ignoring the psychometrics properties of scale reliability and 
validity. SEM would have tested the overall model at once, simultaneously taking into 
account the reliability and validity of the scales. 
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3.7 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive data was gathered for respondents and the organisations they represented.  
 
3.7.1 Organisational characteristics 
 
Frequency tables and their corresponding stacked bar graphs were used to describe the 
data distributions of industry sector, provider organisation, health insurer organisation and 
geographical location, firm age and firm size of the organisations represented by the 
respondents. 
The organisational competitive capability measures were used as an additional validity 
check for the dependent variable, organisational competitiveness using a correlation 
analysis. 
3.7.2 Innovation input 
 
As there were several measures of innovation input in the measurement scale, the 
multivariate technique of cluster analysis was used to analyse these variables 
simultaneously by grouping similar responses in terms of the innovation input variables of 
the number of research and development (R&D) staff employed, whether the organisation 
has an approved R&D budget or not and if the organisation‘s R&D budget encourages 
innovation. These groupings were also compared on the dependent variable measures of 
innovation adoption, innovation generation and organisational competitiveness as a validity 
check of the dependent variable measures. 
 
3.8 Evaluation of the Model: Measurement characteristics of 
scales 
 
According to Kline (2011) it is critical to select measures with strong psychometric 
characteristics and report these characteristics in written summaries. If the scores of the 
measures that are analysed do not have good psychometric properties, then the results can 
be meaningless (Kline 2011). 
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The researcher assessed the measurement adequacy of the scales of each of the model‘s 
constructs separately using first reliability measures, then exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
and then confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), of empirically based and theoretically based 
models.  
3.8.1 Reliability of scales 
Score reliability is the degree to which scores in a particular sample are free from random 
measurement error, and is estimated as one minus the proportion of total observed variance 
due to random error (Kline 2011).  A measure is reliable to a degree that it supplies 
consistent results, and thus reliability is a necessary contributor to validity although not a 
sufficient condition for validity (Cooper and Schindler 2011).  Internal consistency assesses 
the degree to which items in the scale are measuring consistently (Hair, Black, Babin and 
Anderson 2010). Although internal consistency does not assess construct validity, the 
rationale for internal consistency is that the individual items or indicators of the scale should 
be measuring the same construct and thus be highly intercorrelated (Hair et al. 2010). 
Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient is used to measure internal consistency reliability, the degree 
to which responses are consistent across the items within a measure (Kline 2011). 
Generally reliability coefficients around 0.9 are considered excellent, values around 0.8 are 
very good and values around 0.7 are adequate (Kline 2011). According to Hair et al. (2010) 
the generally agreed upon lower limit for Cronbach‘s alpha is 0.70, although it may decrease 
to 0.60 in exploratory research. According to Kline (2011), values less than 0.5 indicate that 
most of the score variance is due to random error, an unacceptable amount of imprecision in 
most research. According to Kline (2011), low score reliability has many detrimental effects 
in manifest variable analysis – poor reliability reduces the power of statistical tests and it 
also generally attenuates effect sizes below their true (population) values as unreliability in 
the scores of variables attenuates their observed correlations (Kline 2011). 
 
The researcher used two measures of internal consistency reliability – Cronbach alpha and 
the average inter item correlations to assess the reliability of the scales of  the three 
independent variables (EO, external collaboration and regulation) and the dependent 
variable (health insurer product innovation), as well as their underlying subscales. The 
average inter item correlations were considered as the value of Cronbach alpha increases 
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with the number of items in the scale. As the number of items differed across scales, the 
average inter-item correlations allowed fairer comparisons of the internal consistency 
reliabilities of these scales. The inter item correlations is the descriptive information about 
the correlation of each item with the sum of all the remaining items and Hair et al. (2010) 
recommends that the average inter-item correlations should exceed 0.30. The Standardised 
Alpha coefficient of internal consistency was not used as all the questionnaire items were 
scaled on the same Likert-type scale. Standardised Alpha should be used when all scale 
items have been standardised, as would be appropriate for example when the individual 
scale items are not scaled the same – variance and covariance are taken into account for 
computation (Yu 2001).  
3.8.2 Validity of the scales of the model 
According to Kline (2011), score validity concerns the soundness of the inferences based on 
the scores, and information about score validity conveys to the researcher whether applying 
a test is capable of achieving certain objectives. All forms of score validity are absorbed 
under the broader concept of construct validity (Kline 2011).  According to Kline (2011) 
there is no single, definite test of construct validity and measurement related research 
usually concerns a particular facet of construct validity.  
 
Criterion-related validity concerns whether scores (X) relate to an external criterion (Y) 
against which the scores can be evaluated (Kline 2011).In view of the importance of 
investigating the construct validity of the dependent variable, an independent measure of 
organisational competitiveness, a key dimension of the dependent variable, was introduced 
in the form of a scale of organisational competitive capacity. Correlating these two 
measures served as external criterion-related validity of the dependent variable, lending 
further evidence to the construct validity of the dependent variable scale. Regrettably, space 
constraints did not allow for the inclusion of other independent measures of the other scales 
of the questionnaire for the purpose of investigating their construct validity through criterion-
related validity. 
Convergent validity and discriminant validity are measures of construct validity and involve 
the evaluation of measures against each other instead of against an external context (Kline 
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2011). The researcher studied the construct validity of the scales using the statistical 
techniques of CFA and EFA, CFA allows the researcher to test the hypothesis that a 
relationship between the observed variables and their underlying latent construct(s) exists. 
The   researcher   uses   knowledge   of   theory,   empirical   research,   or   both, 
postulates   the relationship pattern a priori and then tests the hypothesis statistically (Suhr 
2006). The assumption of factor analysis that sufficient correlations exist among the 
variables of the analysis was tested using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy (MSA) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity before proceeding with  
exploratory factor analysis. According to Hair et al. (2010) Bartlett‘s Test of Sphericity is 
used to determine the appropriateness of factor analysis and it provides the statistical 
significance that the correlation matrix has significant correlations among at least some of 
the correlations. Hair et al (2010) notes that increasing the sample size causes the Bartlett 
Test to become more sensitive in detecting correlations among variables. According to Hair 
et al. (2010) the measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) is also used to quantify the degree 
of intercorrelations among variables and the appropriateness of factor analysis. According 
to Hair et al. (2010) the MSA index ranges from 0 to 1, reaching 1 when each variable is 
perfectly predicted without error by the other variables. According to Hair et al. (2010) the 
measure can be interpreted with the following guidelines: 0.80 or above, meritorious; 0.70 or 
above, middling; 0.60 or above, mediocre; 0.50 or above, miserable; and below 0.50, 
unacceptable. The MSA also increases as the sample size increases (Hair et al. 2010). 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is used to identify the number of constructs and the 
underlying factor structure (Suhr 2006).  It is used to explore the possible underlying factor 
structure of a set of measured variables without imposing any preconceived structure on the 
outcome (Child 1990; Suhr 2006).  
In the present research, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used as a statistical tool for 
testing hypotheses about convergent and discriminant validity (Kline 2011). Analysis of the 
results of exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was also considered in evaluating construct 
validity, particularly when the CFA results were weak.  
As the sample size achieved in the research did not allow for factor analysis of all 74 items 
simultaneously, CFA and EFA were performed in turn on all the items of the scales and 
subscales designed to measure each of the constructs of the model. Thus separate factor 
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analyses were computed on the items of the subscales of the independent  variables of the 
model (EO,  external  collaboration   and  regulation)   and on  the items of the subscales of 
the dependent variable,  health  insurer  product  innovation  (health insurer product 
innovation adoption, health insurer product innovation generation and organisational 
competitiveness).Thereafter, a higher order CFA was used on the subscale scores (rather 
than the item scores) to test the model for a second-order factor structure (Hair et 
al.,2010). Thus second order CFA was performed on the subscale scores of EO, 
external collaboration, regulation and health insurer product innovation to establish 
construct validity at the subscale level. This second order CFA aimed to assess 
whether the subscales that purported to reflect the same construct were more highly 
intercorrelated than subscales purported to reflect different constructs. 
As a factor loading is the correlation of the variable and the factor, a squared loading is the 
amount of the variable‘s total variance accounted for by the factor (Hair et al. 2010).Thus a 
loading value of 0.3 translates to approximately 10% explained variance, a 0.5 loading 
indicates 25% of the variance is accounted for by the factor; and the loading must exceed 
0.7 for the factor to account for 50% of the variance of a variable (Hair et al. 2010). Factor 
loadings in the range of ± 0.3 to ± 0.4 are considered to meet the minimal level for 
interpretation of structure; factor loadings of ± 0.5 or greater are considered practically 
significant and loadings exceeding 0.70 are considered indicative of well-defined structure 
(Hair et al. 2010). 
3.8.3 Testing factor structure via CFA 
Rather than assessing all aspects of the model simultaneously as in SEM, the researcher 
constructed a standard confirmatory factor analysis model for each construct of the model 
separately in which the number of factors and their correspondence with the measurement 
scales were specified (Kline 2011) – as an example, see Appendix C for an explanation of 
the standard CFA model for entrepreneurial orientation (EO). The structural equation 
diagram was used for each of the model constructs, confirming the construct validity of 
each of the constructs. As mentioned in section 3.6 structural equation modelling (SEM) 
was proposed to evaluate the structure of the model but the sample size realised did not 
allow the application of this statistical procedure and regression analysis will be used to 
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analyse the path model, using a path diagram (Figure 3). A path model is a structural 
model for observed variables and a structural model represents hypotheses about effect 
priority (Kline 2011). 
According to Hair et al. (2010) absolute fit indices are a direct measure of how well the 
model specified by the researcher reproduces the observed data. The following absolute fit 
indices were used in the data analysis: 
 Chi- square statistic 
 Non-centrality-based goodness-of-fit  (GOF) indices 
 Population non-centrality parameter 
 Steiger-Lind root mean square error of approximation  (RMSEA) 
 Population  gamma index 
 Adjusted population gamma index 
 Single sample goodness-of-fit indices 
 Joreskog GFI 
 Joreskog AGFI 
 Standardised root mean residual (SRMR)  
 Discrepancy function 
Chi-square statistic 
According to Hair et al. (2010), the most fundamental absolute fit index is the chi-square 
statistic. It is the only statistically-based SEM fit measure and is essentially the same as the 
chi-square statistic used in cross-classification analysis between two non-metric measures -
the only distinction is that when used as a goodness  of  fit (GOF)  measure  the  researcher  
is  looking  for  no  differences between the matrices to support the model as representative  
of the data (Hair et al. 2010). In SEM a relatively small chi-square  value and corresponding 
large p-value  are  indicators  that  there  is  no  statistical  difference  between  the  two 
matrices,  to  support  the idea  that  a proposed  theory  fits  reality  (Hair  et al. 2010). As 
this statistic may prove to be significant in large samples based on small differences and 
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thus small effect size, other criteria are used to complement it. The main measures are now 
described. 
Population non-centrality parameter 
This index directly estimates the population noncentrality parameter. This estimation   is  a  
measure  of  "badness  of  fit"  and  is  computed  with  a  90% confidence interval (StatSoft 
Inc. 2011). 
Steiger-Lind RMSEA index 
According to Hair et al. (2010), RMSEA better represents how well a model fits a 
population, not just a sample used for estimation.  It corrects  for both  model complexity  
and  sample  size  by  including  each  in  its  computation  and  lower RMSEA values 
indicate better fit (Hair et al. 2010). Values of the RMSEA index below 0.5 indicate good fit 
and values below 0.1 indicate outstanding fit (StatSoft Inc. 2011). 
Population gamma index 
According  to StatSoft Inc. (2011)  the population gamma index is an estimate of the 
population  GFI,  the  value  of the GFI that would  be obtained  if we could analyse  the 
population  covariance matrix σ. For this index good fit is indicated by values above 0.9 or 
0.95 (Hair et al. 2010). 
Adjusted population gamma index 
The adjusted  population  gamma  index  is an estimate  of  the population  GFI, corrected 
for model parsimony  and good fit is indicated  by values above 0.95 (StatSoft Inc. 2011). 
Joreskog GFI 
This index is a negatively based estimate of the population GFI, and it tends to produce a 
slightly pessimistic view of the quality of the population fit, and values above 0.95 indicate 
good fit (StatSoft Inc. 2011). 
Joreskog AGFI 
This index is also a negatively based estimate of the population equivalent and values 
above 0.95 indicate good fit (StatSoft Inc. 2011). 
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Standardised root mean residual (SRMR) 
According to Hair et al. (2010) the standardised value of route mean square residual (RMR) 
is useful for comparing fit across models.   According to Hair et al. (2010) lower SRMR 
values represent better fit and higher values represent worse fit. According to Hair et al. 
(2010) a rule of thumb is that an SRMR value of over 0.1 suggests a problem with fit. 
 
Discrepancy function 
The  discrepancy  function  is  a numerical  value  that  expresses  how  badly  a structural 
model reproduces  the observed  data (StatSoft Inc. 2011). The larger the value of the 
discrepancy function, the worse the fit of model to data and the discrepancy function value 
is zero only if fit is perfect (StatSoft Inc. 2011). 
The remainder of the methodology to be described in this chapter refers to the testing 
of the structure of the relationships in the model posited by the researcher.  
3.8.4 Tests of measurement variables 
To describe the distributions of the scores of all the measurement variables, the variable 
means and medians were used as measures of central tendency, and the standard 
deviations were used as the measure of variability.  
Tests of assumptions of score distributions 
Score distributions were examined for normality using the measures of skewness and 
kurtosis to indicate the distribution shape in terms of symmetry and peakedness 
respectively. While positive skew indicates that most of the scores are below the mean and 
negative skew indicates that most of the scores are above the mean (Kline 2011). 
Furthermore, the skew index (Sl) and kurtosis index (Kl) are standardised measures of 
these characteristics (Kline 2011). Variables with absolute values of Sl> 3 are described as 
extremely skewed and those with absolute values for Kl of about 8 to over 20 indicate 
extreme kurtosis (Kline 2011). These criteria were used by the researcher in deciding 
whether to apply transformations to normalise the score distributions using mathematical 
operations to convert the original scores to new ones that may be more normally distributed 
(Kline 2011). The researcher used the cube transformation function for transforming the 
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highly negatively skewed empirical distribution of relationship restructure (RR) scores 
reflecting the construct of external collaboration.  
3.8.5 Comparison of the subgroups on the measurement variables 
As the sample of respondents of the research comprised three underlying subgroups 
(health insurers, health insurer administrators and healthcare service providers as major 
actors in the healthcare value chain), the researcher needed to ascertain whether the 
model could be tested on the full sample of respondents, or on any of the subgroups 
separately. 
The comparisons of the subgroups were based firstly on the means of the scales and 
subscales using independent t-tests to check for differences between the health insurer and 
the health insurer administrator subgroups. When no significant differences were discerned 
between these subgroups, they were combined and their means similarly tested against 
those of the healthcare service providers. In the case of significant t-test comparisons, the 
effect sizes of the subgroup differences were computed to establish the practical 
significance or meaningfulness of the differences. The effect size is expressed as the 
differences in group means divided by their standard deviation (Hair et al. 2010). The 
magnitude of the effect size has a direct impact on the power of the statistical test. An effect 
size (d) of 0.2 is deemed small, 0.5 medium and 0.8 large (Cohen 1992).  
The comparability of the subgroups was assessed further by comparing the subgroups in 
terms of the structure of the relationships among their scales. Comparisons were based on 
the Pearson product moment correlations among the variables for each of the three 
subgroups considered separately. The respective correlations of the independent 
subgroups were then compared pair wise using a normal curve test through the Fisher z 
transformation of the correlation coefficient (Cohen 1992).  
 
3.9 Evaluation of the Model: Structural aspects of the model 
As previously stated, ideally the researcher would have used SEM to test 
simultaneously the measurement and structural aspects of the model. In addition to 
the efficiency and methodological elegance of SEM, the advantage of this method is 
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that the unreliability of the measures is taken into account when testing the structure of 
the model. By contrast, linear regression assumes that the scores of the predictors are 
perfectly reliable (Kline 2011) and consequently, poor regression results may in part be due 
to unreliability in measurement scales rather than the correlations between variables. 
For ease of reference and context, the model that was tested in the research study is 
presented in figure 10. 
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Figure 10 - Conceptual Research Model, Source: (Own source) 
3.9.1 Regression analysis 
The regression equation of the model that was tested via the empirical data is: 
 Level of Health Insurer Product innovation =   + β₁ (EO) +β₂ (External Collaboration) 
 + β₃(Regulation) + β₄(EO*Regulation) +β₅(External Collaboration*Regulation) 
  
According to Kline (2011), the assumptions of multiple regression are stringent and are 
summarised as follows: 
 Regression weights reflect linear relationships only; 
 Statistical tests in multiple regression assume that the residuals are normally 
distributed and have uniform variances across all levels of the predictors; 
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 Multiple linear regression assumed that the scores of the predictors are perfectly 
reliable. 
Multiple regression analysis has been performed to test the model as per the revised 
regression equation. The model predicts health insurer product innovation which includes 
the following constructs: 
 Innovation adoption 
 Innovation generation 
 Organisational competitiveness 
In order to alleviate collinearity problems in moderated multiple regression models, some 
authors (Aiken and West, 1991, Irwin and McClelland, 2001) suggest mean centering of the 
independent variables and interaction terms (Echambadi and Hess 2007). However, 
evidence by Echambadi and Hess (2007) have proved analytically that mean-centering 
neither changes the computational precision of parameters, the sampling accuracy of main 
effects, simple effects, interaction effects, nor the R². Gaticon and Vosgerau (2005) also 
established that mean centering does not reduce multicollinearity at all, even if the bivariate 
correlation between x₁ and x₁x₂ is decreased. 
Mean centering has therefore not been used in preparing the independent variables and 
interaction terms for the regression analysis. 
Regression coefficients are indicators of the relative impact and importance of the 
independent variables in their relationship with the dependent variable (Hair et al. 2010). In 
order to use the regression coefficients for explanatory purposes, it must be ensured that all 
the independent variables are on comparable scales (Hair et al. 2010). Standardisation of 
the regression coefficient is required to achieve this objective. The beta coefficient is used 
for this purpose (Hair et al. 2010). 
When comparing regression models, the most common standard used is overall predictive 
fit, and R² provides this information (Hair et al. 2010). As more variables are included in the 
model, R² will always increase. In order to compare between models with different numbers 
of independent variables, the adjusted R² was used (Hair et al. 2010). The adjusted R² is 
also helpful in comparing models between different data sets, because it will compensate 
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for the different sample sizes (Hair et al. 2010). In the present study, adjusted R² was useful 
when comparing the model based on different subgroups. 
Based on the comparison between the difference in means of the subgroups and the 
difference in inter correlations among variables of the subgroups, the regression analysis 
has included or excluded certain subgroups in order to control for underestimation of the 
results. 
 
3.9.2 Regression models tested 
Tests of the following regression models were performed: 
1.  The test of EO vs. Health Insurer product innovation 
 Tests of hypotheses 1a, b and 3a, b 
2. The tests of External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) and External Collaboration (RR) 
vs. Health insurer product innovation 
 Tests of hypotheses 2a-d and 4a-d 
3. Jointly specified hypothesis to test for specification error – Hypotheses 5 and 
6. 
 Specification error refers to a problem of omitted predictors that account 
for some unique proportion of total criterion variance, but are not included 
in the analysis (Kline 2011). According to Kline (2011), overestimation 
due to the omission of a predictor occurs more often than 
underestimation and to avoid serious specification error is to reduce the 
potential number of left-out variables. 
 Hypotheses 5a,b - Test of EO * Regulation (moderator variable) vs. health 
insurer product innovation - inclusive of all main variables 
 Hypotheses 6a-d - Test of External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) * Regulation 
vs. Health insurer product innovation (inclusive of all main variables) and 
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External Collaboration (RR) * Regulation vs. Health insurer product 
innovation (inclusive of all main variables) 
3.10 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the research methodology that has been followed for the selection 
of the sample population and the sample size, the development of the research instrument, 
the data gathering procedure and the statistical methods used to test the research 
hypotheses and answer the research questions of the research study.  As indicated 
previously the focus of this research study is explanatory research and the objective is to 
test certain relational research hypotheses. This research study followed a quantitative 
cross-sectional research approach and the proposed research model comprises scales of 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO), external collaboration, regulation and health insurer 
product innovation. This research study has several limitations which could provide 
opportunities for future research. The following limitations have been identified: 
 The sample that was selected is assumed to be representative of the population. 
This may not be so. 
 The research study only focused on health insurers, health insurer administrators 
and healthcare providers and did not take any significant contribution to product 
innovation into account from other actors in the healthcare value chain such as 
employers, corporate and individual pharmacies and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. 
 The sample population excluded respondents from regulatory authorities. 
 The study assumed that all innovation is not equal. The focus of this study is to 
measure health insurer product innovation with an emphasis on health insurer 
innovation output. Innovation input measures would be used to validate innovation 
output measures. 
 The design of the measurement instrument did not adequately control for response 
bias as there were no negatively phrased items that controlled for response set, for 
example acquiescence response set. 
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 The design of the measurement instrument did not adequately control for common 
method bias as the same seven-point Likert type scale was used throughout. Thus 
statistical methods had to be used to estimate the presence of this potential bias. 
 The measurement scales for innovation adoption need to be refined due to low 
reliability and validity. 
 The CFA analysis showed that the measurement scales overall need to be 
improved. 
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CHAPTER 4:   PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
The results of the data analysis of the study are reported in this chapter in accordance with 
the research methodology chapter, Chapter 3, of this report.  At the outset, the 
organisational characteristics are described (4.2); thereafter the results of the empirical 
testing of the researcher‘s model are reported. As outlined in the previous chapter, the 
approach adopted is to evaluate the measurement aspects of the model first (3.8), followed 
by the evaluation of the structural relationships of the model (3.9). Finally, conclusions are 
drawn based on the results of the tests of the hypotheses (4.6). 
 
There were several stages to evaluating the model. In view of the complexity of the structure 
of the results on the model evaluation, the underlying logic of the results on the model is 
once again outlined in this introductory section. 
4.1.1 Reliability 
In Section 4.3, measures of reliability were computed for the theoretically derived 
measurement scales as reliability is a necessary condition (although not a sufficient 
condition) for validity.   
4.1.2 Validity 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the sample size achieved in the research did not allow 
for factor analysis of all 74 items simultaneously. Thus in Section 4.4, three sets of factor 
analyses (EFA and CFA) were performed in turn on all the items of the scales and 
subscales designed to measure each of the constructs of the model (EO, external 
collaboration and regulation), followed by a fourth set of factor analyses on the items of the 
subscales of the dependent variable, health insurer product innovation (health insurer 
product innovation adoption, health insurer product innovation generation and 
organisational competitiveness). Thereafter, a higher order CFA was used on the subscale 
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scores (rather than the item scores) to test the model for a second-order factor structure in 
order to establish construct validity at the subscale level.  
 
Each of the factor analyses began as exploratory, with EFA performed separately on the 
items of each construct to assess whether the theoretically derived combinations of items 
designed to reflect the various constructs did indeed load highly on the factors as expected, 
and not highly on other factors. This was the first stage of assessing construct validity. In 
situations where unexpected combinations of items emerged based on the factor loadings, 
new measurement scales were formed as potential substitute measurement scales for the 
theoretically derived scales. These were referred to as the empirically derived scales. 
 
Secondly, confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were computed on both the theoretically 
derived measures of the constructs as well as the empirically derived measures, and the 
CFA results compared using model fit indices. The objective of the CFAs was to see 
whether the theoretically derived scales of the constructs of the model were validated, and if 
not, whether the empirically derived scales showed improved construct validity.  
 
Finally, in Section 4.4.7, an independent measure of a key aspect of the dependent variable 
of the model was introduced in the form of a scale of organisational competitive capability. 
Significant correlations with moderate effect size between this scale and the scale of the 
dependent variable was considered as supporting the construct validity of the measures 
through criterion related validity. Furthermore, variables expected to correlate with the 
dependent variable of product innovation were introduced in the form of innovation input 
measures. These measures, considered jointly via cluster analysis, were correlated against 
the dependent measures in a further validation exercise. 
 
While analysis of the scales‘ psychometric properties of reliability and validity constituted the 
first steps in preparing the data in terms of the items comprising for model analysis, 
evaluation of the score distributions of these scales was the next step of data preparation. 
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4.1.3 Normality Assumptions 
In Section 4.4.10, the score distributions of the theoretically derived and empirically derived 
scales were examined in terms of their descriptive statistics to see whether they met the 
required assumptions for statistical testing. This information informed the researcher on the 
necessary adjustments to make to the measurement scales in terms transformations to 
normality. 
4.1.4 Group comparability 
As previously described, there were three main groups or sectors of the healthcare industry 
that comprised the sample respondents. Although the researcher‘s model was developed to 
apply to both the demand and supply sides of the industry, the possibility existed that the 
relationships specified in the model could be different in the three sectors, rendering an 
analysis of the combined sample as problematic. Thus in Section 4.4.11, the 
intercorrelations of the variables were compared across the subgroups to assess whether 
the structure of the relationships were the same for health insurers (HIs), health insurer 
administrators (HIAs) and healthcare service providers. Differences in the structure of the 
intercorrelations were noted and the structural model was later tested on both the entire 
sample as well as on the total sample excluding the subgroup of healthcare service 
providers (for whom differences were found on some of the intercorrelations). 
4.1.5 Regression analysis for hypothesis testing 
Finally, in Section 4.5, the hypotheses of the model were tested by a series of hierarchical 
regression analyses computed on the theoretically derived scales substituted, where 
necessary, by the empirically derived scales. In view of the number of hypotheses framed, 
the hypotheses were framed as research hypotheses, rather than as statistical null and 
alternative hypotheses. Thus significant regression results, i.e., when the statistical null 
hypothesis would be rejected, were interpreted as indicating support for the corresponding 
research hypothesis. The tests of the research hypotheses jointly served as the empirical 
evaluation of the researcher‘s model. 
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4.2 Sample description 
4.2.1 Organisational characteristics: industry sector, firm age and size 
Descriptive information on the industry sector represented by the respondents is presented 
in Table 2. The majority of respondents (60%) represent health insurance administrators 
(HIAs), 25% of respondents represent health insurers (HIs), and almost 16% represent 
healthcare service providers. The sub-industry categories for providers are included in an 
additional pie graph in Figure 2. 
Table 2: Distribution of Industry sector of respondents (n=139) 
Industry sector Count Percent (%) 
Provider organisation 22 15.8 
Health insurer administrator organisation 83 59.7 
Health insurer organisation 34 24.5 
Total 139 100 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11–Distribution of respondents by industry sector and subsector (n=139) 
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Respondents reported the following information: 
Of the 34 health insurers who responded, 20 (59%) represented closed health insurers and 
14 (41%) represented open health insurers. 
The majority (88%) of respondents worked in organisations that operated nationally; of the 
other respondents, half worked in organisations that operated primarily in Gauteng and the 
others operated primarily in KZN, Limpopo, Western Cape, North West and Eastern Cape. 
Other characteristics of the organisations represented by the respondents are firm age and 
firm size in terms of number of permanent employees and membership/patient base. As 
these characteristics differ across the industry sectors, they are reported separately in 
Table 3 and the respective percentages are reflected in stacked bar graphs in Figures 12-
14. 
These results show that:  
 Most healthcare service providers (73%) had been in operation for more than 20 
years and almost two-thirds had a staff complement of 10 or fewer. Their 
membership/patient base ranged between under 5,000 to over 100,000. 
 Most health insurer administrator organisations (59%) had been in operation for 11-
20 years. Almost all the organisations (98%) employed more than 200 staff. 
Furthermore almost all (83%) had a membership/patient base of more than 100,000 
for the current financial year. 
 A third of the health insurers had been on operation for 11-20 years and 56% for 
longer. Almost half (47%) employed 10 or fewer staff members, while 26% employed 
more than 200 staff. Almost half (47%) had a membership/patient base for the 
current financial year of over 100,000. 
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Table 3: Organisational characteristics by industry sector 
Organisational characteristics 
Industry sector 
Providers HIA HI 
Years in operation 
 0-10 years 18% 22% 12% 
 11-20 years 9% 59% 32% 
>20 years 73% 19% 56% 
Staff employed 
 10 or fewer 64% 0% 47% 
 11-50 5% 0% 21% 
 51-200 9% 2% 6% 
>200 23% 98% 26% 
Membership/patient base for the current financial year 
  up to 5000 32% 0% 3% 
 5,001-30,000 36% 0% 29% 
 30,001-100,000 0% 17% 21% 
>100,000 32% 83% 47% 
The distribution of the Industry sector of respondents is summarised based on the forced-
choice item that provided the response options displayed in Table 3. 
 
Figure 12 – Firm age 
The distribution of the firm age of respondents is summarised based on the forced-choice 
item that provided the response options displayed in Figure 12. 
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Figure 13 – Firm size (number of permanent employees) 
The distribution of the firm size of respondents is summarised based on the forced-choice 
item that provided the response options displayed in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 14 – Firm size (membership/patient base) 
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The distribution of the firm size of respondents is summarised based on the forced-choice 
item that provided the response options displayed in Figure 14. 
4.2.2 Organisational Competitive Capability 
Organisational competitive capability was used as an independent measure of the criterion 
variable in order to validate the model‘s dependent variable, health insurer product 
innovation (organisational competitiveness). A description of the respondents‘ perceptions 
of their organisations‘ competitive capability is presented in table 4, while the validation 
analysis is presented as part of the measurement aspects of the model in section 4.4.7. 
The Organisational competitive capability scale used a seven-point Likert-type scale for 
measurement. Thus the midpoint value of 4 is considered as a neutral point, with values 
higher than 4 indicative of respondents‘ positive perceptions of the competitive capability of 
their organisation. The mean and median values of the score distribution (5.8 and 6.00 
respectively), and the substantial negative skewness of the score distribution (Figure 15) 
show that the respondents‘ perceptions generally tended to be positive or strongly positive, 
with few respondents regarding the competitive capability of their organisations as low. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Organisational Competitive Capability scores 
 
Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
for mean Median Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Organisational competitive 
capability 5.80 5.62 5.98 6 1.09 -1.24 1.62 
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Histogram: ORGANISATIONAL COMPETITIVE CAPABILITY
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Figure 15: Distribution of Organisational Competitive Capability scores 
4.2.3 Organisational Innovation input 
Measures of innovation input were used as an additional independent measure used to 
validate the model‘s dependent variable, health insurer product innovation (organisational 
competitiveness), under the assumption that innovation input is a necessary condition for 
product innovation. Thus organisations with lower levels of innovation input would tend to 
score low on the dependent variable, health insurer product innovation, while organisations 
with high levels of innovation input would tend to score more highly. The three variables 
used to measure innovation input were: 1) whether the organisation has a research and 
development (R&D) budget; 2) whether the organisation‘s R&D budget encourages 
innovation; and 3) the number of R&D staff employed by the organisation‘s R&D 
department/division. These variables were considered jointly via multivariate cluster 
analysis that clustered the respondents as having high, medium or low innovation input 
respectively. 
Table 5 shows the breakdown of the Health insurer (HI), Health insurer administrator (HIA) 
and Healthcare service provider subgroups in terms of the innovation input clusters (high, 
medium and low innovation input), showing that health insurer administrators had the 
highest level of innovation input. This table and the corresponding graphical representation 
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( Figure 16) show that the majority of HIAs (60% or 49 of 83 respondents) perceive a high 
level of innovation input, compared to 24% of HIs (8 of 33 respondents) and 18% of 
healthcare service providers (4 of 22 respondents). The validation analysis for the 
dependent variable is presented in 4.4.8. 
Table 5– Industry sector by Innovation input 
Subgroups 
High Innovation 
Input 
Medium Innovation 
Input 
Low Innovation 
Input 
Row 
Total 
Health Insurers 8 9 16 33 
Health Insurer Administrators 49 26 8 83 
Healthcare service providers 4 3 15 22 
Total 61 38 39 138 
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of Innovation input levels by industry sector 
4.3  Reliability of the Theoretically Derived Scales of the Model 
The reliabilities of scales were analysed using Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient and the 
average inter-item correlations (Table 6). In presenting these results, a robot-type colour 
coding was applied whereby the highest values are shaded dark green, and the lowest 
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values are shaded deep red, with the intermediate shades of green through yellow to red 
applied to values ranked in between these extremes. Perusal of Table 6 shows that the 
Cronbach alpha values of the theoretically derived measures of the constructs of regulation, 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and external collaboration variables are all adequate and 
above the 0.7 cut-off level for internal consistency as indicated by Hair et al. (2010). The 
Cronbach alpha values for the theoretically derived measures of the innovation generation 
construct and for the theoretically derived measures of the organisational competitiveness 
construct (the dependent variable, health insurer product innovation), are around 0.9, 
indicative of high internal consistency reliability. However, the Cronbach alpha and average 
inter-item correlations values for innovation adoption, designed to measure a dimension of 
health insurer product innovation, are at 0.5 and 0.28 respectively, indicating the presence 
of unacceptably high error variance in the scores of this scale. 
Table 6 – Reliabilities of theoretically derived scales 
  
Number 
of items 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Average 
inter-item 
correlation 
Regulation 
   Increased competition   3 0.786 0.56 
HI& and access to private healthcare 6 0.899 0.61 
Standards for coverage  4 0.779 0.48 
Structure of healthcare delivery 3 0.913 0.79 
EO 
   Innovativeness 3 0.871 0.70 
Proactiveness 3 0.892 0.74 
Risk taking 3 0.919 0.80 
External Collaboration 
   Trustworthiness (T) 6 0.881 0.57 
Role specification (RS) 5 0.695 0.33 
Relationship initiation (RI) 2 0.871 0.77 
Relationship restructure (RR) 5 0.896 0.64 
Health insurer product innovation (DV) 
   Innovation adoption 3 0.509 0.28 
Innovation generation 7 0.907 0.59 
Organisational competitiveness 3 0.921 0.81 
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4.4 Validity of the scales 
The validity of the theoretically derived scales of the model was investigated using 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to see whether there was evidence of empirically derived 
combination of items that differed from theoretical expectation. If so, the empirically derived 
scales were retained and CFA was applied to both the original theoretical scales as well as 
the new empirical scales and tested for model fit for each construct. The criterion-related 
validity of the scales of the dependent variable was also considered. 
The assumption of factor analysis that sufficient correlations exist among the variables of 
the analysis was tested using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy (MSA) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity before proceeding with the exploratory 
factor analysis. It should be noted that in all factor analyses, the factor extraction method 
used was principal component analysis and the factor rotation method used was varimax. 
4.4.1 The Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) Construct 
4.4.1.1 EFA Results   
The data matrix of the nine EO variables showed sufficient correlations to proceed with the 
application of factor analysis as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy was high at 0.9 and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant (p<0.001) (Table 
7). 
Table 7 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .926 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1135.324 
df 36 
Sig. .000 
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In all EFA summary results, factor loadings higher than 0.70 are marked. 
Table 8 – Factor loadings for EO items 
 
Factor - 1 
Top management emphasis on tried & true products -0.846 
During the past 3 years, new products or services launched/marketed -0.873 
Changes to products/services been minor or dramatic during the past 3 years -0.776 
Responds to actions -0.844 
New product introduction -0.878 
Postures -0.846 
Appetite -0.801 
Behaviour -0.860 
Aggressive attitude -0.889 
Expl.Var 6.450 
Prp.Totl 0.717 
 
The EFA analysis results in Table 8 indicate that all the scales of the three EO constructs or 
latent variables of innovativeness, proactiveness and risk taking have loaded as one factor 
for measuring EO. However, in view of the strength of the three dimensional model of EO in 
the theoretical literature, the CFA has been applied to the three factor model and thus 
provides estimates for all three latent variables.  
4.4.1.2 CFA Results  
Figure 17 graphically presents the standard CFA analysis model for EO, depicting the 
parameter estimates. Throughout the presentation of the CFA results, a robot-type colour 
coding style has been applied to the parameters for the items expected to load on the same 
factor, from green shadings used for the highest values to red for the lowest. 
The convention used in reporting the CFA results (StatSoft Inc. 2011), is that the construct 
or latent variable expected to be reflected by an item appears in rounded brackets in the 
first column, and the truncated wording of that item appears in square brackets on the same 
line. In the case of good model fit, high parameter estimates would be expected, together 
with low standard errors and significance (p<0.001). 
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Table 9 – CFA Model estimates for EO 
Model Estimates (Correlations EO) 
    
Variables 
Parameter 
- Estimate 
Standard 
- Error 
T - 
Statistic 
Prob. - 
Level 
(Innovativeness)-1->[Top mana] 0.819 0.032 25.5 0.000 
(Innovativeness)-2->[During t] 0.884 0.024 36.8 0.000 
(Innovativeness)-3->[Changes ] 0.791 0.036 22.1 0.000 
(Proactiveness)-4->[Actions] 0.878 0.024 37.1 0.000 
(Proactiveness)-5->[Product ] 0.913 0.019 47.1 0.000 
(Proactiveness)-6->[Postures] 0.800 0.034 23.4 0.000 
(Risk taking)-7->[Appetite] 0.823 0.031 26.7 0.000 
(Risk taking)-8->[Behaviou] 0.913 0.019 47.5 0.000 
(Risk taking)-9->[Aggressi] 0.928 0.018 53 0.000 
 
The CFA results, using the theoretically derived scales for EO indicate that there is a strong 
relationship between EO as an observed variable and its underlying latent constructs. The 
factor loadings for all three latent variables in Table 9 are in the range of ± 0.8 to ± 0.93. 
This is high and practically significant and is an indication that the factors account for more 
than 70% of the variance of the variables. 
The standard CFA analysis model with parameter estimates is presented in Figure 17. 
 There is supportive evidence of the construct validity of EO. 
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Innovativeness Proactiveness Risk Taking
E2E1 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9E3
I1 I2 I7 I9I8I4 I5 I6I3
0.819 0.8230.8000.9130.8780.7910.884 0.913 0.928
 
Figure 17 – Standard CFA analysis model for EO, Source: (Own source) 
4.4.2 The External Collaboration Construct 
4.4.2.1 EFA results 
The data matrix of the 18 External Collaboration variables showed sufficient correlations to 
proceed with the application of factor analysis as the sampling adequacy KMO Measure 
was high at 0.8 and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant (p<0.001) (Table 10). 
Table 10 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .831 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1346.533 
df 153 
Sig. .000 
 
 
101 
 
Table 11 – Factor loadings for External Collaboration items 
 
The EFA results presented in Table 11 show that two items: ‗quality patient care mutual 
dependency’, and ‗product innovation mutual dependency’ load highly on a different 
factor from the other items purported to measure role specification (RS). These items were 
moved accordingly, and the resultant scale was termed the empirically derived scale.  
4.4.2.2 CFA results 
CFA was applied to both the theoretically and empirically derived scales of external 
collaboration, and their parameter values and model fits were compared in order to decide 
on the measurement scales that would ultimately be used in the regression analyses to test 
the model of the research. 
Factor Loadings (Marked loadings are >.700000) 
    
Variables 
Factor  -
1 
Factor -
2 
Factor - 
3 
Factor - 
4 
Trustworthiness (Top management are credible individuals) 0.699 0.159 0.138 0.131 
Trustworthiness (Product expertise) 0.757 0.043 0.241 0.256 
Trustworthiness (Count on top management to do what they 
say) 
0.804 0.099 0.166 0.220 
Trustworthiness (Positive attitudes) 0.760 0.011 0.127 0.263 
Trustworthiness (Good working relationship) 0.758 0.150 -0.110 0.110 
Trustworthiness (Interactions) 0.753 0.143 0.035 0.147 
Role specification (negotiate) 0.443 0.089 0.124 0.608 
Role specification (mutually dependent) 0.241 0.275 0.599 0.083 
Role specification (will work with each other) 0.333 0.087 0.242 0.564 
Role specification (quality patient care mutual dependency) 0.129 0.154 0.873 -0.037 
Role specification (product innovation mutual dependency) 0.016 0.059 0.757 0.206 
Relationship initiation (Spend sufficient time) 0.177 -0.022 0.053 0.886 
Relationship initiation (Show sufficient interest) 0.232 -0.014 0.000 0.860 
Relationship restructure (Assist in providing health care 
information) 
0.159 0.795 0.168 0.033 
Relationship restructure (Reward for results) 0.192 0.803 0.136 -0.164 
Relationship restructure (Simplified billing practices) 0.032 0.805 0.122 0.100 
Relationship restructure (Reduce administrative complexity) 0.022 0.874 0.061 0.072 
Relationship restructure (New investments in technology) 0.146 0.854 0.052 0.038 
Expl.Var 3.979 3.617 1.974 2.542 
Prp.Totl 0.221 0.201 0.110 0.141 
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Table 12 - CFA Model estimates using theory and data outputs for External 
Collaboration 
Model Estimates (Theory): External Collaboration Model Estimates (Data): External Collaboration
Variables
Parameter - 
Estimate
Standard - 
Error
T - 
Statistic
Prob. - 
Level Variables
Parameter 
- Estimate
Standard - 
Error
T - 
Statistic
Prob. - 
Level
(Trustworthiness)-1->[Top mana] 0.680 0.051 13.29 0.000 (Trustwortiness)-1->[Top mana] 0.683 0.051 13.395 0.000
(Trustworthiness)-2->[Product ] 0.820 0.034 23.974 0.000 (Trustwortiness)-2->[Product ] 0.823 0.034 24.156 0.000
(Trustworthiness)-3->[Count on] 0.858 0.03 28.936 0.000 (Trustwortiness)-3->[Count on] 0.862 0.029 29.416 0.000
(Trustworthiness)-4->[Positive] 0.769 0.041 18.923 0.000 (Trustwortiness)-4->[Positive] 0.762 0.042 18.311 0.000
(Trustworthiness)-5->[Good wor] 0.652 0.054 12 0.000 (Trustwortiness)-5->[Good wor] 0.650 0.055 11.908 0.000
(Trustworthiness)-6->[Interact] 0.688 0.05 13.648 0.000 (Trustwortiness)-6->[Interact] 0.684 0.051 13.456 0.000
(RS)-7->[negotiat] 0.739 0.054 13.66 0.000 (RS)-7->[mutually] 0.558 0.075 7.481 0.000
(RS)-8->[mutually] 0.485 0.076 6.383 0.000 (RS)-8->[quality ] 0.877 0.069 12.789 0.000
(RS)-9->[will wor] 0.666 0.06 11.065 0.000 (RS)-9->[product ] 0.604 0.072 8.336 0.000
(RS)-10->[quality ] 0.374 0.084 4.478 0.000 (RI)-10->[negotiat] 0.647 0.057 11.36 0.000
(RS)-11->[product ] 0.353 0.085 4.158 0.000 (RI)-11->[will wor] 0.564 0.065 8.643 0.000
(RI)-12->[Spend su] 0.878 0.044 19.964 0.000 (RI)-12->[Spend su] 0.851 0.037 23.317 0.000
(RI)-13->[Show suf] 0.875 0.044 19.845 0.000 (RI)-13->[Show suf] 0.857 0.036 23.746 0.000
(RR)-14->[Assist i] 0.805 0.036 22.121 0.000 (RR)-14->[Assist i] 0.806 0.036 22.297 0.000
(RR)-15->[Reward f] 0.806 0.036 22.281 0.000 (RR)-15->[Reward f] 0.810 0.036 22.705 0.000
(RR)-16->[Simplifi] 0.726 0.046 15.743 0.000 (RR)-16->[Simplifi] 0.723 0.046 15.589 0.000
(RR)-17->[Reduce a] 0.802 0.037 21.825 0.000 (RR)-17->[Reduce a] 0.802 0.037 21.794 0.000
(RR)-18->[New inve] 0.850 0.031 27.538 0.000 (RR)-18->[New inve] 0.847 0.031 27.165 0.000  
The  CFA  results using the empirically derived scales in Table 12 for external collaboration, 
indicated  that there  is  a  moderate  to strong relationship between external collaboration  
as an observed  variable and its underlying latent constructs, trustworthiness (T), role 
specification (RS), relationship initiation (RI) and relationship restructure (RR). Using the 
empirically derived scales for the CFA estimates, the factor loadings for trustworthiness are 
in the range of ± 0.65 to ± 0.86, which are considered to be practically significant. The 
factor loadings for role specification are in the range of ± 0.56 to 0.88, which likewise are 
considered to be practically significant. The factor loadings for relationship initiation are also 
considered to be practically significant and are in the range of ± 0.56 to ±0.86, and the 
factor loadings for relationship restructure are in the range of ± 0.7 to ± 0.85, indicating 
practical significance. 
Using both the theoretically and the empirically derived scales, the CFA has confirmed that 
two items (items 10 &11 as per Figure 18) that were expected to measure the latent 
variable role specification, fit better measuring the latent variable, relationship initiation (RI). 
In both cases, the factor loadings using the empirically derived scales have slightly reduced 
when these items were moved to the latent variable, relationship initiation.  The EFA 
analysis as presented in Table 11 also shows these two items loading on different factors.  
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The decision was thus made to use the empirically derived scales rather than the 
theoretically derived scales to determine the measurement items of the external 
collaboration construct. The construct validity of the empirically derived external 
collaboration variable was therefore supported. 
Figure 18 graphically presents the standard CFA analysis model for the empirically 
validated structure for External Collaboration. 
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Figure 18 - Standard CFA analysis model for External Collaboration, Source: (Own 
source) 
4.4.3 The Regulation Construct (Moderator Variable) 
According to the researcher‘s model, regulation was expected to serve as a moderating 
variable, whereby the relationship between EO and health insurer product innovation, and 
the relationship between external collaboration and health insurer product innovation, were 
expected to be weaker when the presence of strategic regulatory factors are low and 
stronger when they are high. Furthermore, according to theory, the regulation construct was 
expected to reflect four underlying regulation factors (Increased competition, Health 
insurance and access, standards for coverage, structure of healthcare delivery). 
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However, although the model acknowledged the multidimensionality of the regulation 
construct, it posited the moderation effect of the overall measure of generation rather than 
positing differential moderation effects for each measure of regulation. Thus from the outset 
of the research, the researcher‘s intention was to obtain a single measure of regulation.  
This approach of using a single measure of regulation as the moderator was endorsed 
when the researcher found strong empirical evidence of high internal consistency reliability 
among the 16 items of the overall regulation scale (Cronbach alpha = 0.93 with the average 
inter-item correlation =0.48). It must be emphasised that high internal consistency does not 
imply unidimensionality of the scale but rather that the items correlate with the total scale 
score, albeit that they reflect different constructs. 
4.4.3.1 EFA results 
The data matrix of the 16 Regulation variables showed sufficient correlations to proceed 
with the application of factor analysis as the sampling adequacy measure of The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy was high at 0.9 and Bartlett‘s test of 
sphericity was significant (p<0.001) (Table 13). 
Table 13 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .915 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1466.359 
df 120 
Sig. .000 
 
 
Although the EFA results in Table 14 indicate that the items loaded on three factors rather 
than the four expected factors, it was decided to pursue the four theoretically derived scales 
for the CFA analysis based on strong literature support for the regulation constructs. 
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Table 14 - Factor loadings for Regulation items 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Increased competition (Negotiate prices independently) 0.004 0.206 0.807 
Increased competition (Encourages reduced prices) 0.427 0.124 0.758 
Increased competition (Contracting efficient providers) 0.374 0.168 0.729 
Increased HI&A (Mandatory private coverage) 0.572 0.334 0.262 
Incentives for low-income 0.707 0.291 0.263 
Design and register health plans 0.838 0.046 0.271 
Creates risk pools 0.654 0.406 0.144 
Incentivise employer groups 0.789 0.258 0.205 
Incentivise individual members 0.816 0.128 0.155 
Review of minimum coverage standards 0.509 0.387 0.221 
Incentivise healthy living practices 0.734 0.462 0.165 
Incentives for compliance 0.333 0.697 0.120 
Penalties for noncompliance -0.003 0.771 0.065 
Quality information 0.381 0.670 0.340 
Quality information dissemination 0.364 0.634 0.443 
Incentives for IT 0.489 0.556 0.301 
Expl.Var 4.992 3.135 2.551 
Prp.Totl 0.312 0.196 0.159 
 
4.4.3.2 CFA results  
The CFA results using the theoretically derived scales for regulation indicated there is a 
moderately strong to strong relationship between regulation as an observed variable and its 
underlying latent constructs; increased competition; health insurance and access; 
standards for coverage and structure of healthcare delivery. The factor loadings for the 
increased competition variable are considered to be practically significant and are in the 
range of ± 0.56 to ±0.88. The factor loadings for health insurance and access are in the 
range of ± 0.67 to ± 0.85, indicating practical significance. The factor loadings for standards 
for coverage are in the range of ±0.42 to ± 0.93 indicating practical significance for all items 
except item 13. Item 13, however, still meets the minimum level for interpretation of 
structure. The factor loadings for structure of healthcare delivery are in the range of ± 0.8 to 
± 0.93, indicating practical significance. 
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Table 15 - CFA Model estimates for Regulation 
Model Estimates (Correlations Regulation)
Variable
Parameter 
- Estimate
Standard - 
Error T - Statistic
Prob. - 
Level
(Competition)-1->[Negotiat] 0.56 0.066 8.5120 0.0000
(Competition)-2->[Encourag] 0.88 0.036 24.4080 0.0000
(Competition)-3->[Contract] 0.813 0.041 19.8600 0.0000
(HIA)-4->[Mandator] 0.673 0.051 13.2960 0.0000
(HIA)-5->[Low inco] 0.779 0.038 20.6480 0.0000
(HIA)-6->[Design a] 0.798 0.035 22.6670 0.0000
(HIA)-7->[Creates ] 0.728 0.044 16.4420 0.0000
(HIA)-8->[To Incen] 0.849 0.029 29.7840 0.0000
(HIA)-9->[Incentiv] 0.795 0.036 22.2540 0.0000
(SFC)-10->[Review o] 0.683 0.05 13.5600 0.0000
(SFC)-11->[Healthy ] 0.927 0.025 37.6710 0.0000
(SFC)-12->[Use Ince] 0.665 0.052 12.6880 0.0000
(SFC)-13->[Penaltie] 0.417 0.075 5.5540 0.0000
(SHD)-14->[Quality ] 0.919 0.02 46.2680 0.0000
(SHD)-15->[Dissemin] 0.931 0.019 49.9750 0.0000
(SHD)-16->[IT Incen] 0.803 0.034 23.6110 0.0000  
Figure 19 graphically presents the standard CFA analysis model for Regulation. 
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Figure 19 – Standard CFA analysis model for Regulation, Source: (Own source) 
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4.4.4 The construct of Health Insurer Product Innovation (Dependent Variable) - 
Innovation Output 
4.4.4.1 EFA results 
The data matrix of the 13 Health Insurer Product Innovation variables showed sufficient 
correlations to proceed with the application of factor analysis as the sampling adequacy 
measure of The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy was high at 0.9 
and Bartlett‘s test of sphericity was significant (p<0.001) (Table 16). 
Table 16 - Tests of assumptions of factor analysis 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .904 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1324.488 
df 78 
Sig. .000 
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Table 17 – Factor loadings for health insurer product innovation items 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Adopting existing products -0.1811 0.8817 0.0817 
Adapting existing products 0.3950 0.7849 0.0270 
Generated new hi for organisation 0.6458 0.0923 0.3657 
Generated new hi for the industry 0.4532 -0.1745 0.6444 
Generated new hi for the world 0.2701 -0.0420 0.8012 
Generated new hi for opportunities in new markets 0.5321 0.2295 0.6441 
Generated new hi adopted by competitors 0.5080 -0.0047 0.6605 
Generated new hi opportunities in uncertain local markets 0.4337 0.1961 0.7123 
Generated new hi opportunities in uncertain international markets 0.1927 0.1346 0.8289 
Generated new hi making your organisation competitive 0.8392 0.0980 0.2718 
Improved financial results through new hi product innovation 0.8690 -0.0651 0.1941 
Membership/client growth through new hi product innovation 0.7714 0.0449 0.4711 
Improved position in industry through new hi product innovation 0.8341 0.0702 0.3899 
Expl.Var 4.4007 1.5643 3.7295 
Prp.Totl 0.3385 0.1203 0.2869 
 
The EFA results presented in Table 17 show that one of the items expected to measure 
innovation adoption (Generated new HI for organisation) and one of the items expected to 
measure innovation generation (Generated new HI making your organisation competitive) 
loaded highly on different factors. 
 
4.4.4.2  CFA Results  
CFA was applied to both the theoretically and empirically derived scales of health insurer 
product innovation (innovation output) (table 18). Their respective parameter values and 
model fits were compared in order to decide on the composition of the measurement scales 
of the dependent variable to be used in the regression analyses designed to test the 
researcher‘s model.  
The factor loadings for the latent variables of health insurer product innovation using 
theoretically derived scales and empirically derived scales are depicted in the standard CFA 
analysis model for health insurer product innovation (Figure 20). 
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Table 18 - CFA Model estimates using theoretically derived scales and empirically 
derived scales for health insurer product innovation 
Model Estimates (Theory): Health Insurer Product Innovation (DV) Model Estimates (Data): Health Insurer Product Innovation (DV)
Variables
Parameter - 
Estimate
Standard - 
Error
T - 
Statistic
Prob. - 
Level Variables
Parameter - 
Estimate
Standard - 
Error
T - 
Statistic
Prob. - 
Level
(Adoption)-1->[1 Adopti] 0.059 0.094 0.625 0.532 (Adoption)-1->[1 Adopti] 0.457 0.067 6.781 0.000
(Adoption)-2->[2 Adapti] 0.426 0.08 5.33 0.000 (Adoption)-2->[2 Adapti] 1.000 0
(Adoption)-3->[3 Genera] 0.789 0.079 9.95 0.000 (Generation)-3->[3 Genera] 0.665 0.051 13.073 0.000
(Generation)-4->[4 Genera] 0.706 0.046 15.3 0.000 (Generation)-4->[4 Genera] 0.722 0.044 16.294 0.000
(Generation)-5->[5 Genera] 0.716 0.045 16 0.000 (Generation)-5->[5 Genera] 0.735 0.043 17.178 0.000
(Generation)-6->[8 Genera] 0.862 0.026 33.3 0.000 (Generation)-6->[6 Genera] 0.801 0.034 23.262 0.000
(Generation)-7->[6 Genera] 0.808 0.033 24.3 0.000 (Generation)-7->[8 Genera] 0.851 0.028 30.714 0.000
(Generation)-8->[9 Genera] 0.828 0.031 27.1 0.000 (Generation)-8->[9 Genera] 0.840 0.029 28.667 0.000
(Generation)-9->[10 Gener] 0.714 0.045 15.9 0.000 (Generation)-9->[10 Gener] 0.727 0.044 16.652 0.000
(Generation)-10->[7 Genera] 0.762 0.039 19.4 0.000 (Org Competitiveness)-10->[7 Genera] 0.801 0.033 24.572 0.000
(Org Competitiveness)-11->[11 Impro] 0.792 0.034 23.4 0.000 (Org Competitiveness)-11->[11 Impro] 0.801 0.033 24.648 0.000
(Org Competitiveness)-12->[12 Membe] 0.935 0.015 62.9 0.000 (Org Competitiveness)-12->[12 Membe] 0.929 0.015 62.071 0.000
(Org Competitiveness)-13->[13 Impro] 0.961 0.012 78.7 0.000 (Org Competitiveness)-13->[13 Impro] 0.960 0.012 82.966 0.000  
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Figure 20 – Standard CFA analysis model for Health Insurer Product Innovation, 
Source: (Own source) 
The CFA  results using the empirically derived scales for  health insurer product innovation 
indicated  there  is  a  moderate  to strong relationship between health insurer product 
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innovation as an observed variable  and two of its underlying  latent variables,  innovation  
generation  and organisational competitiveness. The relationship between health insurer 
product innovation output and its latent variable innovation adoption is weaker and the 
factor loading for item 1 meets only the minimum level of interpretation of structure. The 
factor loadings for innovation generation are in the range of ± 0.67 to ± 0.85, indicating 
practical significance. The factor loadings for organisational competitiveness are in the 
range of ± 0.8 to ± 0.96, indicating practical significance. 
Using  both  the theoretically derived scales  and  the  empirically derived scales,  the CFA 
has confirmed  that  two items (item 3 measuring innovation adoption and item 10 
measuring  innovation generation as  per  Figure 20)  fits   better  measuring   different  
latent variables. Item 3 fits better with the latent variable innovation generation and item 10 
fits better with the latent variable organisational competitiveness. In both cases, the factor 
loadings have improved using the empirically derived scales. Accordingly, the decision was 
made to use the empirically derived scales rather than the theoretically derived scales to 
determine the items measuring the latent variables of the observed variable, health insurer 
product innovation. 
Furthermore, the decision was made to exclude the variable, innovation adoption, as a 
variable measuring the dependent variable, health insurer product innovation, owing to its 
poor reliability and validity as a measurement construct. 
Thus there is empirical evidence to support the construct validity for health insurer product 
innovation if innovation generation and organisational competitiveness only are included as 
measurement constructs.  
4.4.5 Second order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
Second order CFA was performed at the subscale level (rather than at the item level as 
used in the other CFAs) to confirm whether the subscales of the four constructs of the 
model did indeed reflect these constructs as expected from the theory. Table 19 presents 
the model estimates for the second order analysis, highlighting the second order constructs 
(red colour indicator). 
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Table 19 – Model estimates second order CFA 
Model Estimates (Correlations Second order) 
    
Variables 
Parameter 
- Estimate 
Standard 
- Error 
T - 
Statistic 
Prob. - 
Level 
(EO)-1->[INNOVATI] 0.934 0.018 53.2 0.000 
(EO)-2->[PROACTIV] 0.913 0.02 46.4 0.000 
(EO)-3->[RISK TAK] 0.839 0.029 29.1 0.000 
(External Collaborati)-4->[TRUSTWOR] 0.703 0.061 11.5 0.000 
(External Collaborati)-5->[ROLE SPE] 0.722 0.06 12.1 0.000 
(External Collaborati)-6->[RELATIONSHIP] 0.653 0.065 10.1 0.000 
(External Collaborati)-7->[RESTRUCT] 0.325 0.088 3.69 0.000 
(Regulation)-8->[ENCOURAG] 0.701 0.05 14 0.000 
(Regulation)-9->[HIA IMPR] 0.858 0.033 26.3 0.000 
(Regulation)-10->[IMPROVE ] 0.789 0.04 19.7 0.000 
(Regulation)-11->[HD STRUC] 0.816 0.037 22.1 0.000 
(HI Product Innovatio)-12->[Adoption] 0.179 0.087 2.06 0.040 
(HI Product Innovatio)-13->[Generati] 0.880 0.03 29.8 0.000 
(HI Product Innovatio)-14->[Organisa] 0.890 0.029 30.9 0.000 
 
Consistent with the CFA results conducted at item level, the CFA analysis failed to confirm 
the validity of the relationship restructure (RR) subscale expected to reflect External 
Collaboration, and the innovation adoption subscale designed to reflect Health Insurer 
Product Innovation. 
These results lend further evidence to the revision of the theoretically derived scales and 
subscales of the model to strengthen the psychometric quality of the predictor variables of 
the research model. 
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4.4.6 Summary of CFA analyses 
Table 20 – Model fit results 
Regulation
External 
collaboration 
theoretical
External 
collaboration 
empirical EO
HI Product 
innovation 
theoretical
HI Product 
innovation 
empirical 2nd order
Basic Summary Statistics
Discrepancy Function 1.475 2.304 2.108 0.556 1.59 1.253 0.886
ML Chi -Square 199.187 311.036 284.553 76.152 219.485 172.912 121.408
Degrees  of Freedom 98 129 129 24 62 62 71
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RMS Standardized Res idual 0.059 0.082 0.085 0.046 0.079 0.076 0.076
Noncentrality Fit Indices
Population Noncentra l i ty Parameter Point estimate 0.813 1.289 1.162 0.406 1.206 0.795 0.368
90% CI 0.53 -1.15 0.94 -1.69 0.83 -1.55 0.24 -0.63 0.9 -1.57 0.54 -1.11 0.17 -0.62
Steiger-Lind RMSEA Index Point estimate 0.091 0.1 0.095 0.13 0.139 0.113 0.072
90% CI 0.07 -0.11 0.09 -0.11 0.08 -0.11 0.1 -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.09 -0.13 0.05 -0.09
Population Gamma Index Point estimate 0.908 0.875 0.886 0.917 0.844 0.891 0.95
90% CI 0.87 -0.94 0.84 -0.91 0.85 -0.92 0.88 -0.95 0.81 -0.88 0.86 -0.92 0.92 -0.98
Adjusted Population Gamma Index Point estimate 0.872 0.834 0.848 0.845 0.77 0.84 0.926
90% CI 0.83 -0.91 0.79 -0.87 0.81 -0.89 0.77 -0.91 0.72 -0.82 0.79 -0.89 0.88 -0.96
Single Sample Fit Indices 
Joreskog GFI 0.839 0.8 0.81 0.886 0.797 0.839 0.888
Joreskog AGFI 0.776 0.735 0.748 0.786 0.702 0.764 0.834  
Table 20 presents the model fit results. Model fit has been determined through key model 
indices presented in table 20. Model fit is also presented using theoretically derived scales 
and empirically derived scales for the external collaboration variable (independent variable) 
and the health insurer product innovation variable (dependent variable). Second order 
results have also been used as a method to improve model fit. 
The chi-square statistic values for all the variables and the second order analysis are 
relatively large and the corresponding p-values are small. This is an indication that the 
proposed theory does not fit reality well. Using the empirically derived scales, the chi-
square values for external collaboration and health insurer product innovation have reduced 
(slight improvement in the point estimates). 
The Steiger-Lind RMSEA index values for all the variables and second order are all greater 
than 0.05, indicating weak model fit. Using the empirically derived scales instead of the 
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theoretically derived scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer product 
innovation indicated a slight improvement (values reduced) in the point estimates. 
The population gamma index values for all the variables and second order are all smaller 
than 0.95, indicating weak model fit. Using the empirically derived scales instead of the 
theoretically derived scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer product 
innovation indicated a slight improvement (values increased) in the point estimates. 
The adjusted population gamma index values for all the variables and second order are all 
smaller than 0.95, indicating weak model fit. Using the empirically derived scales instead of 
the theoretically derived scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer 
product innovation indicated a slight improvement (values increased) in the point estimates. 
The Joreskog GFI index values for all the variables and second order are all smaller than 
0.9 or 0.95, indicating weak model fit. Using the empirically derived scales instead of the 
theoretically derived scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer product 
innovation indicated a slight improvement (values increased) in the values. 
The Joreskog AGFI index values for all the variables and second order are all smaller than 
0.95, indicating weak model fit. Using the empirically derived scales instead of the 
theoretically derived scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer product 
innovation indicated a slight improvement (values increased) in the values. 
Assessing the standardised root mean residual (SRMR) values for all the variables and 
second order, indicated values smaller than 0.1 (values are within the guideline), indicating 
better model fit. Using the empirically derived scales instead of the theoretically derived 
scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer product innovation indicated a 
slight value improvement for health insurer product innovation only (value decreased). 
The larger discrepancy function values for all the variables and second order indicate that 
the model does not fit the data well. Using the empirically derived scales instead of the 
theoretically derived scales for variables external collaboration and health insurer product 
innovation indicated a slight value improvement for both variables (values decreased). 
The model fit analysis shows weak model fit, despite attempting to improve the values 
using the empirically derived scales instead of the theoretically derived scales. 
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4.4.7 Criterion related validity of Organisational Competitiveness 
In view of the importance of establishing the construct validity of the dependent variable of 
the model, the researcher included additional variables that were expected to correlate 
significantly with the measures of the dependent variable. Significant and substantial 
relationships would be interpreted as evidence of criterion-related validity and further 
support the construct validity of the scale of the dependent variable.  
The Organisational competitive capability scale mean was used for additional validation of 
health insurer product innovation output (dependent variable) The scatterplot (Figure 21) 
shows a moderately strong  linear relationship (r=0.63, p<0.001) between the scales of 
Organisational Competitiveness vs. Organisational Competitive Capacity. As the scale of 
Organisational Competitive Capacity is considered in previous research to measure a 
similar construct to Organisational Competitiveness, a strong relationship between the 
measures was considered as evidence for the construct validity of the scale of 
Organisational Competitiveness. 
 
Figure 21 – Organisational competitiveness vs. Organisational competitive capacity 
4.4.8 Additional Criterion related validity of Innovation Generation and 
Organisational Competitiveness 
Based on the assumption that innovation input is a necessary condition for product 
innovation, the researcher expected to find that organisations with lower levels of innovation 
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input would tend to score relatively lower on the dependent variable measures, while 
organisations with higher levels of innovation input would tend to score more highly.  
Using cluster analysis, respondents were categorised as having high, medium or low 
innovation input. This clustering variable was formed based on standardised measures of 
three independent measures of organisational innovation input: 1) whether the organisation 
has a research and development (R&D) budget; 2) whether the organisation‘s R&D budget 
encourages innovation; and 3) the number of R&D staff employed by the organisation‘s 
R&D department/division. The cluster variable means are depicted graphically in Figure 22. 
This categorisation was then related to the two measures of the model‘s dependent variable 
- health insurer product innovation (innovation generation and organisational 
competitiveness),  
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the clusters differed significantly on 
the three standardised clustering variables, as well as on innovation generation and 
organisational competitiveness (Table 21). Moreover, post hoc Scheffe tests used to 
identify significant pairwise mean differences on innovation generation and organisational 
competitiveness among the clusters, found that all pairwise cluster comparisons were 
significant (Appendix H).  Furthermore, the direction and magnitude of the means for both 
Innovation generation and Organisational competitiveness were such that these means 
were highest in organisations with relatively high innovation input, followed by organisations 
with medium levels of innovation input and lowest for those organisations with low levels of 
innovation input. The significant results and direction of the clusters‘ mean measures of the 
dependent variable have thus fulfilled the expectations underlying the test for the criterion-
related validity of the scales of the dependent variable and thus there is further support for 
the construct validity of health insurer product innovation. 
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Table 21 – 1-way ANOVA comparisons of clusters on clustering variables and 
dependent variable measures 
 
SS - 
Effect 
df - 
Effect 
MS - 
Effect 
SS - 
Error 
df - 
Error 
MS - 
Error F p 
R&D budget 
 118.70 2 59.35 17.13 135 0.13 467.63 0.0000 
R&D budget encourages 
innovation 82.72 2 41.36 54.28 135 0.40 102.87 0.0000 
Number of staff employed 99.37 2 49.68 37.35 135 0.28 179.58 0.0000 
Innovation generation 107.97 2 53.99 198.10 135 1.47 36.79 0.0000 
Organisational competitiveness 153.14 2 76.57 212.15 135 1.57 48.73 0.0000 
 
 
Innovation input level 
Cluster means High (n=61) Medium (n=38) Low (n=398) 
Innovation generation 5.12 3.85 3.05 
Organisational competitiveness 5.85 4.28 3.40 
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Plot of Means for Each Cluster
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Figure 22 – Clusters based on innovation input variables 
4.4.9 Reliabilities of empirically derived measures 
Based on the previous results on reliability and validity, empirically derived scales were 
adopted for further analysis. The table of reliabilities (Table 6) presented for the 
theoretically based scales has thus been revised to include the reliabilities of the empirically 
based scales (Table 22). In this table the reliabilities of the empirically based scales are 
italicised. 
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Table 22 – Reliabilities of the empirically based scales 
 
 
Number 
of items 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Average 
inter-item 
correlation 
REGULATION  
   Increased Competition 3 0.786 0.56 
HI & Access to private healthcare 6 0.899 0.61 
Standards for coverage 4 0.779 0.48 
Structure of healthcare delivery 3 0.913 0.79 
EO 
   Innovativeness 3 0.871 0.70 
Proactiveness 3 0.892 0.74 
Risk taking 3 0.919 0.80 
EXTERNAL COLLABORATION 
   Trustworthiness (T) 6 0.881 0.57 
Role Specification (RS) 5 0.695 0.33 
Relationship Initiation (RI) 2 0.871 0.77 
Relationship Restructure (RR) 5 0.896 0.64 
External Collaboration 18 0.879 0.28 
External Collaboration (T, RS, RI)* 13 0.872 0.37 
HEALTH INSURER PRODUCT 
INNOVATION 
   Innovation adoption 3 0.509 0.28 
Innovation adoption* 2 0.627 0.46 
Innovation generation 7 0.907 0.59 
Innovation generation* 6 0.905 0.62 
Organisational Competitiveness 3 0.921 0.81 
Orginisational Competitiveness* 4 0.929 0.78 
    *italics=empirically derived scales 
   
 
Table 22 indicates that the reliability of innovation adoption, although improved using the 
empirically derived scale rather than the theoretical scale, is still unacceptably low – the 
Cronbach alpha value has increased from 0.51 to 0.63 and the average inter-item 
correlation has increased.  Thus the construct of Innovation adoption was excluded from 
the model due to its poor reliability and validity results.  
The Cronbach alpha value using the empirical result for innovation generation shows little 
change and the Cronbach alpha value for the new organisational competitiveness scale is 
similar. The empirically derived External Collaboration scale (comprising Trustworthiness 
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(T), Role Specification (RS) and Relationship Initiation (RI) items) reliability is good, with 
improved average inter-item correlation, using the empirically derived scale instead of the 
theoretically derived scale. The average inter-item correlation for innovation generation 
using the empirically derived scale has improved slightly, although the inter-item correlation 
for organisational competitiveness has decreased slightly, using the empirically derived 
scale.  
Having established empirical support for reasonably satisfactory psychometric properties 
(scale reliability and validity reliability) for the scale and subscale measures, the next step in 
the analysis was to investigate the score distributions and test them for normality. 
4.4.10  Descriptive statistics of measurement scales 
Table 23 presents the descriptive statistics of central tendency, variability, skewness and 
kurtosis of the theoretically and empirically derived scales to be used in testing the 
researcher‘s model. The table also includes these statistics for the anticipated moderating 
variables of the model - EO*Regulation, External Collaboration (T, RS, RI)*Regulation and 
External Collaboration (RR)*Regulation. These moderating variables were derived by 
calculating the product of the respective pairs of variables, for example calculating the 
product of each respondent‘s EO and Regulation scores to form the EO*Regulation 
variable. This table also presents the skew index (SI) and kurtosis index (KI) which aided 
the assessment of the normality of the distributions of the theoretically and empirically 
derived variables. 
Table 23 – Descriptive statistics of theoretically and empirically derived scales 
 
Mean 
95% CI for 
mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew 
ness 
Kurtosis     SI             
KI 
EO 4.49 4.25 4.74 4.56 1.44 -0.23 -0.93 -0.07 -3.21 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 4.65 4.49 4.81 4.64 0.95 -0.19 -0.01 -0.22 -3.01 
External Collaboration (RR) 5.83 5.63 6.02 6.00 1.19 -1.47 2.22 -0.88 -1.89 
Regulation 3.37 3.15 3.58 3.06 1.28 0.55 -0.55 0.26 -3.21 
EO*Regulation 15.48 14.06 16.90 13.54 8.48 0.92 0.56 0.00 -3.00 
Ext Coll (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 16.29 14.84 17.74 13.26 8.67 0.96 0.19 0.00 -3.00 
Ext Coll (RR)*Regulation 19.83 18.34 21.31 18.23 8.87 0.53 -0.34 0.00 -3.00 
Adoption 4.76 4.55 4.98 5.00 1.29 -0.80 0.30 -0.37 -2.89 
Generation 4.19 3.94 4.44 4.29 1.49 -0.10 -0.86 -0.03 -3.17 
Organisational competitiveness 4.74 4.46 5.01 5.00 1.63 -0.50 -0.80 -0.11 -3.11 
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4.4.10.1 Distributions 
Graphic presentations of the data distributions for all the measurement scales are 
presented in Figures 23 to 32, and include three tests of Normality - the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S), Lilliefors and Shapiro-Wilk tests. In view of the large sample size, these 
tests have high power and so small deviations from normality may be significant. Thus 
these test results were considered in conjunction with the descriptive statistics in Table 19 
and together informed the researcher‘s decision on whether or not the score distributions 
should be transformed to normality.     
However, as none of the values of the skew indices came close to the guideline value of ±3 
for extreme skewness, the researcher considered only the scale of External Collaboration 
(RR) as possibly eligible for transformation as it had the highest SI value (albeit not very 
high). The cube transformation applied to the External Collaboration (RR) scores yielded a 
slight improvement towards normality (skewness = 0.44, SI = 0.00), although the tests of 
significance showed that the transformed distribution was still significantly different from 
normality. 
Note that the distribution of innovation adoption scores had already been dropped from the 
model, and the distributions of Organisational competitive capability and the Innovation 
input variables were not considered in this analysis as they were not variables entered in 
the regression models. 
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Figure 23 - Distribution of EO scores 
 
 
Figure 24- Distribution of External Collaboration scores (T,RS,RI) 
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Figure 25 – Distribution of External Collaboration (Relationship Restructure) scores 
before transformation 
 
Figure 26 – Distribution of External Collaboration (Relationship Restructure) scores 
after transformation (cube transformation) 
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Figure 27 - Distribution of Regulation scores 
 
Figure 28 - Distribution of EO*Regulation (interaction term) scores 
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Figure 29 - Distribution of External Collaboration (T,RS,RI)*Regulation scores 
 
Figure 30 – Distribution of External Collaboration (RR)*Regulation scores 
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Figure 31 - Distribution of Innovation Generation scores 
 
Figure 32 – Distribution of organisational competitiveness scores 
4.4.11  Comparison of the subgroups on the measurement variables  
Rather than performing a one-way ANOVA to compare all the subgroups simultaneously on 
the means of the measurement variables, the researcher used the more powerful 
parametric t-test to compare the HIs and HIAs first, as the combination of HIs and HIAs into 
a single group was meaningful in the context of the study. Based on the generally non-
significant differences between the means of these groups, a second t-test was then used 
to compare the providers to the combined group of HIs and HIAs. 
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Appendix I presents these t-test results and includes the effect size (d) for evaluating the 
strength of the differences between the mean scores of health insurers and health insurer 
administrators. Table 24 presents the results for the comparison of means of the variables 
between health insurers/health insure administrators (groups were consolidated based on 
the results in Appendix I) and healthcare service providers, Figure 33 is a graphical 
presentation of the difference in scale means for the consolidated health insurers/health 
insurer administrators, versus the healthcare service providers. 
Table 24 – Comparison of scale means of HIs (n=34) and HIAs (n=83) 
 
Mean - 
HI HIA 
Mean - 
Providers t-value p 
Std.Dev. 
- HI HIA 
Std.Dev. - 
Providers 
Effect 
size d 
EO 4.60 3.93 2.020 * 1.46 1.26 0.37 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 4.80 3.84 4.639 *** 0.85 1.06 0.14 
External Collaboration (RR) 5.92 5.33 2.171 * 1.07 1.62 0.05 
cub External Collaboration (RR) 225.87 187.61 1.696  92.65 118.66 0.11 
Regulation 3.40 3.20 0.687  1.35 0.81 0.35 
Adoption 4.95 3.75 4.244 *** 1.19 1.38 0.10 
Generation 4.39 3.11 3.884 *** 1.45 1.23 0.80 
Organisational competitiveness 4.99 3.38 4.558 *** 1.50 1.70 0.30 
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
According to the tables, HIs and HIAs differ significantly on Innovation generation only 
(t(115) = -3.936, p<0.01)), with a higher mean for HIAs than for HIs. None of the other 
mean differences are significant. However, when comparing the combined HI and HIA 
groups to the providers, the means of several of the scales to be used for testing the 
researcher‘s model are significantly different. A more detailed graphical comparison is 
provided in the bar graph (Figure 33) of the group means on all the scales and subscales. 
Moreover, as a seven-point scale has been used for all these scales, the heights of the bars 
can be used to compare the means across all scales. The pattern shown in the graph is 
that the means for the providers tend to be lower than those for the His and HIAs, except in 
the case of regulation where the mean scores are relatively low for all groups (see 
Appendix I for the complete table of t-test results).  
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Figure 33 – Comparison of means between health insurers/health insurer 
administrators and healthcare service providers 
4.4.11.1 Intercorrelations among variables 
Tables 21-24 present the intercorrelations among the variables for the three subgroups. 
Table 21 presents the inter correlations among the variables for the consolidated group. 
Tables 22-24 present the inter correlation differences among variables between the three 
subgroups – inter correlation differences are highlighted. As previously described, there 
were three main sectors of the healthcare industry represented by the respondents. 
Although the researcher‘s model was developed for the combined groups of respondents, 
the possibility existed that the relationships specified in the model could differ by sector, 
and this may change the correlation among the variables when the total group was 
considered. Thus the intercorrelations of the variables were compared across the 
subgroups to assess whether the structure of the relationships were the same for health 
insurers (HIs), health insurer administrators (HIAs) and healthcare service providers.  
 
The Pearson product moment correlation matrices for the pairwise correlations among the 
scales to be used in testing the researcher‘s model are presented in Table 25 for the total 
group, table 26, for the HIs, table 27 for the HIAs and table 28 for the healthcare service 
providers respectively. 
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The respective correlations of each of the subgroups were then compared pairwise using a 
normal curve test through the Fisher z transformation of the correlation coefficient (Cohen, 
1992). Tables 29, 30 and 31 present the results of the comparisons of the correlations for 
HIs versus HIAs, HIs versus healthcare service providers, and HIAs versus healthcare 
service providers.   
 
No significant differences were found between the correlation matrices of the HIs and HIAs, 
and only one of the pairwise correlations differed significantly between the correlation 
matrices of the HIs and the service Providers. However, there were several differences 
between the correlation matrices of the HIAs and the service Providers. Based on this 
observation, it was decided to conduct the regression analyses that involved these variable 
pairs on the respondents first including, and then excluding, the service provider group so 
that any distortion of the regression results due to the effect of the service providers would 
be apparent.  
 
Table 25 - Intercorrelation matrices of measurement variables for model testing of 
total group and industry sectors variables  
Total group (n=139) EO
External 
Collaboration 
(T,RS,RI)
External 
Collaboration 
(RR) Regulation Generation
Organisational 
competitiveness
EO 1.000 0.163 0.190 0.189 0.691 0.668
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.163 1.000 0.209 0.523 0.260 0.322
External Collaboration (RR) 0.190 0.209 1.000 0.136 0.226 0.332
Regulation 0.189 0.523 0.136 1.000 0.281 0.213
Generation 0.691 0.260 0.226 0.281 1.000 0.781
Organisational competitiveness 0.668 0.322 0.332 0.213 0.781 1.000  
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Table 26 – Health insurers (HIs) 
HI's (n=34) EO
External 
Collaboration 
(T,RS,RI)
External 
Collaboration 
(RR) Regulation Generation
Organisational 
competitiveness
EO 1.000 0.136 0.075 0.220 0.691 0.671
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.136 1.000 0.436 0.453 0.147 0.122
External Collaboration (RR) 0.075 0.436 1.000 0.223 0.216 0.265
Regulation 0.220 0.453 0.223 1.000 0.383 0.250
Generation 0.691 0.147 0.216 0.383 1.000 0.743
Organisational competitiveness 0.671 0.122 0.265 0.250 0.743 1.000  
Table 27 – Health insurer administrators - HIAs 
HIA's (n=83) EO
External 
Collaboration 
(T,RS,RI)
External 
Collaboration 
(RR) Regulation Generation
Organisational 
competitiveness
EO 1.000 0.132 0.304 0.177 0.776 0.745
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.132 1.000 0.086 0.655 0.181 0.191
External Collaboration (RR) 0.304 0.086 1.000 0.079 0.288 0.444
Regulation 0.177 0.655 0.079 1.000 0.164 0.183
Generation 0.776 0.181 0.288 0.164 1.000 0.767
Organisational competitiveness 0.745 0.191 0.444 0.183 0.767 1.000  
Table 28 – Healthcare service providers 
Providers (n=22) EO
External 
Collaboration 
(T,RS,RI)
External 
Collaboration 
(RR) Regulation Generation
Organisational 
competitiveness
EO 1.000 -0.051 -0.084 -0.123 0.157 0.291
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) -0.051 1.000 0.079 0.254 0.081 0.367
External Collaboration (RR) -0.084 0.079 1.000 0.213 -0.047 0.009
Regulation -0.123 0.254 0.213 1.000 0.318 0.117
Generation 0.157 0.081 -0.047 0.318 1.000 0.785
Organisational competitiveness 0.291 0.367 0.009 0.117 0.785 1.000  
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Table 29 - Significance levels (p) of comparisons of correlations between subgroups 
– HIAs vs. HIs 
HIA vs HI
p values EO HIA vs HI
Ext Collab 
(T,RS,RI) HIA 
vs HI
Ext Collab 
(RR) HIA vs HI
Regulation 
HIA vs HI
Generation 
HIA vs HI
Organisational 
competitiveness 
HIA vs HI
EO - - - - - -
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) - - - - - -
External Collaboration (RR) - - - - - -
Regulation - - - - - -
Generation - - - - - -
Organisational competitiveness - - - - - -  
Table 30 - Significance levels (p) of comparisons of correlations between subgroups 
– Providers vs. HIs 
Providers vs HI
p values
EO Providers 
vs HI
Ext Collab 
(T,RS,RI) 
Providers vs 
HI
Ext Collab 
(RR) Providers 
vs HI
Regulation 
Providers vs 
HI
Generation 
Providers vs 
HI
Organisational 
competitiveness 
Providers vs HI
EO - - - - 0.0223 -
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) - - - - - -
External Collaboration (RR) - - - - - -
Regulation - - - - - -
Generation 0.0223 - - - - -
Organisational competitiveness - - - - - -  
 
 
Table 31 - Significance levels (p) of comparisons of correlations between subgroups 
– Providers vs. HIAs 
Providers vs HIA
p values
EO Providers 
vs HIA
Ext Collab 
(T,RS,RI) 
Providers vs 
HIA
Ext Collab 
(RR) Providers 
vs HIA
Regulation 
Providers vs 
HIA
Generation 
Providers vs 
HIA
Organisational 
competitiveness 
Providers vs HIA
EO - - - - 0.0008 0.0095
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) - - - 0.0377 - -
External Collaboration (RR) - - - - - -
Regulation - 0.0377 - - - -
Generation 0.0008 - - - - -
Organisational competitiveness 0.0095 - - - - -  
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4.5 Evaluation of the model structure via regression analysis 
Multiple regression analysis results for the model are presented in this section.  
At the outset of the research, the model conceptualised by the researcher comprised two 
hypotheses to be tested: 
Original first hypothesis: The relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO 
is moderated by industry regulation. 
Original second hypothesis: The relationship between health insurer product innovation and 
external collaboration is moderated by industry regulation. 
However, these two hypotheses had to be expanded to accommodate the factorially 
complex nature of the constructs of product innovation and external collaboration. 
The results presented on the construct validity of the measures of health insurer product 
innovation (4.4.4) confirmed the presence of two underlying dimensions – innovation 
generation and organisational competitiveness. The presence of two dimensions underlying 
the dependent variable effectively doubled the number of hypotheses to be tested. 
Similarly, the construct validity results on external collaboration (4.4.2) confirmed the 
presence of two underlying dimensions – external collaboration Trustworthiness (T), Role 
specification (RS) and Relationship initiation (RI), and external collaboration relationship 
restructure (RR), which had the effect of again doubling the number of hypotheses that 
involved external collaboration. Finally, additional hypotheses were included that involved 
all combinations of the variables so that there would be no misspecification of the 
regression model. 
Accordingly, six sets of hypotheses were framed at three levels of analyses for evaluating 
the model: 
The first level of analysis was to test the basic relationship between EO and health insurer 
product innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) and the 
relationship between external collaboration and health insurer product innovation 
(innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) (Hypotheses 1a-1b, 2a-2d); 
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The second level of analysis was to investigate whether these basic relationships are 
moderated by regulation (presence of strategic regulatory factors which encourage product 
innovation)(Hypotheses 3a-3b, 4a-4d); 
The third level of analysis was to investigate possible misspecification of the model  
(Hypotheses 5a-5b, 6a-6d). 
For ease of reference, these hypotheses are presented in Table 32. 
Table 32 – Research hypotheses 
Level of 
analysis 
Hypo- 
thesis DV IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4 Moderating effect 
Level 1 
1a Innovation generation EO 
    
1b Org competitiveness EO 
    
2a Innovation generation EC (T,RS,RI)         
2b Org competitiveness EC (T,RS,RI) 
    
2c Innovation generation EC (RR) 
    
2d Org competitiveness EC (RR)         
Level 2 
3a Innovation generation EO Regulation 
  
EO*Regulation 
3b Org competitiveness EO Regulation 
  
EO*Regulation 
4a Innovation generation EC (T,RS,RI) Regulation     EC (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
4b Org competitiveness EC (T,RS,RI) Regulation 
  
EC (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
4c Innovation generation EC (RR) Regulation 
  
EC (RR)*Regulation 
4d Org competitiveness EC (RR) Regulation     EC (RR)*Regulation 
Level 3 
5a Innovation generation EO EC (T,RS,RI) EC (RR) Regulation EO*Regulation 
5b Org competitiveness EO EC (T,RS,RI) EC (RR) Regulation EO*Regulation 
6a Innovation generation EO EC (T,RS,RI) EC (RR) Regulation EC (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
6b Org competitiveness EO EC (T,RS,RI) EC (RR) Regulation EC (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
6c Innovation generation EO EC (T,RS,RI) EC (RR) Regulation EC (RR)*Regulation 
6d Org competitiveness EO EC (T,RS,RI) EC (RR) Regulation EC (RR)*Regulation 
Key to table: 
EO – Entrepreneurial orientation 
EC (T,RS,RI) – External collaboration (Trustworthiness, role specification, relationship initiation) 
EC (RR) – External collaboration (relationship restructure) 
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It is important to note that in view of the number of hypotheses, they are stated in the form 
of research hypotheses rather than in the form of statistical null and alternate hypotheses. 
Thus when significant regression results are found and the null hypothesis of no 
relationship (or zero slope) is rejected, the result is reported as supporting the 
corresponding research hypothesis of the existence of a relationship.   
As the hypotheses in sets 3-6 all involve testing of moderating effects, regression results 
including and excluding the moderating variables are presented, together with the changes 
in R2 and the parameters of the models. 
Based on the results of the EFAs and CFAs, the full regression equation of the model was 
revised as follows: 
 Level of Health Insurer Product innovation =   + β₁(EO) + β₂(External 
 Collaboration(T,RS,RI)) + β₃(External Collaboration(RR)) + β₄(Regulation) + 
β₅(EO*Regulation) + β₆ (External Collaboration (T,RS,RI)*Regulation) + β₇(External 
Collaboration(RR)*Regulation)  
This model was tested hierarchically through the 18 hypotheses of the research. The 
regression results for each hypothesis are presented in turn. 
4.5.1 Test of Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) vs. Health insurer product 
innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) 
Hypothesis 1 
Research hypothesis 1 posits that a positive correlation exists between the level of new 
product innovation by health insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO). 
A strong positive linear correlation was found between EO and innovation generation 
(r=0.69, p<0.001) and between EO and organisational competitiveness (r=0.67, p<0.001). 
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Hypothesis 1a 
 
 
Figure 34 – Hypothesis 1a – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) 
Results: Hypothesis 1a – The regression output (scatterplot of innovation generation vs. 
EO) shown in figure 34 indicates an R² value of 0.477. EO (Independent variable) explains 
47.7% of the variation in the dependent variable, innovation generation. 
Conclusion: There is empirical support for the relationship between EO and innovation 
generation. 
Hypothesis 1b 
The significant relationship between EO and Organisational competitiveness is represented 
as a scatterplot in Figure 35. 
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Figure 35 – Hypothesis 1b – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
Results: Hypothesis 1b – The regression output (scatterplot of organisational 
competitiveness vs. EO) shown in figure 35 indicates an R² value of 0.447. EO 
(Independent variable) explains 44.7% of the variation in the dependent variable, 
organisational competitiveness. 
Conclusion: There is empirical support for the relationship between EO and innovation 
generation. 
The results therefore show that EO is a strong predictor of health insurer product innovation 
and hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. Furthermore, the correlations between the EO 
constructs (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking) and the health insurer product 
innovation constructs (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) are 
provided in table 33. These correlations are highly significant (p<0.001) with moderate 
effect size (r2 ranging between 0.29 and 0.49), thus providing further support for Hypothesis 
1at a lower level of measurement. 
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Table 33 – Correlations between EO constructs and health insurer product 
innovation constructs  
EO Constructs 
Innovation 
generation 
Organisational 
competitiveness 
Innovativeness 0.69 0.70 
Proactiveness 0.63 0.62 
Risk-taking 0.62 0.54 
 
4.5.2. Tests of hypotheses 2 
Test of External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and External Collaboration (RR) 
vs. Health Insurer product innovation (innovation generation and 
organisational competitiveness) 
Table 34 - Correlations between innovation generation and organisational 
competitiveness (DV’s) and External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and External 
Collaboration (RR) 
  External Collaboration External Collaboration 
  (T,RS,RI) (RR) 
Innovation generation 0.2601 0.2264 
  p=0.002 p=0.007 
Organisational competitiveness 0.322 0.3321 
  p=0.000 p=0.000 
 
Table 34 shows that a weak positive correlation exists between External Collaboration (T, 
RS, RI) and innovation generation (r=0.26, p<0.01) and weak positive correlation exists 
between External Collaboration (RR) and innovation generation (r=0.23, p<0.01). A weak 
positive correlation exists between External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and organisational 
competitiveness (r=0.32, p<0.001) and weak positive correlation exists between External 
Collaboration (RR) and organisational competitiveness (r=0.33, p<0.001). 
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Hypothesis 2 
Research hypothesis 2 posits that a positive correlation exists between the level of new 
product innovation by health insurers and external collaboration between health insurers 
and healthcare service providers. 
Figures 36-41 present the results for the testing of hypothesis 2.  
 
Figure 36 – Hypothesis 2a – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. external 
collaboration (T, RS, RI) 
A weak positive linear correlation was found between External Collaboration 
(Trustworthiness (T), Role specification (RS), Relationship initiation (RI)) and innovation 
generation (r=0.26, p<0.01)  
Results: Hypothesis 2a – The regression output (scatterplot of innovation generation vs. 
External Collaboration (T, RS, RI)) shown in figure 36 indicates an R² value of 0.067. 
External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) (Independent variable) explains 6.7% of the variation in 
the dependent variable, innovation generation. 
Conclusion: There is empirical support, although weak, for the relationship between 
External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and innovation generation. 
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Figure 37 – Hypothesis 2b – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. 
external collaboration (T, RS, RI) 
A weak positive linear correlation was found between External Collaboration 
(Trustworthiness (T), Role specification (RS), Relationship initiation (RI)) and organisational 
competitiveness (r=0.32, p<0.001)  
Results: Hypothesis 2b – The regression output (scatterplot of organisational 
competitiveness vs. External Collaboration (T, RS, RI)) shown in figure 37 indicates an R² 
value of 0.104. External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) (Independent variable) explains 10.4% of 
the variation in the dependent variable, organisational competitiveness. 
Conclusion: There is empirical support, although weak, for the relationship between 
External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and organisational competitiveness. 
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Figure 38 – Hypothesis 2c – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. external 
collaboration (RR) 
A weak positive linear correlation was found between External Collaboration (Relationship 
restructure (RR)) and innovation generation (r=0.226, p<0.01)  
Results: Hypothesis 2c – The regression output (scatterplot of innovation generation vs. 
External Collaboration (RR)) shown in figure 38 indicates an R² value of 0.051. External 
Collaboration (RR) (Independent variable) explains 5.1% of the variation in the dependent 
variable, innovation generation. 
Conclusion: There is empirical support, although weak, for the relationship between 
External Collaboration (RR) and innovation generation. 
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Figure 39 – Hypothesis 2c – scatterplot of innovation generation vs. (cube 
transformation) external collaboration (RR) 
A weak positive linear correlation was found between transformed variable Cube External 
Collaboration (Relationship restructure (RR)) and innovation generation (r=0.185, p<0.05)  
Results: Hypothesis 2c – The regression output (scatterplot of innovation generation vs. 
Cube External Collaboration (RR)) shown in figure 39 indicates an R² value of 0.034. Cube 
External Collaboration (RR) (Independent variable) explains 3.4% of the variation in the 
dependent variable, innovation generation. 
Conclusion: There is empirical support, although weak, for the relationship between Cube 
External Collaboration (RR) and innovation generation. 
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Figure 40 – Hypothesis 2d – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. 
external collaboration (RR) 
A weak positive linear correlation was found between External Collaboration (Relationship 
restructure (RR)) and organisational competitiveness (r=0.33, p<0.001)  
Results: Hypothesis 2d – The regression output (scatterplot of organisational 
competitiveness vs. External Collaboration (RR)) shown in figure 40 indicates an R² value 
of 0.110. External Collaboration (RR) (Independent variable) explains 11.0% of the variation 
in the dependent variable, organisational competitiveness.  
Conclusion: There is empirical support, although weak, for the relationship between 
External Collaboration (RR) and organisational competitiveness. 
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Figure 41 – Hypothesis 2d – scatterplot of organisational competitiveness vs. (cube 
transformation) external collaboration (RR) 
A weak positive linear correlation was found between the transformed variable Cube 
External Collaboration (Relationship restructure (RR)) and organisational competitiveness 
(r=0.30, p<0.001)  
Results: Hypothesis 2d – The regression output (scatterplot of organisational 
competitiveness vs. External Collaboration (RR)) shown in figure 41 indicates an R² value 
of 0.090. Cube External Collaboration (RR) (Independent variable) explains 9.0% of the 
variation in the dependent variable, organisational competitiveness.  
Conclusion: There is empirical support, although weak, for the relationship between Cube 
External Collaboration (RR) and organisational competitiveness. 
4.5.3 Test for hypothesis 3 
Research hypothesis 3 posits that the relationship between the level of new product 
innovation by health insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is moderated by 
perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for encouraging health insurer product 
innovation, such that the relationship is weaker where these strategic regulatory factors 
have lower presence and stronger where they have higher presence. 
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Hypothesis 3 
The regression output for the base model and model including the moderator is presented 
in table 35. The hypothesis was also tested excluding the health care service provider 
subgroup (Table 36) in view of the significant differences found between the healthcare 
provider subgroup versus the other respondents on the correlation between EO and 
Innovation generation (4.4.11.1). 
Results 
Table 35 – Hypothesis 3a 
Hypothesis 3a Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 0.5116 0.3498 
   
1.2306 0.7790 
  EO     0.6816 0.0636 0.6612 *** 
 
 0.5253 0.1641 0.5096 ** 
Regulation 0.1821 0.0719 0.1562 * 
 
-0.0461 0.2323 -0.0395 
 EO*Regulation 
     
0.0486 0.0470 0.2764 
 R2 base 0.5006 
        ΔR2 0.0039 
        F(2,136) base 68.16*** 
        F(3,135) with moderator 45.82*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Innovation generation = 
0.5116+0.6816(EO)+0.1821(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): Innovation generation = 1.2306+0.5253(EO)-
0.0461(Regulation)+0.0486(EO*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 3a that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between EO and innovation generation as: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.5%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
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 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.68 to 0.53). 
Results 
Table 36 – Hypothesis 3a (excluding healthcare service providers) 
Hypothesis 3a  
EXCLUDING PROVIDERS Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 0.6278 0.3366 
   
0.9639 0.7217 
  EO 0.7213 0.0619 0.7252 *** 
 
0.6478 0.1527 0.6512 *** 
Regulation 0.1308 0.0670 0.1216 
  
0.0233 0.2148 0.0217 
 EO*Regulation 
     
0.0229 0.0435 0.1400 
 R2 base 0.5779 
        ΔR2 0.0010 
        F(2,114) 78.03*** 
        F(3,113) 51.78*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Innovation generation = 
0.6278+0.7213(EO)+0.1308(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): Innovation generation = 0.9639+0.6478(EO)+ 
0.0233(Regulation)+0.0229(EO*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: Excluding healthcare service providers, the relationship between EO and 
Innovation generation is even stronger at 57.8% explained variance. For this reduced 
sample the results also show no support for the hypothesis that Regulation moderates the 
relationship between EO and Innovation generation as: 
 There is minimal (0.1%) increase in the explained variance of Innovation generation 
(R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.72 to 0.65). 
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Hypothesis 3b 
The regression output for the base model and model including the moderator is presented 
in table 37. The hypothesis was also tested excluding the health care service provider 
subgroup (Table 38) based on the significant difference in the correlations between EO and 
Organisation competitiveness for healthcare providers compared to the HIAs. 
Table 37 – Hypothesis 3b 
Hypothesis 3b Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 1.0401 0.4012 
 
* 
 
0.7578 0.8965 
  EO 0.7365 0.0729 0.6512 *** 
 
0.7978 0.1889 0.7055 *** 
Regulation 0.1151 0.0825 0.0900 
  
0.2047 0.2674 0.1600 
 EO*Regulation 
     
-0.0191 0.0541 -0.0989 
 R2 0.4543 
        ΔR2 0.0005 
        F(2,136) 56.6*** 
        F(3,135) 37.53*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Organisational Competitiveness = 
1.0401+0.7365(EO)+0.1151(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): Organisational Competitiveness = 
0.7578+0.7978(EO)+0.2047(Regulation)-0.0191(EO*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 3b that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between EO and organisational competitiveness as: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of organisational 
competitiveness (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.74 to 0.80). 
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Table 38 – Hypothesis 3b (excluding healthcare service providers) 
EXCLUDING PROVIDERS Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness B SE Beta (ß) p 
 
B Std.Err Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 1.3533 0.3637 
 
*** 
 
0.2991 0.7726 
  EO 0.7334 0.0669 0.7147 *** 
 
0.9641 0.1635 0.9394 *** 
Regulation 0.0784 0.0724 0.0706 
  
0.4156 0.2300 0.3745 
 EO*Regulation 
     
-0.0719 0.0465 -0.4257 
 R2 0.5371 
        ΔR2 0.0096 
        F(2,114) 66.12*** 
        F(3,113) 45.41*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Organisational Competitiveness = 
1.3533+0.7334(EO)+0.0784(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl Moderator): Organisational Competitiveness = 
0.2991+0.9641(EO)+0.4156(Regulation)-0.0719(EO*Regulation) 
Conclusion: Excluding healthcare service providers, the relationship between EO and 
organisational competitiveness is even stronger at 53.7% explained variance. For this 
reduced sample the results also show no support for the hypothesis that Regulation 
moderates the relationship between EO and Innovation generation as: 
 There is minimal (0.9%) increase in the explained variance of organisational 
competitiveness (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.73 to 0.96). 
4.5.4 Test for hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 
Research hypothesis 4 posits that the relationship between the level of new product 
innovation by health insurers and external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers is moderated by perceived strategic regulatory factors 
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necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation, such that this relationship is 
weaker where these strategic regulatory factors have lower presence and stronger where 
they have higher presence. 
Results: Hypothesis 4a – the regression output for the base model and model including 
the moderator is presented in table 39.  
Table 39 – Hypothesis 4a 
Hypothesis 4a Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation B SE Beta (ß) p 
 
B Std.Err Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 2.2714 0.6050 
 
*** 
 
0.9176 1.8837 
  External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.2439 0.1495 0.1559 
  
0.5223 0.3962 0.3339 
 Regulation 0.2325 0.1115 0.1994 * 
 
0.6472 0.5578 0.5552 
 Ext Coll (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
     
-0.0821 0.1082 -0.4778 
 R2 0.0966 
        ΔR2 0.0038 
        F(2,136) 7.27** 
        F(3,135) 5.02** 
        
 
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Innovation generation = 
2.2714+0.2439(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.2325(Regulation) 
 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): Innovation generation = 
0.9176+0.5223(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.6472(Regulation)-0.0821(EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 4a that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (T,RS,RI) and 
innovation generation as: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.5%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (T,RS,RI) from the base 
model to the model including the moderator (0.24 to 0.52). 
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Results: Hypothesis 4b– the regression output for the base model and model including 
the moderator is presented in table 40.  
Table 40 – Hypothesis 4b 
Hypothesis 4b Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness B SE Beta (ß) p 
 
B Std.Err Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 2.1603 0.6602 
 
** 
 
2.3692 2.0597 
  External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.4976 0.1632 0.2900 ** 
 
0.4546 0.4333 0.2649 
 Regulation 0.0782 0.1216 0.0612 
  
0.0142 0.6099 0.0111 
 Ext Coll (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
     
0.0127 0.1183 0.0672 
 R2 0.1064 
        ΔR2 0.0001 
        F(2,136) 8.09*** 
        F(3,135) 5.36** 
        
 
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Org Competitiveness = 
2.1603+0.24976(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.0782(Regulation) 
 
Regression Equation (incl Moderator): Org Competitiveness = 
2.3692+0.4546(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.0142(Regulation)+0.0127(EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 4b that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (T,RS,RI) and 
organisational competitiveness: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (T, RS, RI) from the base 
model to the model including the moderator (0.50 to 0.45). 
Results: Hypothesis 4c– the regression output for the base model and model including 
the moderator is presented in table 41.  
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Table 41 – Hypothesis 4c 
Hypothesis 4c Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 1.7885 0.6464 
 
** 
 
1.5048 1.8253 
  External Collaboration (RR) 0.2401 0.1020 0.1917 * 
 
0.2880 0.3052 0.2299 
 Regulation 0.2971 0.0949 0.2548 ** 
 
0.3963 0.6042 0.3400 
 Ext Coll (RR)*Regulation 
     
-0.0166 0.0998 -0.0988 
 R2 0.1150 
        ΔR2 0.0002 
        F(2,136) 8.83*** 
        F(3,135) 5.86*** 
        
 
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Innovation generation = 
1.7885+0.2401(EC(RR))+0.2971(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): Innovation generation = 
1.5048+0.2880(EC(RR))+0.3963(Regulation)-0.0166(EC(RR)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 4c that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (RR) and 
innovation generation: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(RR)*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (RR) from the base model to 
the model including the moderator (0.24 to 0.29). 
Results: Hypothesis 4d– the regression output for the base model and model including 
the moderator is presented in table 42.  
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Table 42 – Hypothesis 4d 
Hypothesis 4d Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept 1.5293 0.6996 
 
* 
 
1.3973 1.9755 
  External Collaboration (RR) 0.4244 0.1104 0.3089 *** 
 
0.4466 0.3303 0.3250 
 Regulation 0.2185 0.1027 0.1708 * 
 
0.2646 0.6539 0.2069 
 Ext Coll (RR)*Regulation 
     
-0.0077 0.1080 -0.0419 
 R2 0.1389 
        ΔR2 0.0000 
        F(2,136) 10.97*** 
        F(3,135) 7.26*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): Org Competitiveness = 
1.5293+0.4244(EC(RR))+0.2185(Regulation) 
 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): Org Competitiveness = 
1.3973+0.4466(EC(RR))+0.2646(Regulation)-0.0077(EC(RR)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 4d that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (RR) and 
organisational competitiveness: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC (RR)*Regulation) is not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (RR) from the base model to 
the model including the moderator (0.42 to 0.45). 
 
4.5.5 Jointly specified hypotheses 5 & 6 – To test for model misspecification 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were created to test for model misspecification by including all the 
main variables when testing the moderation effects of the interaction terms on the 
relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO and the relationship 
between health insurer product innovation and external collaboration. 
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4.5.5.1 Hypothesis 5 
EO * Regulation (including all main variables) vs. health insurer product 
innovation (innovation generation, organisational competitiveness) 
Results: Hypothesis 5a– The regression output for the base model and model including 
the moderator is presented in table 43. The hypothesis was also tested excluding the health 
care service provider subgroup (Table 44) in view of the significant differences found 
between the healthcare provider subgroup versus the other respondents on the correlation 
between EO and Innovation generation (4.4.11.1). 
Table 43 – Hypothesis 5a 
Hypothesis 5a Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept -0.3532 0.5933 
   
0.3328 0.9323 
  EO 0.6631 0.0643 0.6433 *** 
 
0.5184 0.1647 0.5029 ** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.1337 0.1123 0.0855 
  
0.1222 0.1130 0.0781 
 External Collaboration (RR) 0.0904 0.0783 0.0722 
  
0.0938 0.0784 0.0749 
 Regulation 0.1225 0.0831 0.1051 
  
-0.0847 0.2325 -0.0726 
 EO*Regulation 
     
0.0450 0.0471 0.2559 
 R2 0.5124 
        ΔR2 0.0033 
        F(4,134) 35.2*** 
        F(5,133) 28.33*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): 
Innovation generation = -0.3532+0.6631(EO)+0.1337(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.0904 
(EC(RR))+0.1225(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Innovation generation = 0.3328+0.5184(EO)+0.1222(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.0938(EC(RR))-
0.0847(Regulation)+0.0450(EO*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 5a that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between EO (including all the main variables) and 
innovation generation as: 
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 There is minimal (less than 0.5%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) (including all the main variables) is not 
significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.66 to 0.52). 
 
Results: Hypothesis 5a 
Table 44 – Hypothesis 5a (excluding healthcare service providers) 
EXCLUDING PROVIDERS Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE 
 Beta 
(ß) p    B 
 
Std.Err 
 Beta 
(ß) p 
Intercept 0.2027 0.6724 
   
0.5567 0.9219 
  EO 0.7079 0.0636 0.7117 *** 
 
0.6286 0.1545 0.6320 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) -0.0022 0.1307 -0.0013 
  
-0.0028 0.1311 -0.0017 
 External Collaboration (RR) 0.0866 0.0859 0.0641 
  
0.0885 0.0862 0.0654 
 Regulation 0.1263 0.0830 0.1174 
  
0.0109 0.2211 0.0102 
 EO*Regulation 
     
0.0246 0.0437 0.1504 
 R2 0.5817 
        ΔR2 0.0012 
        F(4,112) 38.94*** 
        F(5,111) 31.03*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model):  
Innovation generation = 0.2027+0.7079(EO)-0.0022(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.0866 
(EC(RR))+0.1263(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Innovation generation = 0.5567+0.6286(EO)-0.0028(EC(T, RS,RI)) 
+0.0885(EC(RR))+0.0109(Regulation)+0.0246(EO*Regulation) 
Conclusion: Excluding healthcare service providers, the relationship between EO and 
Innovation generation is even stronger at 58.1% explained variance. For this reduced 
sample the results also show no support for the hypothesis that Regulation moderates the 
relationship between EO (including all main variables) and Innovation generation as: 
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 There is minimal (0.1%) increase in the explained variance of Innovation generation 
(R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) (including all main variables) is not significant 
(p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.71 to 0.63). 
Results: Hypothesis 5b 
The regression output for the base model and model including the moderator is presented 
in table 45. The hypothesis was also tested excluding the health care service provider 
subgroup (Table 46) based on the significant difference in the correlations between EO and 
Organisation competitiveness for healthcare providers compared to the HIAs. 
Table 45 – Hypothesis 5b 
Hypothesis 5b Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational 
competitiveness  B SE 
 Beta 
(ß) p    B 
 
Std.Err 
 Beta 
(ß) p 
Intercept -1.2594 0.6434 
   
-1.7180 1.0131 
  EO 0.6869 0.0697 0.6073 *** 
 
0.7836 0.1790 0.6928 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.3475 0.1218 0.2025 ** 
 
0.3552 0.1228 0.2070 ** 
External Collaboration (RR) 0.2458 0.0849 0.1789 ** 
 
0.2436 0.0852 0.1773 ** 
Regulation -0.0408 0.0902 -0.0319 
  
0.0977 0.2527 0.0764 
 EO*Regulation 
     
-0.0301 0.0512 -0.1559 
 R2 0.5236 
        ΔR2 0.0012 
        F(4,134) 36.82*** 
        F(5,133) 29.38*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.2594+0.6869(EO)+0.3475(EC - T, RS,RI) 
+0.2458(EC - RR)-0.0408(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.7180+0.7836(EO)+0.3552(EC - T, RS,RI) 
+0.2436(EC - RR)+0.0977(Regulation)-0.0301(EO*Regulation) 
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Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 5b that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between EO (including all main variables) and 
organisational competitiveness as: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.5%)increase in the explained variance of organisational 
competitiveness (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) (including all main variables) is not significant 
(p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.69 to 0.78). 
Table 46 – Hypothesis 5b (excluding healthcare service providers) 
EXCLUDING PROVIDERS Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness B SE Beta (ß) p 
 
B Std.Err Beta (ß) p 
Intercept -0.2987 0.6920 
   
-1.2498 0.9408 
  EO 0.6855 0.0654 0.6680 *** 
 
0.8985 0.1577 0.8755 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.0343 0.1345 0.0196 
  
0.0361 0.1337 0.0206 
 External Collaboration (RR) 0.3067 0.0884 0.2200 *** 
 
0.3017 0.0880 0.2164 *** 
Regulation 0.0467 0.0854 0.0420 
  
0.3566 0.2256 0.3213 
 EO*Regulation 
     
-0.0661 0.0446 -0.3917 
 R2 0.5838 
        ΔR2 0.0081 
        F(4,112) 39.28*** 
        F(5,111) 32.2*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
 
Regression Equation (Base model):  
Org Competitiveness = 
-0.2987+ 0.6855 (EO) + 0.0343(EC(T,RS,RI)) + 0.3067(EC(RR))+ 0.0467(Regulation) 
Regression Equation (incl Moderator): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.2498+0.8985(EO)+0.0361(EC(T,RS,RI))+0.3017 
(EC(RR))+0.3566(Regulation)-0.0661(EO*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: Excluding healthcare service providers, the relationship between EO and 
organisational competitiveness is even stronger at 58.4% explained variance. For this 
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reduced sample the results also show no support for the hypothesis that Regulation 
moderates the relationship between EO (including all main variables) and organisational 
competitiveness as: 
 There is minimal (0.8%) increase in the explained variance of organisational 
competitiveness(R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EO*Regulation) (including all main variables) is not significant 
(p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EO from the base model to the 
model including the moderator (0.69 to 0.90). 
 
4.5.5.2 Hypothesis 6 
 External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) * Regulation (including all main 
variables) and External Collaboration (RR) * Regulation (including all main 
variables) vs. health insurer product innovation 
Results: Hypothesis 6a 
Table 47 – Hypothesis 6a 
Hypothesis 6a Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept -0.3532 0.5933 
   
-2.4504 1.4220 
  EO 0.6631 0.0643 0.6433 *** 
 
0.6727 0.0642 0.6526 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.1337 0.1123 0.0855 
  
0.5795 0.2968 0.3705 
 External Collaboration (RR) 0.0904 0.0783 0.0722 
  
0.0717 0.0787 0.0572 
 Regulation 0.1225 0.0831 0.1051 
  
0.7809 0.4146 0.6699 
 Ext Coll (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
     
-0.1305 0.0805 -0.7596 
 R2 0.5124 
        ΔR2 0.0094 
        F(4,134) 35.2*** 
        F(5,133) 29.03*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): 
Innovation generation = -0.3532+0.6631(EO)+0.1337(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.0904(EC(RR))+0.1225(Regulation) 
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Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Innovation generation = -2.4504+0.6727(EO)+0.5795(EC-T,RS,RI) 
+0.0717(EC-RR)+0.7809(Regulation)-0.1305(EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 6a that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (T, RS, RI) 
(including all the main variables) and innovation generation as: 
 There is minimal (less than 1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) (including all the main variables) is 
not significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (T, RS, RI) from the base 
model to the model including the moderator (0.13 to 0.58). 
 
Results: Hypothesis 6b 
Table 48 – Hypothesis 6b 
Hypothesis 6b Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept -1.2594 0.6434 
   
-1.4707 1.5571 
  EO 0.6869 0.0697 0.6073 *** 
 
0.6878 0.0703 0.6082 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.3475 0.1218 0.2025 ** 
 
0.3924 0.3250 0.2287 
 External Collaboration (RR) 0.2458 0.0849 0.1789 ** 
 
0.2439 0.0861 0.1775 ** 
Regulation -0.0408 0.0902 -0.0319 
  
0.0255 0.4539 0.0199 
 Ext Coll (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
     
-0.0132 0.0882 -0.0697 
 R2 0.5236 
        ΔR2 0.0001 
        F(4,134) 36.82*** 
        F(5,133) 29.25*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.2594+0.6869(EO)+0.3475(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.2458(EC(RR))-0.0408(Regulation) 
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Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.4707+0.6878(EO)+0.3924(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.2439(EC(RR))+0.0255(Regulation)-0.0132(EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 6b that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (T, RS, RI) 
(including all main variables) and organisational competitiveness: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(T,RS,RI)*Regulation) (including all main variables) is not 
significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (T, RS, RI) from the base 
model to the model including the moderator (0.35 to 0.39). 
 
Results: Hypothesis 6c 
Table 49 – Hypothesis 6c 
Hypothesis 6c Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Generation  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept -0.3532 0.5933 
   
-0.7902 1.3942 
  EO 0.6631 0.0643 0.6433 *** 
 
0.6636 0.0645 0.6438 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.1337 0.1123 0.0855 
  
0.1309 0.1130 0.0837 
 External Collaboration (RR) 0.0904 0.0783 0.0722 
  
0.1654 0.2300 0.1321 
 Regulation 0.1225 0.0831 0.1051 
  
0.2786 0.4578 0.2389 
 Ext Coll (RR)*Regulation 
     
-0.0259 0.0748 -0.1544 
 R2 0.5124 
        ΔR2 0.0004 
        F(4,134) 35.2*** 
        F(5,133) 28*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): 
Innovation generation = -0.3532+0.6631(EO)+0.1337(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.0904(EC(RR))+0.1225(Regulation) 
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Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Innovation generation = -0.7902+0.6636(EO)+0.1309(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.1654(EC(RR))+0.2786(Regulation)-0.0259(EC(RR)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 6c that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (RR) (including 
all the main variables) and innovation generation as: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(RR)*Regulation) (including all the main variables) is not 
significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (RR) from the base model to 
the model including the moderator (0.09 to 0.17). 
 
Results: Hypothesis 6d 
Table 50 – Hypothesis 6d 
Hypothesis 6d Base model 
 
Including moderator 
Organisational competitiveness  B SE  Beta (ß) p    B  Std.Err  Beta (ß) p 
Intercept -1.2594 0.6434 
   
-1.3829 1.5125 
  EO 0.6869 0.0697 0.6073 *** 
 
0.6870 0.0700 0.6075 *** 
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 0.3475 0.1218 0.2025 ** 
 
0.3467 0.1226 0.2020 ** 
External Collaboration (RR) 0.2458 0.0849 0.1789 ** 
 
0.2670 0.2495 0.1943 
 Regulation -0.0408 0.0902 -0.0319 
  
0.0032 0.4966 0.0025 
 Ext Coll (RR)*Regulation 
     
-0.0073 0.0812 -0.0397 
 R2 0.5236 
        ΔR2 0.0000 
        F(4,134) 36.82*** 
        F(5,133) 29.24*** 
        
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05 
Regression Equation (Base model): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.2594+0.6869(EO)+0.3475(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.2458(EC(RR))-0.0408(Regulation) 
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Regression Equation (incl. Moderator): 
Org Competitiveness = -1.3829+0.6870(EO)+0.3467(EC(T,RS,RI)) 
+0.2670(EC(RR))+0.0032(Regulation)-0.0073(EC(RR)*Regulation) 
 
Conclusion: For the complete sample, there is no support for Hypothesis 6b that 
Regulation moderates the relationship between External Collaboration (EC) (RR) (including 
all main variables) and organisational competitiveness: 
 There is minimal (less than 0.1%)increase in the explained variance of Innovation 
generation (R2) from the base model to the model including the moderator  
 The moderating effect (EC(RR)*Regulation) (including all main variables) is not 
significant (p>0.05) 
 There is minimal change in the parameter value for EC (RR) from the base model to 
the model including the moderator (0.25 to 0.27). 
4.6 Summary of the results 
The results chapter is structured to present the data analysis results under three main 
headings; 1) the sample description, including respondents and organisational 
characteristics, 2) the measurement aspects of the model and 3) regression analysis to test 
the model. The presentation of the results included data tables, data figures and graphs to 
present the results of the data analyses performed. The regression analysis results 
confirmed the following in terms of the four relational hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 – the research hypothesis is supported. The results indicated a strong linear 
relationship between EO and health insurer product innovation. EO explained 47% of the 
variance in innovation generation and 45% of the variance in organisational competiveness. 
Hypothesis 2 – the research hypothesis is supported, although weak. The results indicated 
a weak linear relationship between external collaboration and health insurer product 
innovation. External collaboration (T, RS, RI) explained 7% of the variance in innovation 
generation and 10% of the variance in organisational competiveness. External collaboration 
(RR) explained 5% of the variance in innovation generation and 11% of the variance in 
organisational competiveness. External collaboration (RR) (cube transformation) explained 
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only 3% of the variance in innovation generation and 9% of the variance in organisational 
competiveness. 
Hypothesis 3 – the research hypothesis is not supported. The results indicated a negligible 
moderation effect by the interaction term (EO*regulation) in the relationship between health 
insurer product innovation and EO. The moderation effect was negligible for the regression 
analysis including healthcare service providers and excluding healthcare service providers. 
Hypothesis 4 – the research hypothesis is not supported. The results indicated a negligible 
moderation effect by the interaction terms (External Collaboration (T, RS, RI)*Regulation 
and External Collaboration (RR)*Regulation) in the relationship between health insurer 
product innovation and External collaboration. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 were created to test for misspecification of the model by including all 
the main variables when testing the moderation effects of the interaction terms on the 
relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO and the relationship 
between health insurer product innovation and external collaboration. 
Hypothesis 5 – the research hypothesis is not supported. The results indicated a negligible 
moderation effect by the interaction term (EO*regulation), including all the main variables, in 
the relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO. The moderation effect 
was negligible for the regression analysis including healthcare service providers and 
excluding healthcare service providers. 
Hypothesis 6 – the research hypothesis is not supported. The results indicated a negligible 
moderation effect by the interaction terms (External Collaboration (T, RS, RI)*Regulation 
and External Collaboration (RR)*Regulation), including all the main variables, in the 
relationship between health insurer product innovation and External collaboration. 
Table 51 provides a summary of the research hypotheses results. 
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Table 51 – Summary of results of the research hypotheses tests 
Research Hypothesis Description of path Result 
H1 a, b 
A positive correlation exists between 
the level of new product innovation by 
health insurers and entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO). 
EO          Health insurer 
product innovation (G, OC) 
Supported 
H2 a-d 
A positive correlation exists between 
the level of new product innovation by 
health insurers and external 
collaboration between health insurers 
and healthcare service providers. 
 
External Collaboration (EC) 
(T, RS,RI)            Health 
insurer product innovation 
(G, OC) 
External Collaboration (EC) 
(RR)              Health insurer 
product innovation (G, OC)   
Supported 
 
 
Supported 
H3 a, b 
The relationship between the level of 
new product innovation by health 
insurers and entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) is moderated by 
perceived strategic regulatory factors 
necessary for encouraging health 
insurer product innovation, such that 
the relationship is weaker where these 
strategic regulatory factors have lower 
presence and stronger where they 
have higher presence. 
EO*Regulation (interaction 
term)          Health insurer 
product innovation (G, OC) 
Not supported 
H4 a-d 
The relationship between the level of 
new product innovation by health 
insurers and external collaboration 
between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers is 
moderated by perceived strategic 
regulatory factors necessary for 
encouraging health insurer product 
innovation, such that this relationship 
is weaker where these strategic 
regulatory factors have lower presence 
and stronger where they have higher 
presence 
 
EC (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
(interaction term)          
Health insurer product 
innovation (G, OC) 
EC (RR)*Regulation 
(interaction term)          
Health insurer product 
innovation (G, OC) 
Not supported 
 
 
Not supported 
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Research Hypothesis Description of path Result 
H5 a, b 
To test for model misspecification 
EO*Regulation (interaction 
term)           Health insurer 
product innovation  (G, OC) 
(incl. All main variables) 
Not supported 
H6 a-d 
To test for model misspecification 
EC (T,RS,RI)*Regulation 
(interaction term)          
Health insurer product 
innovation (G, OC) 
(incl. All main variables) 
EC (RR)*Regulation 
(interaction term)          
Health insurer product 
innovation (G, OC) 
(incl. All main variables) 
Not supported 
 
 
 
Not supported 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter consolidates the discussion of the research results, the conclusions of the 
research study, implications for theory development and for healthcare executives and 
recommendations for future research.  
5.2 Discussion of Results 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive analysis reveals for the entrepreneurial orientation (EO) scale above 
midpoint (4) scores across items for health insurers and health insurer administrators, 
suggesting that these two subgroups of the study have medium to high levels of EO. These 
are captured through the three EO dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-
taking. Healthcare service providers show below midpoint (4) scores for the innovativeness 
and risk-taking constructs and above midpoint scores for the proactiveness construct. The 
total scores across items for EO for healthcare service providers, as the third subgroup of 
this study, reveal that the score is below the midpoint (4), suggesting that this subgroup has 
low to medium levels of EO.  
The external collaboration scales, trustworthiness, role specification and relationship 
restructure have above midpoint (4) scores for health insurers, health insurer administrators 
and healthcare service providers. This suggests that all three subgroups perceive 
trustworthiness, role specification and relationship restructure to be important elements in 
driving collaboration between the subgroups. Healthcare service provider scores for 
trustworthiness only just exceed the midpoint (4) score. This suggests that there could be 
some level of distrust among healthcare service providers in terms of trusting the strategic 
alliance strategies of health insurers/health insurer administrators focusing on health insurer 
product innovation. For all three subgroups the relationship initiation construct scores are 
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significantly lower than the midpoint (4) and this suggests that the perception of all 
subgroups is that not sufficient time is spent, or sufficient interest is shown, among the 
different subgroups to collaborate in improving healthcare efficiencies and the provision of 
better care to patients.  Total scores across scales for external collaboration (including 
trustworthiness, role specification and relationship initiation) for healthcare insurers and 
healthcare insurer administrators are above the midpoint (4) and for health care service 
providers below the midpoint (4). This suggests that external collaboration, viewed from the 
health insurers and health insurer administrators‘ perspectives is more important in terms of 
driving health insurer product innovation than it is for healthcare service providers. 
Descriptive analysis reveals for regulation (increased competition, health insurance and 
access, standards for coverage and structure of healthcare delivery) below midpoint (4) 
scores across items for all three subgroups, health insurers, health insurer administrators 
and healthcare service providers. This suggests that all three subgroups perceive the South 
African healthcare regulatory environment to significantly lack strategic regulatory factors, 
necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation. 
For the health insurer product innovation scales, descriptive analysis reveals above 
midpoint (4) scores across items for health insurer administrators. This suggests that this 
subgroup has medium to high levels of health insurer product innovation output. Health 
insurers recorded below midpoint scores for the innovation generation construct only, and 
this indicates that they have lower levels of innovation generation output than health insurer 
administrators. This suggests that health insurer administrators are perceived to be the 
drivers/initiators of health insurer product innovation generation in health insurers due to 
their close external collaboration strategies. The scores across items for healthcare service 
providers were below the midpoint (4) and this suggests that healthcare service providers 
have low levels of product innovation output in the healthcare value chain. 
5.2.2 Evaluation of the Model 
5.2.2.1 Measurement Characteristics of the scales 
The measurement aspects of the model were evaluated first, before evaluating the 
structural aspects of the model. 
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Reliability was analysed and computed for the theoretically-derived measurement scales as 
reliability is a necessary condition (although not a sufficient condition) for validity. The 
reliabilities of scales were analysed using Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient and the average 
inter-item correlations. The results show that the Cronbach alpha values of the theoretically 
derived measures of the constructs of regulation, entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and 
external collaboration variables are all adequate and above the 0.7 level. The Cronbach 
alpha for the theoretically derived measures of the innovation generation construct as well 
as the theoretically derived measures of the organisational competitiveness construct (the 
dependent variable, health insurer product innovation), are around 0.9, which is excellent. 
The Cronbach alpha values of the innovation adoption construct, measuring health insurer 
product innovation at 0.5, is well below 0.7, which indicates the presence of unacceptably 
high error variance in the scores of this scale. The Cronbach alpha values, using the 
empirically derived measures for the innovation adoption construct, improved slightly but 
was still below 0.7 at 0.63, which indicates the presence of unacceptably high error 
variance in the scores of this scale. The innovation adoption construct was dropped from 
the model due to its poor measurement characteristics. 
The validity of the theoretically derived scales of the model was investigated using 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to see whether there was evidence of an empirically 
derived different combination of items that was different from theoretical expectation. If so, 
the empirically derived scales were retained and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was 
applied to both the original theoretical scales as well as the new empirical scales and tested 
for model fit for each construct. The results revealed differences between the theoretically 
derived scales and the empirically derived scales for two of the independent variables: 
external collaboration (independent variable) and health insurer product innovation 
(dependent variable). The empirically derived scales for both constructs were retained and 
the measurement items were altered accordingly. Construct validity was then supported for 
both constructs. The theoretically derived scales for both EO and regulation were retained 
and construct validity was supported for both constructs. 
As mentioned earlier, the decision was made to exclude the variable, innovation adoption, 
as a variable measuring the dependent variable, health insurer product innovation. This is 
due to its poor reliability and validity as a measurement construct for health insurer product 
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innovation. Thus the results indicate that there is empirical evidence to support the 
construct validity for health insurer product innovation, if innovation generation and 
organisational competitiveness are only included as measurement constructs. 
Based on the assumption that innovation input is a necessary condition for product 
innovation, the researcher expected to find that organisations with lower levels of innovation 
input would tend to score relatively lower on the dependent variable measures, while 
organisations with higher levels of innovation input would tend to score more highly.  
Using the multivariate technique of cluster analysis, respondents were categorised as 
having high, medium or low innovation input. This clustering variable was formed based on 
standardised measures of three independent measures of organisational innovation input: 
1) whether the organisation has a research and development (R&D) budget; 2) whether the 
organisation‘s R&D budget encourages innovation; and 3) the number of R&D staff 
employed by the organisation‘s R&D department/division. This categorisation was then 
related to the two measures of the model‘s dependent variable - health insurer product 
innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness). The results of the 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that the clusters differed significantly on the 
three standardised clustering variables, as well as on innovation generation and 
organisational competitiveness. Furthermore, the results showed that the direction and 
magnitude of the means for both innovation generation and organisational competitiveness 
were such that these means were highest in organisations with relatively high innovation 
input, followed by organisations with medium levels of innovation input and lowest for those 
organisations with low levels of innovation input. The significant results and direction of the 
clusters‘ mean measures of the dependent variable have thus fulfilled the expectations 
underlying the test for the criterion-related validity of the scales of the dependent variable 
and thus there is further support for the construct validity of health insurer product 
innovation for the researcher‘s model. 
The results showed that the majority of health insurer administrators (60%) perceive a high 
level of innovation input, compared to 24% of health insurers and 18% of healthcare service 
providers. These results suggest that health insurer administrators have the innovation 
input capacity to drive health insurer product innovation in the South African private 
healthcare industry. 
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Organisational competitive capability (external variable) was used for additional validation 
of health insurer product innovation output (dependent variable). The analysis results show 
a moderately strong linear relationship (r=0.63, p<0.001) between the scales of 
Organisational Competitiveness vs. Organisational Competitive Capacity. As the scale of 
Organisational Competitive Capacity is considered in previous research to measure a 
similar construct to Organisational Competitiveness, a strong relationship between the 
measures is considered as evidence for the construct validity of the scale of Organisational 
Competitiveness (dependent variable). 
Second order CFA on the subscale level confirmed external collaboration (relationship 
restructure) and innovation adoption as second order constructs and this resulted in the 
revision of the regression equation for the model, including external collaboration 
(relationship restructure). As previously mentioned innovation adoption was excluded from 
the model as a measurement construct due to its poor reliability and validity results. 
Comparison of the subgroups on the measurement variables revealed differences between 
the healthcare service provider subgroup versus the other respondents (health insurers and 
health insurer administrators) on the correlation between EO and innovation generation. 
Significant differences in the correlations between EO and Organisational Competitiveness 
for healthcare service providers compared to health insurer administrators were found. This 
result prompted the decision to perform the regression analysis, testing the relationship 
between health insurer product innovation and EO, with and without the healthcare service 
provider subgroup. The testing of the interaction term (EO*Regulation) on the relationship 
between health insurer product innovation and EO also included and excluded the 
healthcare service provider subgroup. Finally, the model fit analysis results showed weak 
model fit despite attempting to improve the values using the empirically derived scales 
instead of the theoretically derived scales for external collaboration and health insurer 
product innovation. The model fit results suggest that the measurement scales for the 
model need to be refined. The CFA also confirmed that the measurement scales overall 
need to be improved and refined. 
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5.2.2.2 Evaluation of the model via regression analysis 
The results on the construct validity of the measures of health insurer product innovation 
(dependent variable) confirmed the presence of two underlying dimensions – innovation 
generation and organisational competitiveness. The construct validity results on external 
collaboration similarly confirmed the presence of two underlying dimensions – external 
collaboration (Trustworthiness (T), Role specification (RS) and Relationship initiation (RI)), 
and external collaboration (Relationship restructure (RR)). Additional hypotheses were 
included that involved all combinations of the variables to test the interaction terms on the 
relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO and the relationship 
between health insurer product innovation and external collaboration, so that there would 
be no misspecification of the regression model. 
The following relational research hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1: A positive correlation exists between the level of new product innovation by 
health insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) – hypotheses 1a and b. 
Hypothesis 2: A positive correlation exists between the level of new product innovation by 
health insurers and external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers – hypotheses 2a-d. 
 Hypothesis 3: The relationship between the level of new product innovation by health 
insurers and entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is moderated by perceived strategic 
regulatory factors necessary for encouraging health insurer product innovation, such that 
the relationship is weaker where these strategic regulatory factors have lower presence and 
stronger where they have higher presence – hypotheses 3a and b. 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between the level of new product innovation by health 
insurers and external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers is moderated by perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for encouraging 
health insurer product innovation, such that this relationship is weaker where these 
strategic regulatory factors have lower presence and stronger where they have higher 
presence – hypotheses 4a-d. 
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Hypotheses 5 and 6 were created to test for model misspecification by including all the 
main variables when testing the moderation effects of the interaction terms on the 
relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO and the relationship 
between health insurer product innovation and external collaboration – hypotheses 5a and 
b and 6a-d. 
The regression analyses showed the following results for each of the research hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
The regression results for research hypothesis 1 (H1a and b) revealed a strong positive 
linear relationship between health insurer product innovation (for both innovation generation 
and organisational competitiveness) and EO. Research hypothesis 1 is therefore supported 
and the finding is supported by the literature. The literature indicates that the strength of a 
firm‘s entrepreneurial orientation can have a strong positive effect on performance (Zahra 
and Covin 1995; Morris and Sexton 1996; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005; Green, Covin and 
Slevin 2008). According to Wiklund (1999) and Soininen et al. (2011), innovation keeps 
organisations ahead of their competitors, gaining competitive advantage which leads to 
improved financial results. According to Goedhuys and Veugelers (2011) product innovation 
translates into superior sales and growth rates. Li et al. (2006) found a strong link between 
EO and new product development improvement (Drucker 1985; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Li 
et al. 2006). The correlation results between the EO constructs (innovativeness, 
proactiveness and risk-taking) and the health insurer product innovation constructs 
(innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) show the correlations to be 
highly significant (p<0.001) with moderate effect size (r2 ranging between 0.29 and 0.49), 
thus providing further support for hypothesis 1 at a lower level of measurement. 
The CFA results indicated that innovation adoption was a weak measurement construct for 
healthcare innovation and it was dropped from the researcher‘s model. This could suggest 
that innovation adoption should be positioned differently to actors in the healthcare value 
chain as it could have a negative or inferior connotation to innovation perceptions by the 
various subgroups. 
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Hypothesis 2 
The regression results for research hypothesis 2 (H2a-d) revealed a weak positive linear 
relationship between health insurer product innovation (for both innovation generation and 
organisational competitiveness) and External Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and External 
Collaboration (RR). Research hypothesis 2 is therefore supported, although the results 
were weak. The literature support the importance of the relationship between product 
innovation and external collaboration: according to Adler et al. (2011), collaborative 
communities encourage people to continually apply their unique talents to group projects 
and to become motivated by a collective mission, not just personal gain or the intrinsic 
pleasures of autonomous creativity. Christensen et al. (2009) explains that because 
healthcare, according to his ‗tools of cooperation model‘, is in the lower left world of 
disagreement, certain remedies reformers tried to introduce in the past have not worked.  
There are also instances in which disagreement among parties that need to cooperate is so 
fundamental that it is simply impossible to reach consensus on a course of action 
(Christensen et al. 2009). The weak relationship between health insurer product innovation 
and external collaboration suggests that industry dynamics could play a part explaining this 
weak result. 
Hypothesis 3 
The regression results for research hypothesis 3 (H3a and b) revealed a negligible 
moderation effect for regulation on the relationship between health insurer product 
innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) and EO. Research 
hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported. The literature indicates that in the healthcare 
sector, regulatory bodies play a pivotal role in balancing cooperation and competition by 
means of reforms introduced through legislation (Provan 1984; Mur-Veeman et al. 2001; 
Baretta 2008).  According to Baretta (2008) regulatory bodies can also influence the level of 
competition in the healthcare industry. According to Christensen et al. (2009) the lack of 
business model innovation in the healthcare industry is a result of regulators not permitting 
it. Porter and Teisberg (2006) argue that if every actor in the healthcare system has to 
measure and report results and compete for every member/subscriber or patient, value will 
increase and innovation will flourish. They further indicate that the healthcare regulatory 
framework must include strategic regulatory factors which encourage innovation in: health 
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insurance and access; standards for coverage; and structure of healthcare delivery. This 
result suggests, contrary to expectation, that the low levels of strategic regulatory factors 
necessary to encourage health insurer innovation in the current South African healthcare 
regulatory framework, do not impact the relationship between health insurer product 
innovation and EO.  
Hypothesis 4 
The regression results for research hypothesis 4 (H4a and b) revealed a negligible 
moderation effect for regulation on the relationship between health insurer product 
innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) and External 
Collaboration (T, RS, RI) and External Collaboration (RR). Research hypothesis 4 is 
therefore not supported. Baretta (2008) argues that regulatory bodies can also impact on 
the level of cooperation among providers of healthcare services through many decisions, 
such as the implementation of a financing model for healthcare service providers that 
induces collaboration/cooperation among them. According to Porter and Teisberg (2006) 
healthcare policy has been both a reflection and a contributor to the zero-sum competition 
that plagues the current inefficient healthcare system. This result suggests, contrary to 
expectation, that the low levels of strategic regulatory factors necessary to encourage 
health insurer innovation in the current South African healthcare regulatory framework, do 
not impact the relationship between health insurer product innovation and external 
collaboration.  
Hypotheses 5 and 6 
As mentioned earlier, hypotheses 5 and 6 were created to test for model misspecification 
by including all the main variables when testing the moderation effects of the interaction 
terms on the relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO and the 
relationship between health insurer product innovation and external collaboration. The 
healthcare service provider subgroup was again excluded and included in the regression 
analysis for hypothesis 5 – testing for the moderation effect of the interaction term 
(EO*Regulation) on the relationship between health insurer product innovation and EO. The 
regression results revealed that both research hypotheses 5 and 6 are not supported, 
suggesting no evidence of model misspecification. 
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Analysis conclusion – model testing 
The data analysis results indicate that EO is the only strong predictor of health insurer 
product innovation in the conceptual model designed by the researcher. The results also 
indicate that regulation is not moderating the relationships between health insurer product 
innovation and EO and health insurer product innovation and external collaboration. The 
study results also show that external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare 
service providers is a weak predictor of health insurer product innovation. 
5.3 Conclusions of the study 
This research study contributes to entrepreneurship literature and builds on existing 
entrepreneurship studies. The aim of the research study was to build on the existing 
Domain Framework of Guth and Ginsberg (1990) for integrating corporate entrepreneurship 
into the strategic management of a company. The researcher developed a conceptual 
model, building on the innovation process of the Domain Framework by Guth and Ginsberg 
(1990), in order to investigate the relationship between the level of health insurer product 
innovation and entrepreneurial orientation (EO); the relationship between the level of health 
insurer product innovation and external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers. The research study also investigated whether low levels of 
presence of perceived strategic regulatory factors, necessary for encouraging health insurer 
product innovation in the private healthcare industry in South Africa, weakens the 
relationship between the level of new health insurer product innovation and EO and 
weakens the relationship between the level of new health insurer innovation and external 
collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service providers. This study focused 
on important actors in both the demand and supply side structures of the South African 
private healthcare value chain, including private health insurers, health insurer 
administrators, private hospital groups and physician representative societies/associations.  
Based on the research findings, the strong positive correlations between EO and health 
insurer product innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) 
provide strong support that in order for health insurers to create new innovative 
products/plans for the private healthcare industry in South Africa, high firm-level EO is a 
necessity in terms of product innovation success. The study also found that there is a 
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perception that health insurer administrators generally control the health insurer product 
innovation process with health insurers due to their internal innovation input capacity. This 
finding is important as it suggests that health insurers and healthcare service providers 
must invest more in innovation input capacity in order to drive greater health insurer product 
innovation performance in the South African private healthcare industry. The innovation 
capacity of healthcare service providers is especially important in initiating supply side 
innovation in the healthcare value chain. 
According to Rosenbusch et al. (2011), entrepreneurs and small business owners face the 
dilemma of deciding whether they should pursue and focus on innovation development 
projects as firm-internal projects or with strategic alliances (external partners). They indicate 
that prior research mainly advocates external collaborations and networking for new and 
small organisations. They also indicate that their findings show that internal innovation 
projects lead to greater firm performance than innovation projects with external partners. 
They further stress that their meta-analytical results indicate that the innovation projects 
that focus on external collaboration do not increase the performance of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). 
The study results, contrary to expectation, also show a weak correlation between external 
collaboration and health insurer product innovation. The results suggest that the perception 
of the importance of external collaboration as a driver for health insurer product innovation 
is weaker in the supply side structures than the demand side structures of the private 
healthcare value chain. However, both the supply and demand side structures have 
recognition for the fact that the restructuring of the relationship between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers is a necessary driver for external collaboration and health 
insurer product innovation progress and success. The study results also suggest that the 
weak correlation of the relationship between health insurer product innovation and external 
collaboration could be a result of industry dynamics. Christensen et al. (2009) also indicate 
through their ‗tools of cooperation‘ matrix, that healthcare is in the lower left world of 
disagreement, suggesting that actors in the healthcare value chain experience high levels 
of disagreement in terms of healthcare innovation and reform, impacting external 
collaboration and innovation negatively. 
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The study results show that the South African private healthcare regulatory framework for 
health insurers has low levels of strategic regulatory factors present, necessary for 
encouraging health insurer product innovation. This is an important finding in terms of 
contextualising the regulatory environment for health insurers in South Africa. These 
strategic factors include increased health insurance and access to health insurance by 
formally employed, uncovered employees; the review of standards for coverage by actors in 
the healthcare value chain to reduce waste and over-servicing of patients and; the structure 
of healthcare delivery to facilitate and ensure quality, efficiency and value for 
subscribers/patients. According to Porter and Teisberg (2006), the structure of healthcare 
delivery is viewed as a critical element in driving supply side value-based innovation in the 
healthcare value chain. 
The results further revealed, contrary to expectation, a negligible moderation effect for 
regulation on the relationship between health insurer product innovation (innovation 
generation and organisational competitiveness) and External Collaboration (T, RS,RI) and 
External Collaboration (RR). The researcher expected to find a negative moderation result 
as the literature indicates that the lack of business model innovation is due to regulators not 
permitting it (Christensen et al. 2009). 
This research study therefore highlights important issues impacting health insurer product 
innovation which could be explored further in light of ensuring the future viability of the 
private healthcare industry in South Africa. The provision of quality, cost effective and 
efficient healthcare delivery by both the private and public sectors in South Africa are 
important social delivery objectives and regulators need to focus more on fostering 
innovation activities in the healthcare value chain in order to achieve these objectives. 
5.3.1 Implications for theory development 
This research study contributes to theoretical development in a number of ways. The 
importance of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in organisational performance has been 
recognised in the literature and this study revealed that EO is critical to health insurer 
product innovation (innovation generation and organisational competitiveness) in the private 
healthcare industry in South Africa, and provides additional grounding for statements about 
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the strong positive effect of EO on organisational performance (Zahra and Covin 1995; 
Morris and Sexton 1996; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005;  Green, Covin and Slevin 2008). 
The addition of external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service 
providers in the researcher‘s conceptual model, as a predictor of health insurer product 
innovation, revealed that external collaboration between health insurers and healthcare 
service providers is a weak predictor of health insurer product innovation. The weak 
positive linear correlation results of research hypothesis 2 (the relationship between health 
insurer product innovation and external collaboration) could add to the theoretical view 
expressed by Christensen et al. (2009) that the level of disagreement between the demand 
and supply side structures in terms of healthcare innovation could be significant and 
therefore impedes healthcare innovation and reform. Furthermore, this study could also add 
to the findings by Rosenbusch et al. (2011) that innovation projects focusing on external 
collaboration do not increase the performance of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
Including regulation as a moderator in the researcher‘s conceptual model further revealed 
that low levels of strategic regulatory factors are present in healthcare regulation in South 
Africa. These low levels of strategic regulatory factors do not moderate the relationships 
between EO and health insurer product innovation and the relationship between external 
collaboration and health insurer product innovation. The literature expressed a contrarian 
view on the impact of regulation on innovation and collaboration and this finding could add 
to the competition and collaboration literature, especially for private healthcare industries. 
Christensen et al. (2009) indicates that the lack of business model innovation in the 
healthcare industry is a result of regulators not permitting it and according to Porter and 
Teisberg (2006) healthcare policy has been both a reflection and a contributor to the zero-
sum competition that plagues current inefficient healthcare systems. 
5.3.2 Implications for healthcare executives  
The findings of the study could have practical and policy implications. The practical 
implications for healthcare executives are; 1) to ensure that their organisations have the 
necessary internal innovation input capacity to drive innovation output and that 2) external 
collaboration between health insurers and healthcare service providers need to be focused 
on more actively by actors in the healthcare value chain. Both the supply and demand side 
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structures (subgroups identified for the purposes of this study) have indicated recognition 
for the fact that the restructuring of relationships between health insurers and healthcare 
service providers is a necessary driver for collaboration in terms of health insurer product 
innovation progress and success. This finding suggests that healthcare insurer executives 
should actively focus on the following initiatives as examples which could drive greater 
innovation activities between health insurers and healthcare service providers: 
 Assist healthcare service providers to have more up-to-date patient information 
 Reward healthcare service providers for improving results over time 
 Introduce simplified billing practices in terms of contractual arrangements between 
health insurers and healthcare service providers 
 Reduce administrative complexities by eliminating paperwork and transactions 
 Make new investments in technology and related infrastructure to facilitate 
collaboration practices  
The policy implications highlighted by this study relate to the perception of the low levels of 
strategic regulatory factors present in healthcare regulation in South Africa, necessary to 
drive health insurer product innovation. The strategic regulatory factors necessary to drive 
health insurer product innovation are: increased health insurance and access to health 
insurance; standards for coverage; and the structure of healthcare delivery (Porter and 
Teisberg 2006). Healthcare delivery is viewed as a critical component in terms of driving 
value-based competition and innovation in healthcare (Porter and Teisberg 2006). 
Healthcare executives need to work with, and actively lobby, regulators to investigate these 
aspects which could ignite both demand and supply side innovation activities in the 
healthcare value chain of the private healthcare industry of South Africa. 
5.4 Recommendations for future research 
The research study highlighted several areas in terms of future research. The construct 
validity of the measurement constructs used to measure the variables of the model, EO, 
external collaboration, regulation and health insurer product innovation were confirmed 
through CFA. Although, the model fit results indicated weak model fit, the measurement 
constructs used for this study formed a good foundation from which future research could 
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be explored and for further refinement of the measurement instruments focusing on the 
various constructs of the model.  
Future research could involve a larger sample of actors in the demand and supply side 
structures of the South African private healthcare value chain, focusing especially on supply 
side innovation and focusing on the structure of healthcare delivery.  External collaboration, 
especially in the healthcare environment in South Africa, needs to be explored further 
based on the weak results found in predicting health insurer product innovation in this 
specific study. External collaboration is viewed as a critical component in terms of supply 
side innovation in healthcare. According to Mintzberg (2011) healthcare actors need to build 
systems that both promote health and treat illness and to do that, more cooperation 
between healthcare actors are required, not more competition. Future research could focus 
on the relationship between market dynamism in the private healthcare industry in South 
Africa and external collaboration between the various actors in the private healthcare value 
chain. 
The impact of regulation on innovation progress in the private healthcare industry needs to 
be investigated further based on the results of this study, due to the importance of 
regulation balancing cooperation and competition in the healthcare value chain. The 
perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for encouraging health insurer product 
innovation should be explored further in terms of how this could impact innovation activities 
in the private healthcare industry of South Africa. 
Innovation generation and innovation adoption as two measurement constructs for health 
insurer product innovation need to be refined and explored further in terms of the private 
healthcare industry in South Africa, especially the level of health insurer product innovation, 
which could be classified as innovation adoption and innovation generation. This needs to 
be linked to health insurer product innovation performance which could provide a clearer 
differentiation between the two constructs and their respective relationships to health 
insurer product innovation. 
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APPENDIX A  
ACTUAL RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
 
1) Please select which industry sector you belong to, from the list below: 
O  Health insurer 
O Health insurer administrator 
O Health service provider 
 
1b)  Please indicate whether your organisation is a(n): 
O Restricted membership medical scheme 
O Open medical scheme 
 
1b)  Please select which area you work in, as a healthcare service provider, from the list 
below: 
O Hospital 
O Medical Specialist/Specialist representative body 
O General Practitioner/GP representative body 
 
SECTION A 
2)  How long has your organisation been in operation? 
O 0-3 years 
O 4-5 years 
O 6-10 years 
O 11-20 years 
O More than 20 years 
 
3)  How many staff does your organisation employ? (Please only include permanent 
staff in your selection choice) 
O Less than five permanent 
O 6-10 permanent staff 
O 11-50 permanent staff 
O 51-100 permanent staff 
O 101-200 permanent staff 
O More than 200 permanent staff 
 
4)  What is the size of your organisation in terms of membership base (i.e. average 
number of lives insured, lives under administration) for the current financial year? 
O Fewer than 1 000 
O 1 000 – 5 000 
O 5 001 – 10 000 
O 10 001 – 30 000 
O 30 001 – 60 000 
O 60 001 – 100 000 
O More than 100 000 
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5)  Does your organisation operate on a national level? 
  O Yes 
  O No 
 
5b)  In which province(s) does your organisation operate? 
O Eastern Cape 
O Free State 
O Gauteng 
O KwaZulu Natal 
O Limpopo Province 
O Mpumalanga 
O Northern Cape 
O North West Province 
O Western Cape 
 
ORGANISATIONAL COMPETITIVE CAPABILITY 
6) For each statement, please select how much you would agree or disagree with the 
statement in terms of your own organisation‘s competitive capabilities.  Please rate 
each statement on a 7-point agreement scale. 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Your organisation exploits entrepreneurial 
opportunities 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Your organisation has the capacity to 
innovate and sustain an economically 
viable industry position 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Your organisation uses entrepreneurial 
initiatives to explore new technologies or 
product-market domains 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Your organisation uses entrepreneurial 
initiatives to exploit existing technologies 
or product-market domains 
 
Your organisation is strategically 
positioned to improve the quality of 
healthcare delivery for members/patients 
in the healthcare industry 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο  
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Your organisation is able to change the 
structure of healthcare delivery in the 
private healthcare industry 
 
 
Ο 
 
Ο 
 
Ο 
 
Ο 
 
Ο 
 
Ο 
 
Ο 
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SECTION B- ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION (EO) 
 
For the following questions, please select a point on the spectrum identified by the 
statements on the left and the right, the best describes the perception you have of your 
origination: 
 
INNOVATIVENESS: 
7)  In general, the top management of your organisation/practice favour. 
 
O 1 A strong emphasis on the marketing of tried and true products or services. 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 A strong emphases on Research & Development leadership and innovations 
 
8)  During the past 3 years, the quantity of new products or services launched/marketed 
by your organisation/practice can best be described as: 
 
O 1 Few products or services 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Many products and services 
 
9)  Have the changes to products/services been of a minor nature or quite dramatic 
during the past 3 years? 
 
O 1 Changes in product or services have been mostly of a minor nature. 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Changes in product or services have usually been quite dramatic. 
 
PRO-ACTIVENESS: 
10)  ln dealing with its competitors, your organisation I practice: 
 
O 1 Typically responds to actions which competitors initiate 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Typically initiates actions to which competitors then respond. 
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11)  In dealing with its competitors, your organisation I practice: 
 
O 1 Is very seldom the first business to introduce new products or services, 
administrative techniques, operating technologies and so on. 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Is very often the first business to introduce new products or services, 
administrative techniques, operating technologies, and so on 
 
12) In dealing with its competitors, your organisation/practice: 
 
O 1 Typically seeks to avoid competitive clashes, preferring a ―live-and-let-
live‖ posture 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Typically adopts a very competitive, ―undo-the-competition‖ posture 
 
RISK-TAKING 
13) In general, the top management of your organisation/practice have:  
 
O 1 A strong appetite for low risk projects (with normal and certain rates of 
return). 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6  
O 7 A strong appetite for high-risk projects (with chances of very high returns) 
 
14) In general, the top managers of your organisation/practice believe that: 
 
O 1 Owing to the nature of the environment, it is best to explore it gradually 
via cautious, incremental behaviour: 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Owing to the nature of the environment, bold wide-ranging acts are 
necessary to achieve the organisation‘s objectives 
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15) When confronted with decision-making situations involving uncertainty, your 
organisation/practice 
 
O 1 Typically adopts a cautious ―wait and see‖ posture in order to minimize 
the probability of making costly decisions 
O 2 
O 3 
O 4 
O 5 
O 6 
O 7 Typically adopts a bold, aggressive posture in order to maximise the 
probability of exploiting potential opportunities. 
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SECTION C: EXTERNAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN HEALTH INSURERS (HIs) / 
HEALTH INSURER ADMINISTRATORS (HIAs) AND HEALTHCARE SERVICE 
PROVIDERS 
 
TRUSTWORTHINESS 
 
16) Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements, using the 7-point agreement scale as shown below: 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The top management of healthcare service 
providers/His/HIAs that your 
organisation/practice deals with, are credible 
individuals 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Your organisation/practice trusts the product 
innovation expertise of healthcare service 
providers/His/HIAs  
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Your  organisation/practice 
Can count on top management of healthcare 
service providers/His/HIAs to do what they 
say 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Healthcare service providers/His/HIAs have 
a positive attitude to collaborating with health 
insurers/health insurer administrators/health 
care service providers in terms of innovative 
products  
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Your organisation/practice has a good 
working relationship with healthcare service 
providers His/HIAs 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Interactions, between your 
organisation/practice and healthcare service 
providers His/HIAs are characterised by 
open communication of both parties. 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
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ROLE SPECIFICATION 
 
17) Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements, using the 7-point agreement scale as shown below: 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Health insurers /health insurer administrators 
and healthcare service providers negotiate to 
come to agreement on health insurer product 
design and contractual obligations 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Health insurers /health insurer administrators 
and healthcare service providers are mutually 
dependent on each other in caring for 
members / patient through  innovation health 
insurer product design 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Health insurers / health insurer administrators 
and healthcare service providers will work 
with each other to overcome disagreements 
on their roles in managing members / 
patients 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
In providing quality patient care and 
members benefits, health insurers /health 
insurer administrators need healthcare 
service providers as much as healthcare 
service providers need health insurers health 
insurer administrators. 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
In designing innovative health insurer 
products / services, health insurers/health 
insurer administrators depend on healthcare 
service providers as much as healthcare 
service providers depend on health 
insurers/health insurer administrators 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
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RELATIONSHIPSHIP INITIATION 
 
18) Please indicate, using a 7-point agreement scale, the extent to which you agree 
or disagree that healthcare service providers/health insurers (His) / health 
insurer administrators (HIAs): 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Spend sufficient time with health 
insurers/health insurer administrators/health 
care service providers trying to learn how 
they can assist in providing better 
care/patient benefits 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Show sufficient interest in improving 
healthcare efficiencies and quality of patient 
care/patient benefits 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
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THE RESTRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURER/HEALTH INSURER 
ADMINISTRATOR AND HEALTCARE SERVICE PROVIDER RELATIONSHIPSHIP 
 
19) Please indicate, using a 7-point agreement scale, the extent to which you agree 
or disagree those health insurers/health insurer administrators in South Africa 
should: 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Assist healthcare service providers 
involved in patient care to have up-to-
date patient information 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Reward healthcare  service providers for 
improving results over time 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Move to introduce simplified billing 
practices in terms of their contracting 
arrangements with healthcare service 
providers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Reduce  administrative complexity by 
simplifying, standardising and eliminating 
paperwork and transactions for 
healthcare service providers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Make new investments in technology and 
related infrastructure to facilitate 
collaboration with healthcare service 
providers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
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SECTION D: REGULATION 
 
ENCOURAGE COMPETITION IN THE HEALTHCARE VALUE CHAIN TO REDUCE 
PRICES 
 
20) Please indicate, using a 7-point agreements scale, the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with the following statements about the South African healthcare 
regulatory environment. 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
It encourages healthcare insurer/health 
insurer administrators to negotiate 
prices independently with health care 
providers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
        
It encourages reduced prices and 
increased efficiencies 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
It encourages contracting with only 
efficient and excellent healthcare 
service providers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
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IMPROVE HEALTH INSURANCE AND ACCESS TO PRIVATE HEALTHCARE  
 
21) Please indicate, using a 7-point agreement scale, the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements about the South African healthcare regulatory 
environment 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
It supports mandatory private 
healthcare coverage for all 
formally employed people to 
increase the privately insured 
population 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
It creates incentives for low-
income formally employed people 
to join private health insurers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
It enables health insurers to 
design and register affordable 
healthcare benefit plans 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
It creates risk pools for high risk 
individuals in order to spread the 
risk proportionally among all 
health insurers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
It allows health insurers to 
incentivise employer groups to 
improve employee health status 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
It allows health insurers to 
incentivise individual members to 
improve their health status 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
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IMPROVE STANDARDS FOR COVERAGE 
 
22) Please indicate, using a 7-point agreement scale, the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with the following statements about the South African healthcare 
regulatory environment. 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- Strongly 
Agree 
 
It reviews minimum coverage / 
benefit standards to update for 
evolving types of care  
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
It incentivises members of health 
insurers to participate in healthy 
living practices 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
It incentivises members of health 
insurers to comply with treatment 
protocols 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
It financially penalizes members of 
health insurers for not complying 
with treatment protocols 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
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IMPROVE THE STRUCTURE OF HEALTHCARE DELIVERY 
 
23) Please indicate, using 7-point agreement scale, the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements about the South Africa healthcare 
regulatory environment. 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
It establishes a process for ensuring that 
high quality information of provider 
outcomes for every medical condition is 
collected for the benefit of members of 
health insurers 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
It establishes a process whereby high 
quality information and provider outcomes 
are disseminated for the benefit of 
members of health insurers  
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
It provides incentives to healthcare service 
providers and health insurers/ health 
insurer administrators for the adoption of 
information technology 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
 
SECTION E:  HEALTH INSURER PRODUCT INNOVATION GENERATION AND 
ADOPTION 
 
INTERNAL INNOVATION INPUT 
 
24) Does your organisation/practice have an approved budget for Research and 
Development (R&D) activities? 
 
O Yes 
O No 
O Unsure 
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25) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The approved budget for R&D activities 
in your organisation/practice 
encourages innovation 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
26) Please indicate the staff complement of your organisation‘s R&D function: 
 
O No staff members 
O Fewer than 5 staff members 
O 5-10 staff members 
O more than 11 staff members 
 
INNOVATION OUTPUT 
 
27) How many healthcare products or services has your organisation/practice 
launched in the last three years that have been innovative for your organisation 
 
O 0 
O 1-2 
O 3-5 
O 6-10 
O More than 10 
 
28) How many healthcare products or services has your organisation/practice 
launched in the 1st three years that have been innovative for the healthcare 
industry in South Africa? 
 
O 0 
O 1-2 
O 3-5 
O 6-10 
O More than 10 
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29) Over the past three years, to what extent do you agree or disagree that your 
organisation/practice has (for healthcare service providers: in conjunction with 
health insurers/health insurer administrators and for health insurer 
administrators: in conjunction with health insurers). 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Adopting existing healthcare insurance 
products/plans for its members/patients 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Adapted existing healthcare insurance  
products /plans for its members/patients 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that are new to your 
organisation/practice 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have not yet been 
launched in the healthcare industry 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have not yet been 
launched elsewhere in the world  
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have been adopted 
subsequently by your competitors in the 
healthcare industry 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have made your 
organisation/practice more competitive 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have opened new 
opportunities in new markets 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have opened new 
opportunities in uncertain local markets 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
Generated new healthcare insurance 
products/plans that have opened new 
opportunities in uncertain international 
markets 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
201 
 
 1- 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2- 
Disagree 
3- 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
4- 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
5- 
Somewhat 
Agree 
6- 
Agree 
7- 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Improve the financial operating result of 
your organisation/practice through new 
health insurer product innovation. 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Created membership/client/ 
patient growth for your organisation 
/practice through new health insurer 
product innovation 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
 
Ο 
 
Improved your  organisation‘s / practice‘s 
position in the industry through new health 
insurer product innovation 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
 
 
Ο 
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APPENDIX B  
CONSISTENCY MATRIX 
Research problem 
In the context of healthcare inequalities and a struggling and underfunded public healthcare 
system in South Africa, the South African private healthcare industry is viewed as a national 
asset.  However, the South African private health insurance industry is a complex and 
heavily-regulated industry, with minimal growth in total lives covered, spiralling healthcare 
costs and coverage of only 16% of the South African population. There are approximately 
five-million formally employed uninsured people in South Africa and in order to grow and 
sustain the private healthcare industry, and lighten the population load of formally employed 
uninsured people on public healthcare delivery systems, the private healthcare industry 
needs new, attractive/innovative health insurer products/plans.  This could align the 
incentives of stakeholders (demand and supply side structures) in the private healthcare 
value chain, and thus could create the necessary access to private healthcare cover for the 
uninsured. 
Purpose of the research study 
The purpose of this research study is to investigate the relationship between the level of 
health insurer product innovation and entrepreneurial orientation (EO); the relationship 
between the level of health insurer product innovation and external collaboration between 
health insurers and healthcare service providers and; whether the low presence of 
perceived strategic regulatory factors, necessary for  encouraging health insurer product 
innovation in the private healthcare industry in South Africa, weakens the relationship 
between the level of new health insurer product innovation and EO, as well as the 
relationship between the level of new health insurer innovation and external collaboration 
between health insurers and healthcare service providers. 
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Research Hypotheses 
 
Research 
Questions 
 
Source of 
data 
 
Type 
of 
data 
 
Analysis 
Hypothesis 1:  
A positive correlation exists between the level of 
new product innovation by health insurers and 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO). 
Research question 1: 
Does firm entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) promote 
new product innovation 
by health insurers? 
 
 
Questionnaire 
– online survey 
Sections B, E 
 
 
Ordinal 
Interval 
 
Mean, Standard 
Deviation, EFA, 
CFA, Cluster 
analysis, 
Correlation 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis 
Hypothesis 2:   
A positive correlation exists between the level of 
new product innovation by health insurers and 
external collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers. 
 
Research question 2: 
Does external 
collaboration between 
health insurers and 
healthcare service 
providers promote new 
product innovation by 
health insurers? 
 
 
Questionnaire 
– online survey 
Sections C , E 
 
 
Ordinal 
Interval 
 
Mean, Standard 
Deviation, EFA, 
CFA, Cluster 
analysis, 
Correlation 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis 
Hypothesis 3:  
The relationship between the level of new product 
innovation by health insurers and entrepreneurial 
orientation (EO) is moderated by perceived 
strategic regulatory factors necessary for 
encouraging health insurer product innovation, 
such that the relationship is weaker where these 
strategic regulatory factors have lower presence 
and stronger where they have higher presence. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The relationship between the level of new product 
innovation by health insurers and external 
collaboration between health insurers and 
healthcare service providers is moderated by 
perceived strategic regulatory factors necessary for 
encouraging health insurer product innovation, 
such that this relationship is weaker where these 
strategic regulatory factors have lower presence 
and stronger where they have higher presence. 
Research question 3: 
Does the South African 
private healthcare 
regulatory environment 
impede new product 
innovation by health 
insurers? 
 
 
Questionnaire 
– online survey 
Section D 
 
 
Ordinal 
Interval 
 
Mean, Standard 
Deviation, EFA, 
CFA, Cluster 
analysis, 
Correlation 
analysis, 
Regression 
analysis 
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APPENDIX C 
Innovativeness Proactiveness Risk Taking
E2E1 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9E3
I1 I2 I7 I9I8I4 I5 I6I3
0.819 0.8230.8000.9130.8780.7910.884 0.913 0.928
 
The standard CFA model for EO is presented above. The model represents the hypothesis 
that indicators I1-I3 measure the factor/latent variable innovativeness, indicators I4-I6 
measure the factor/latent variable proativeness and indicators I7-I9 measure the 
factor/latent variable risk-taking. Each indicator is a continuous variable represented as 
having two causes, a single factor that the indicator is supposed to measure and all other 
unique sources of influence represented by the error term (Kline 2011). Each of the 
indicators has a measurement error term, such as E1 for indicator I1 – measurement errors 
are independent of each other and of the factors. The lines with single arrow heads that 
point from the factor (e.g. innovativeness) to the indicator represent the presumed causal 
effect of the factor on the observed scores. The associations between the factors are 
unanalysed, so it is assumed that the factors covary. 
The statistical estimates of these direct effects are called factor loadings and indicators 
assumed to be caused by underlying factors are referred to as reflective indicators (Kline 
2011). The factor loadings for the latent variable, innovativeness for example, is in the 
range ± 0.8 to ± 0.88. This is high and practically significant and is an indication that the 
factor account for more than 70% of the variance of the variable.  
205 
 
APPENDIX D 
List of registered private health insurers in South Africa 
Medical Scheme Name Registration Date Type 
AECI MEDICAL AID SOCIETY 11/02/1971 Restricted 
AFROX MEDICAL AID SOCIETY 05/12/1996 Restricted 
ALLIANCE MIDMED MEDICAL SCHEME 30/08/1976 Restricted 
ALTRON MEDICAL AID SCHEME 01/04/1987 Restricted 
ANGLO MEDICAL SCHEME 16/10/1968 Restricted 
ANGLOVAAL GROUP MEDICAL SCHEME 28/07/1997 Restricted 
BANKMED 29/06/1972 Restricted 
BARLOWORLD MEDICAL SCHEME 01/12/1980 Restricted 
BESTMED MEDICAL SCHEME 11/08/1971 Open 
BMW EMPLOYEES MEDICAL AID SOCIETY 13/01/1984 Restricted 
BONITAS MEDICAL FUND 01/03/1982 Open 
BP MEDICAL AID SOCIETY 20/02/1968 Restricted 
BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY MEDICAL AID FUND 02/08/2001 Restricted 
CAPE MEDICAL PLAN 11/11/1971 Open 
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS (SA) MEDICAL AID FUND (CAMAF) 08/06/1971 Restricted 
COMMUNITY MEDICAL AID SCHEME (COMMED) 26/01/1995 Open 
COMPCARE WELLNESS MEDICAL SCHEME 01/06/1978 Open 
DE BEERS BENEFIT SOCIETY 29/05/1969 Restricted 
DISCOVERY HEALTH MEDICAL SCHEME 08/10/1971 Open 
EDCON MEDICAL AID SCHEME 03/03/1978 Restricted 
ENGEN MEDICAL BENEFIT FUND 07/08/1997 Restricted 
EYETHUMED MEDICAL SCHEME 19/12/2000 Restricted 
FEDHEALTH MEDICAL SCHEME 26/11/1969 Open 
FISHING INDUSTRY MEDICAL SCHEME (FISH-MED) 20/10/1967 Restricted 
FOOD WORKERS MEDICAL BENEFIT FUND 20/10/1967 Restricted 
GENESIS MEDICAL SCHEME 25/05/1995 Open 
GOLD FIELDS MEDICAL SCHEME 15/01/1997 Restricted 
GOLDEN ARROWS EMPLOYEES MEDICAL BENEFIT FUND 30/06/1972 Restricted 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MEDICAL SCHEME (GEMS) 01/01/2005 Restricted 
GRINTEK ELECTRONICS MEDICAL AID SCHEME 09/12/1983 Restricted 
HORIZON MEDICAL SCHEME 11/09/1996 Restricted 
HOSMED MEDICAL AID SCHEME 01/09/1988 Open 
IBM (SA) MEDICAL SCHEME 12/02/1971 Restricted 
IMPALA MEDICAL PLAN 15/07/2002 Restricted 
IMPERIAL GROUP MEDICAL SCHEME 01/12/1995 Restricted 
KEYHEALTH 28/05/1968 Open 
LA-HEALTH MEDICAL SCHEME 10/01/1968 Restricted 
LIBCARE MEDICAL SCHEME 20/02/1969 Restricted 
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Medical Scheme Name Registration Date Type 
LIBERTY MEDICAL SCHEME 17/09/1998 Open 
LONMIN MEDICAL SCHEME 01/01/2006 Restricted 
MAKOTI MEDICAL SCHEME 07/09/1976 Open 
MALCOR MEDICAL SCHEME 18/05/1994 Restricted 
MASSMART HEALTH PLAN 20/10/1978 Restricted 
MBMED MEDICAL AID FUND 05/12/1969 Restricted 
MEDIHELP 23/06/1969 Open 
MEDIMED MEDICAL SCHEME 12/09/1980 Open 
MEDIPOS MEDICAL SCHEME 15/06/1994 Restricted 
MEDSHIELD MEDICAL SCHEME 06/02/1968 Open 
METROCARE  30/07/1987 Restricted 
METROPOLITAN MEDICAL SCHEME 28/10/1970 Restricted 
MINEMED MEDICAL SCHEME 18/02/1997 Restricted 
MOMENTUM HEALTH 06/05/1971 Open 
MOTOHEALTH CARE 01/10/2007 Restricted 
NAMPAK (SA) MEDICAL SCHEME 01/02/1971 Restricted 
NASPERS MEDICAL FUND 07/03/1972 Restricted 
NATIONAL INDEPENDENT MEDICAL AID SOCIETY (NIMAS) 27/01/1971 Open 
NEDGROUP MEDICAL AID SCHEME 24/12/1976 Restricted 
NETCARE MEDICAL SCHEME 19/12/2000 Restricted 
OLD MUTUAL STAFF MEDICAL AID FUND 13/02/1969 Restricted 
PARMED MEDICAL AID SCHEME 29/03/1974 Restricted 
PG BISON MEDICAL AID SOCIETY 04/01/1983 Restricted 
PG GROUP MEDICAL SCHEME 20/11/1970 Restricted 
PHAROS MEDICAL PLAN 02/02/1994 Open 
PICK N PAY MEDICAL SCHEME 09/05/1996 Restricted 
PLATINUM HEALTH 19/12/2000 Restricted 
PRO SANO MEDICAL SCHEME 17/05/1976 Open 
PROFMED 10/08/1969 Restricted 
QUANTUM MEDICAL AID SOCIETY 01/03/1983 Restricted 
RAND WATER MEDICAL SCHEME 24/10/1969 Restricted 
REMEDI MEDICAL AID SCHEME 18/09/1972 Restricted 
RESOLUTION HEALTH MEDICAL SCHEME 09/04/1998 Open 
RETAIL MEDICAL SCHEME 10/02/1970 Restricted 
RHODES UNIVERSITY MEDICAL SCHEME 15/12/1967 Restricted 
SABC MEDICAL AID SCHEME 23/06/1972 Restricted 
SAMWUMED 11/11/1968 Restricted 
SAPPI MEDICAL AID SCHEME 20/01/1985 Restricted 
SASOLMED 17/02/1971 Restricted 
SEDMED 19/02/1987 Restricted 
SELFMED MEDICAL SCHEME 19/11/1974 Open 
SIEMENS MEDICAL SCHEME 06/11/1968 Restricted 
SIZWE MEDICAL FUND 17/03/1978 Open 
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Medical Scheme Name Registration Date Type 
SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES MEDICAL SCHEME 01/09/1970 Restricted 
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE MEDICAL SCHEME (POLMED) 01/11/1999 Restricted 
SPECTRAMED 23/08/1971 Open 
SUREMED HEALTH 20/08/1976 Open 
TFG MEDICAL AID SCHEME 18/11/1998 Restricted 
THEBEMED 12/09/2002 Open 
TIGER BRANDS MEDICAL SCHEME 01/06/1993 Restricted 
TOPMED MEDICAL SCHEME 24/04/1972 Open 
TRANSMED MEDICAL FUND 22/11/2000 Restricted 
TSOGO SUN GROUP MEDICAL SCHEME 30/07/1999 Restricted 
UMVUZO HEALTH MEDICAL SCHEME 01/07/2004 Restricted 
UNIVERSITY OF KWA-ZULU NATAL MEDICAL SCHEME 01/07/1983 Restricted 
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND - JOHANNESBURG STAFF 
MEDICAL AID FUND 18/05/1971 Restricted 
WITBANK COALFIELDS MEDICAL AID SCHEME 30/04/1969 Restricted 
WOOLTRU HEALTHCARE FUND 12/12/1969 Restricted 
XSTRATA MEDICAL AID SCHEME 07/08/1968 Restricted 
Source: Council for Medical Schemes (2011) (http://medicalschemes.com) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
208 
 
APPENDIX E 
List of accredited health insurer administrators in South Africa 
Accredited Medical Scheme Administrators 
AGILITY GLOBAL HEALTH SOLUTIONS AFRICA (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 3) 
ALLCARE ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 2) 
CAPE MEDICAL PLAN (SELF-ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 50) 
DE BEERS BENEFIT SOCIETY (SELF-ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 57) 
DISCOVERY HEALTH (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 19) 
ETERNITY PRIVATE HEALTH FUND ADMINISTRATORS PTY LTD (ADMIN: 10) 
MEDIHELP MEDICAL SCHEME (SELF ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 46) 
MEDSCHEME HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 21) 
METROPOLITAN HEALTH CORPORATE (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 17) 
METROPOLITAN HEALTH PTY LTD (ADMIN: 18) 
MOMENTUM MEDICAL SCHEME ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 13) 
PLATINUM HEALTH (SELF ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 53) 
PRIVATE HEALTH ADMINISTRATORS (A DIVISION OF SWEIDAN TRUST (PTY) LTD) (ADMIN: 11) 
PRO SANO MEDICAL SCHEME (SELF-ADMINISTERED (ADMIN: 58) 
PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL SCHEME ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 37) 
PROVIDENCE HEALTHCARE RISK MANAGERS PTY LTD (ADMIN: 22) 
RAND WATER MEDICAL SCHEME (SELF-ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 56) 
SANLAM HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 47) 
SECHABA MEDICAL SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 8) 
THEBE YA BOPHELO HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 7) 
UMVUZO HEALTH MEDICAL SCHEME (SELF-ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 51) 
UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 5) 
V MED ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD (ADMIN: 45) 
WITBANK COALFIELDS MEDICAL AID SCHEME (RESTRICTED -SELF-ADMINISTERED) (ADMIN: 54) 
  
Source: Council for Medical Schemes (2011) (http://medicalschemes.com) 
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APPENDIX F 
List of private hospital groups 
Hospital Group Number of beds 
2007 
Number of beds 
2008 
Number of beds 
2009 
% share of 
total beds 
(2009) 
Netcare Holdings 
(listed company) 
7576 8177 8984 29% 
Mediclinic (listed 
company) 
6732 6685 7807 25% 
Life Healthcare (listed 
company 
6894 7142 7874 25% 
Clinix (unlisted 
company) 
657 1154 1290 4% 
Independent 
hospitals 
6567 7369 5450 17% 
Total private sector 
beds 
28426 30527 31405 100% 
Source: HASA (2012) (http://www.hasa.co.za/about/what/) 
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APPENDIX G 
List of general practitioner and specialist representative associations 
General Practitioners Association/society 
 IPA Foundation (http://www.ipafoundation.co.za) 
- SAMCC (www.samcc.co.za) 
- ASAIPA (www.asaipa.co.za) 
- SPNET (www.spnx.co.za) 
Specialists Association/society 
 Healthman (http://www.healthman.co.za) 
 SA Private Practitioners Forum 
(http://www.sappf.co.za) 
 NPG (National Pathology Group) 
(http://www.npg.co.za) 
 RADSOC (Radiological Society of South Africa) 
(http://www.rssa.co.za) 
 SAMA (South African Medical Association) 
(http://www.sama.co.za) 
 SPESNET (http:www.spesnet.co.za) 
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APPENDIX H 
Scheffe test p values of pairwise cluster mean comparisons on Innovation 
generation and organisational competitiveness 
Scheffe Test p values; Variable: Innovation generation 
 
 Mean Generation 
Innovation input level High input=5.12 Medium input=3.85 Low input=3.05 
High input 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Medium input 0.0000 
 
0.0186 
Low input 0.0000 0.0186 
 
 
Scheffe Test p values; Variable: Organisational competitiveness 
 
 Mean Organisational competitiveness 
Innovation input level High input=5.85 Medium input=4.28 Low input=3.40 
High input 
 
0.0000 0.0000 
Medium input 0.0000 
 
0.0186 
Low input 0.0000 0.0186 
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APPENDIX I 
T-test results: To test for the difference between Health insurer and health insurer 
administrator means 
T-tests; Grouping: Industry sector  Group 1: HI Group 2: HIA .2/.5/.8
VARIABLES Mean - HI Mean - HIA t-value df p Valid N - HI
Valid N - 
HIA Std.Dev. - HI Std.Dev. - HIA
F-ratio - 
Variances
p - 
Variances
Effect size 
d
EO 4.22 4.76 -1.82885 115 0.070013 34 83 1.39 1.46 1.11325 0.747546 0.3723817
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 4.72 4.84 -0.67678 115 0.499906 34 83 0.77 0.89 1.310938 0.387452 0.1378872
External Collaboration (RR) 5.96 5.90 0.24503 115 0.806867 34 83 1.17 1.04 1.267349 0.387958 0.0499502
cub External Collaboration (RR) 232.84 223.01 0.51965 115 0.60431 34 83 99.63 90.12 1.222125 0.46193 0.1058092
Regulation 3.06 3.54 -1.74092 115 0.084372 34 83 1.43 1.30 1.223925 0.458795 0.3545217
Adoption 4.87 4.99 -0.4953 115 0.621333 34 83 1.06 1.24 1.370058 0.313368 0.1009316
Generation 3.61 4.71 -3.93642 115 0.000142 34 83 1.47 1.32 1.244058 0.424817 0.8015402
Organisational competitiveness 4.68 5.12 -1.47509 115 0.142921 34 83 1.52 1.47 1.06533 0.796005 0.3003374
 
Mann-Whitney U test (Health insurers vs. health insurer administrators) 
Mann-Whitney U Test By variable Industry sector Marked tests are significant at p <.05000
VARIABLES
Rank 
Sum - HI
Rank 
Sum - 
HIA U Z p-value
Z - 
adjusted p-value
Valid N - 
HI
Valid N - 
HIA
2*1sided - 
exact p
EO 1700.5 5202.5 1105.5 -1.83093 0.067112 -1.83137 0.067046 34 83 0.066499
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 1928.5 4974.5 1333.5 -0.46223 0.643914 -0.46226 0.643896 34 83 0.643298
External Collaboration (RR) 2123.5 4779.5 1293.5 0.70236 0.482458 0.70627 0.480022 34 83 0.482411
cub External Collaboration (RR) 2123.5 4779.5 1293.5 0.70236 0.482458 0.70627 0.480022 34 83 0.482411
Regulation 1689.5 5213.5 1094.5 -1.89696 0.057834 -1.89705 0.057823 34 83 0.057182
Adoption 1839.5 5063.5 1244.5 -0.9965 0.319006 -1.00987 0.312557 34 83 0.319163
Generation 1400 5503 805 -3.63484 0.000278 -3.6369 0.000276 34 83 0.000214
Organisational competitiveness 1758.5 5144.5 1163.5 -1.48275 0.138142 -1.48683 0.137061 34 83 0.137868
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Difference in means of variables for subgroups (health insurers/health insurer 
administrators (combined) and healthcare service providers) 
Variables
Mean HIA & HI Mean Providers t-value df p Valid N Valid N Std.Dev. Std.Dev. F-ratio p Effect size 
d
EO 4.60 3.93 2.020 137 0.0453 117 22 1.4577 1.2583 1.3420 0.4440 0.4695
External Collaboration (T,RS,RI) 4.80 3.84 4.639 137 0.0000 117 22 0.8530 1.0629 1.5525 0.1473 1.0781
External Collaboration (RR) 5.92 5.33 2.171 137 0.0317 117 22 1.0727 1.6208 2.2829 0.0058 0.5045
Regulation 3.40 3.20 0.687 137 0.4933 117 22 1.3478 0.8077 2.7845 0.0088 0.1596
Innovation Adoption (DV) 4.95 3.75 4.244 137 0.0000 117 22 1.1890 1.3780 1.3431 0.3257 0.9862
Innovation Generation (DV) 4.39 3.11 3.884 137 0.0002 117 22 1.4499 1.2320 1.3850 0.3940 0.9025
Organisational competitiveness (DV) 4.99 3.38 4.558 137 0.0000 117 22 1.4958 1.6951 1.2842 0.4002 1.0592
ORG COMPETITIVE CAPABILITY 5.90 5.27 2.557 137 0.0117 117 22 0.9586 1.5203 2.5150 0.0019 0.5942
Innovativeness 4.51 3.68 2.339 137 0.0208 117 22 1.5466 1.3896 1.2387 0.5881 0.5436
Proactiveness 4.82 4.32 1.351 137 0.1789 117 22 1.6280 1.3666 1.4192 0.3579 0.3140
Risk taking 4.47 3.79 1.981 137 0.0496 117 22 1.4786 1.5415 1.0868 0.7435 0.4603
Trustworthiness 5.23 4.17 5.005 137 0.0000 117 22 0.8396 1.2462 2.2032 0.0084 1.1631
Role specification 5.28 4.55 3.489 137 0.0007 117 22 0.8456 1.1665 1.9029 0.0333 0.8107
Relationship initiation 3.90 2.82 2.995 137 0.0033 117 22 1.5613 1.4924 1.0945 0.8515 0.6959
Restructure of relationships 5.92 5.33 2.171 137 0.0317 117 22 1.0727 1.6208 2.2829 0.0058 0.5045
Encourage competition 3.93 3.41 1.375 137 0.1713 117 22 1.6611 1.3837 1.4412 0.3365 0.3196
Improve HI & A 3.30 3.46 -0.472 137 0.6380 117 22 1.5646 1.1918 1.7233 0.1506 0.1096
Improve standards for coverage 3.36 3.31 0.172 137 0.8641 117 22 1.3757 1.1545 1.4199 0.3573 0.0399
Improve structure of healthcare delivery 3.02 2.61 1.144 136 0.2545 116 22 1.6346 1.1252 2.1105 0.0509 0.2661
Variables
Mean HIA & HI Mean Providers t-value df p Valid N Valid N Std.Dev. Std.Dev. F-ratio p Effect size 
d
ORG COMPETITIVE CAPABILITY 5.90 5.27 2.557 137 0.0117 117 22 0.9586 1.5203 2.5150 0.0019 0.5942
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
